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Chapter 4

Supply Contracts

4.1 Introduction

- Significant level of outsourcing
- Many leading brand OEMs outsource complete manufacturing and design of their products
- More outsourcing has meant
 - Search for lower cost manufacturers
 - Development of design and manufacturing expertise by suppliers
- Procurement function in OEMs becomes very important
- OEMs have to get into contracts with suppliers
 - For both strategic and non-strategic components

4.2 Strategic Components

Supply Contract can include the following:

- Pricing and volume discounts.
- Minimum and maximum purchase quantities.
- Delivery lead times.
- Product or material quality.
- Product return policies.

2-Stage Sequential Supply Chain

- A buyer and a supplier.
- Buyer's activities:
 - generating a forecast
 - determining how many units to order from the supplier
 - placing an order to the supplier so as to optimize his own profit
 - Purchase based on forecast of customer demand
- Supplier's activities:
 - reacting to the order placed by the buyer.
 - Make-To-Order (MTO) policy

Swimsuit Example

- 2 Stages:
 - a retailer who faces customer demand
 - a manufacturer who produces and sells swimsuits to the retailer.
- Retailer Information:
 - Summer season sale price of a swimsuit is \$125 per unit.
 - Wholesale price paid by retailer to manufacturer is \$80 per unit.
 - Salvage value after the summer season is \$20 per unit.
- Manufacturer information:
 - Fixed production cost is \$100,000
 - Variable production cost is \$35 per unit

What Is the Optimal Order Quantity?

- Retailer marginal profit is the same as the marginal profit of the manufacturer, \$45.
- Retailer's marginal profit for selling a unit during the season, \$45, is smaller than the marginal loss, \$60, associated with each unit sold at the end of the season to discount stores.
- Optimal order quantity depends on marginal profit and marginal loss but not on the fixed cost.
- Retailer optimal policy is to order 12,000 units for an average profit of \$470,700.
- If the retailer places this order, the manufacturer's profit is $12,000(80 - 35) - 100,000 = \$440,000$

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Sequential Supply Chain




FIGURE 4-1: Optimized safety stock

Risk Sharing

- In the sequential supply chain:
 - Buyer assumes all of the risk of having more inventory than sales
 - Buyer limits his order quantity because of the huge financial risk.
 - Supplier takes no risk.
 - Supplier would like the buyer to order as much as possible
 - **Since the buyer limits his order quantity, there is a significant increase in the likelihood of out of stock.**
- If the supplier shares some of the risk with the buyer
 - it may be profitable for buyer to order more
 - reducing out of stock probability
 - increasing profit for both the supplier and the buyer.
- Supply contracts enable this risk sharing

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Buy-Back Contract

- Seller agrees to buy back unsold goods from the buyer for some agreed-upon price.
- Buyer has incentive to order more
- Supplier's risk clearly increases.
- Increase in buyer's order quantity
 - Decreases the likelihood of out of stock
 - Compensates the supplier for the higher risk

Buy-Back Contract Swimsuit Example

- Assume the manufacturer offers to buy unsold swimsuits from the retailer for \$55.
- Retailer has an incentive to increase its order quantity to 14,000 units, for a profit of \$513,800, while the manufacturer's average profit increases to \$471,900.
- Total average profit for the two parties = \$985,700 (= \$513,800 + \$471,900)
- Compare to sequential supply chain when total profit = \$910,700 (= \$470,700 + \$440,000)

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Buy-Back Contract Swimsuit Example




FIGURE 4-2: Buy-back contract

Revenue Sharing Contract

- Buyer shares some of its revenue with the supplier
 - in return for a discount on the wholesale price.
- Buyer transfers a portion of the revenue from each unit sold back to the supplier

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Revenue Sharing Contract Swimsuit Example

- Manufacturer agrees to decrease the wholesale price from \$80 to \$60
- In return, the retailer provides 15 percent of the product revenue to the manufacturer.
- Retailer has an incentive to increase his order quantity to 14,000 for a profit of \$504,325
- This order increase leads to increased manufacturer's profit of \$481,375
- Supply chain total profit
= \$985,700 (= \$504,325+\$481,375).

Revenue Sharing Contract Swimsuit Example




FIGURE 4-3: Revenue-sharing contract

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Other Types of Contracts

- **Quantity-Flexibility Contracts**
 - Supplier provides full refund for returned (unsold) items
 - As long as the number of returns is no larger than a certain quantity.
- **Sales Rebate Contracts**
 - Provides a direct incentive to the retailer to increase sales by means of a rebate paid by the supplier for any item sold above a certain quantity.

Global Optimization Strategy

- What is the best strategy for the entire supply chain?
- Treat both supplier and retailer as one entity
- Transfer of money between the parties is ignored

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Global Optimization Swimsuit Example

- Relevant data
 - Selling price, \$125
 - Salvage value, \$20
 - Variable production costs, \$35
 - Fixed production cost.
- Supply chain marginal profit, 90 = 125 - 35
- Supply chain marginal loss, 15 = 35 - 20
- Supply chain will produce more than average demand.
- Optimal production quantity = 16,000 units
- Expected supply chain profit = \$1,014,500.

Global Optimization Swimsuit Example





FIGURE 4-4: Profit using global optimization strategy

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Global Optimization and Supply Contracts


- Unbiased decision maker unrealistic
 - Requires the firm to surrender decision-making power to an unbiased decision maker
- Carefully designed supply contracts can achieve as much as global optimization
- Global optimization does not provide a mechanism to allocate supply chain profit between the partners.
 - Supply contracts allocate this profit among supply chain members.
- Effective supply contracts allocate profit to each partner in a way that no partner can improve his profit by deciding to deviate from the optimal set of decisions.



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Implementation Drawbacks of Supply Contracts


- **Buy-back contracts**
 - Require suppliers to have an effective reverse logistics system and may increase logistics costs.
 - Retailers have an incentive to push the products not under the buy back contract.
 - Retailer's risk is much higher for the products not under the buy back contract.
- **Revenue sharing contracts**
 - Require suppliers to monitor the buyer's revenue and thus increases administrative cost.
 - Buyers have an incentive to push competing products with higher profit margins.
 - Similar products from competing suppliers with whom the buyer has no revenue sharing agreement.



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4.3 Contracts for Make-to-Stock/Make-to-Order Supply Chains

- Previous contracts examples were with Make-to-Order supply chains
- What happens when the supplier has a Make-to-Stock situation?




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Supply Chain for Fashion Products Ski-Jackets

Manufacturer produces ski-jackets prior to receiving distributor orders


- Season starts in September and ends by December.
- Production starts 12 months before the selling season
- Distributor places orders with the manufacturer six months later.
- At that time, production is complete; distributor receives firms orders from retailers.
- The distributor sales ski-jackets to retailers for \$125 per unit.
- The distributor pays the manufacturer \$80 per unit.
- For the manufacturer, we have the following information:
 - Fixed production cost = \$100,000.
 - The variable production cost per unit = \$55
 - Salvage value for any ski-jacket not purchased by the distributors= \$20.



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Profit and Loss

- For the manufacturer
 - Marginal profit = \$25
 - Marginal loss = \$60.
 - Since marginal loss is greater than marginal profit, the distributor should produce less than average demand, i.e., less than 13,000 units.
- How much should the manufacturer produce?
 - Manufacturer optimal policy = 12,000 units
 - Average profit = \$160,400.
 - Distributor average profit = \$510,300.
- Manufacturer assumes all the risk limiting its production quantity
- Distributor takes no risk



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Make-to-Stock Ski Jackets





FIGURE 4-5: Manufacturer's expected profit

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Pay-Back Contract


- Buyer agrees to pay some agreed-upon price for any unit produced by the manufacturer but not purchased.
- Manufacturer incentive to produce more units
- Buyer's risk clearly increases.
- Increase in production quantities has to compensate the distributor for the increase in risk.



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Pay-Back Contract Ski Jacket Example

- Assume the distributor offers to pay \$18 for each unit produced by the manufacturer but not purchased.
- Manufacturer marginal loss = $55 - 20 - 18 = \$17$
- Manufacturer marginal profit = \$25.
- Manufacturer has an incentive to produce more than average demand.
- Manufacturer increases production quantity to 14,000 units
- Manufacturer profit = \$180,280
- Distributor profit increases to \$525,420.
 - Total profit = \$705,400
- Compare to total profit in sequential supply chain = \$670,000 (= \$160,400 + \$510,300)



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Pay-Back Contract Ski Jacket Example




FIGURE 4-6: Manufacturer's average profit (pay-back contract)

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Pay-Back Contract Ski Jacket Example (cont)





FIGURE 4-7: Distributor's average profit (pay-back contract)

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Cost-Sharing Contract


- Buyer shares some of the production cost with the manufacturer, in return for a discount on the wholesale price.
- Reduces effective production cost for the manufacturer
- Incentive to produce more units



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Cost-Sharing Contract Ski-Jacket Example

- Manufacturer agrees to decrease the wholesale price from \$80 to \$62
- In return, distributor pays 33% of the manufacturer production cost
- Manufacturer increases production quantity to 14,000
- Manufacturer profit = \$182,380
- Distributor profit = \$523,320
- The supply chain total profit = \$705,700
- **Same as the profit under pay-back contracts**



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Cost-Sharing Contract Ski-Jacket Example




FIGURE 4-8: Manufacturer's average profit (cost-sharing contract)

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Cost-Sharing Contract Ski-Jacket Example (cont)





FIGURE 4-9: Distributor's average profit (cost-sharing contract)

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Implementation Issues


- Cost-sharing contract requires manufacturer to share production cost information with distributor
- Agreement between the two parties:
 - Distributor purchases one or more components that the manufacturer needs.
 - Components remain on the distributor books but are shipped to the manufacturer facility for the production of the finished good.



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Global Optimization

- Relevant data:
 - Selling price, \$125
 - Salvage value, \$20
 - Variable production costs, \$55
 - Fixed production cost.
 - Cost that the distributor pays the manufacturer is meaningless
 - Supply chain marginal profit, $70 = 125 - 55$
 - Supply chain marginal loss, $35 = 55 - 20$
 - Supply chain will produce more than average demand.
 - Optimal production quantity = 14,000 units
 - Expected supply chain profit = \$705,700
- Same profit as under pay-back and cost sharing contracts**



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Global Optimization





FIGURE 4-10: Global optimization

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4.4 Contracts with Asymmetric Information

- Implicit assumption so far: Buyer and supplier share the same forecast
- Inflated forecasts from buyers a reality
- How to design contracts such that the information shared is credible?



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Two Possible Contracts

- Capacity Reservation Contract
 - Buyer pays to reserve a certain level of capacity at the supplier
 - A menu of prices for different capacity reservations provided by supplier
 - Buyer signals true forecast by reserving a specific capacity level
- Advance Purchase Contract
 - Supplier charges special price before building capacity
 - When demand is realized, price charged is different
 - Buyer's commitment to paying the special price reveals the buyer's true forecast

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4.5 Contracts for Non-Strategic Components

- Variety of suppliers
- Market conditions dictate price
- Buyers need to be able to choose suppliers and change them as needed
- Long-term contracts have been the tradition
- Recent trend towards more flexible contracts
 - Offers buyers option of buying later at a different price than current
 - Offers effective hedging strategies against shortages

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Long-Term Contracts

- Also called *forward or fixed commitment contracts*
- Contracts specify a fixed amount of supply to be delivered at some point in the future
- Supplier and buyer agree on both price and quantity
- Buyer bears no financial risk
- Buyer takes huge inventory risks due to:
 - uncertainty in demand
 - inability to adjust order quantities.

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Flexible or Option Contracts

- Buyer pre-pays a relatively small fraction of the product price up-front
- Supplier commits to reserve capacity up to a certain level.
- Initial payment is the *reservation price* or *premium*.
- If buyer does not *exercise* option, the initial payment is lost.
- Buyer can purchase any amount of supply up to the option level by:
 - paying an additional price (*execution price* or *exercise price*)
 - agreed to at the time the contract is signed
 - Total price (reservation plus execution price) typically higher than the unit price in a long-term contract.

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Flexible or Option Contracts

- Provide buyer with flexibility to adjust order quantities depending on realized demand
- Reduces buyer's inventory risks.
- Shifts risks from buyer to supplier
 - Supplier is now exposed to customer demand uncertainty.
- Flexibility contracts
 - Related strategy to share risks between suppliers and buyers
 - A fixed amount of supply is determined when the contract is signed
 - Amount to be delivered (and paid for) can differ by no more than a given percentage determined upon signing the contract.

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Spot Purchase

- Buyers look for additional supply in the open market.
- May use independent e-markets or private e-markets to select suppliers.
- Focus:
 - Using the marketplace to find new suppliers
 - Forcing competition to reduce product price.

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Portfolio Contracts

- Portfolio approach to supply contracts
- Buyer signs multiple contracts at the same time
 - optimize expected profit
 - reduce risk.
- Contracts
 - differ in price and level of flexibility
 - hedge against inventory, shortage and spot price risk.
- Meaningful for commodity products
 - a large pool of suppliers
 - each with a different type of contract.

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Appropriate Mix of Contracts

- How much to commit to a long-term contract?
 - **Base commitment** level.
- How much capacity to buy from companies selling option contracts?
 - **Option** level.
- How much supply should be left uncommitted?
 - Additional supplies in spot market if demand is high
- Hewlett-Packard's (HP) strategy for electricity or memory products
 - About 50% procurement cost invested in long-term contracts
 - 35% in option contracts
 - Remaining is invested in the spot market.

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Risk Trade-Off in Portfolio Contracts

- If demand is much higher than anticipated
 - Base commitment level + option level < Demand,
 - Firm must use spot market for additional supply.
 - Typically the worst time to buy in the spot market
 - Prices are high due to shortages.
- Buyer can select a trade-off level between price risk, shortage risk, and inventory risk by carefully selecting the level of long-term commitment and the option level.
 - For the same option level, the higher the initial contract commitment, the smaller the price risk but the higher the inventory risk taken by the buyer.
 - The smaller the level of the base commitment, the higher the price and shortage risks due to the likelihood of using the spot market.
 - For the same level of base commitment, the higher the option level, the higher the risk assumed by the supplier since the buyer may exercise only a small fraction of the option level.

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Risk Trade-Off in Portfolio Contracts

| | | | |
|--------------|------|----------------------------------|------------------------|
| | | Low | High |
| | | Base commitment level | |
| Option level | High | Inventory risk (supplier) | N/A* |
| | Low | Price and shortage risks (buyer) | Inventory risk (buyer) |

*For a given situation, either the option level or the base commitment level may be high, but not both.

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CASE: H. C. Starck, Inc.



- Background and context
- Why are lead times long?
- How might they be reduced?
- What are the costs? benefits?

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Metallurgical Products

- Make-to-order job shop operation
- 600 sku's made from 4" sheet bar (4 alloys)
- Goal to reduce 7-week customer lead times
- Expediting is ad hoc scheduling rule
- Six months of inventory
- Manufacturing cycle time is 2 – 3 weeks
- Limited data

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Why Is Customer Lead Time 7 Weeks?

- From sales order to process order takes 2 weeks
- Typical order requires multiple process orders, each 2 – 3 weeks
- Expediting as scheduling rule
- Self fulfilling prophecy?

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What Are Benefits from Reducing Lead Time?

- New accounts and new business
- Protect current business from switching to substitutes or Chinese competitor
- Possibly less inventory
- Better planning and better customer service
- Savings captured by customers?

How Might Starck Reduce Customer Lead Times?

- Hold intermediate inventory
 - How would this help?
 - How much? Where?
- Eliminate paper-work delays
- Reduce cycle time for each process order
 - How? What cost?

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Two-Product Optimal Cycle Time

$$Cost(T) = \frac{K_B + K_F}{T} + T \left(\frac{h_B D_B}{2} + \frac{h_F D_F}{2} \right)$$

$$T^* = \sqrt{\frac{2(K_B + K_F)}{h_B D_B + h_F D_F}}$$

$$T^* = \sqrt{\frac{2(400 + 400)}{.06 \times 100 \times 526000 + .06 \times 125 \times 183000}} = 0.02 \text{ years}$$

Intermediate Inventory

- Characterize demand by possible intermediate for each of two alloys
- Pick stocking points based on risk pooling benefits, lead time reduction, volume
- Determine inventory requirements based on inventory model, e. g. base stock

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| Popularity Rank | Material | Gauge | Description | 1999 Invoiced Sales - Pounds per month | | | | | | | | | | Total | Cum% |
|-----------------|----------|-------|-----------------------------|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|-----|-------|-------|-------|------|
| | | | | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | | | |
| 1 | 1011 | 0.002 | Foil | 618 | 1,075 | 1,215 | 1,188 | 1,020 | 290 | 1,550 | 849 | 1,017 | 8,896 | 22% | |
| 2 | 1004 | 0.015 | Sheet | 68 | 611 | 1,263 | 1,617 | 1,917 | 803 | 321 | 377 | 404 | 5,931 | 37% | |
| 3 | 1003 | 0.005 | Sheet | 263 | 576 | 584 | 812 | 617 | 965 | 572 | 268 | 5,661 | 50% | | |
| 4 | 1029 | 0.500 | Disk - 10" dia | 275 | 0 | 353 | 0 | 581 | 0 | 330 | 414 | 1,017 | 3,173 | 38% | |
| 5 | 1009 | 0.030 | Sheet | 0 | 122 | 614 | 275 | 422 | 360 | 686 | 246 | 177 | 2,502 | 65% | |
| 6 | 1008 | 0.040 | Sheet | 321 | 101 | 191 | 486 | 8 | 98 | 263 | 176 | 690 | 2,334 | 71% | |
| 7 | 1022 | 0.010 | Sheet | 20 | 56 | 287 | 173 | 41 | 204 | 560 | 143 | 276 | 1,768 | 76% | |
| 8 | 1014 | 0.250 | Plate | 6 | 12 | 0 | 770 | 0 | 0 | 752 | 0 | 0 | 1,714 | 80% | |
| 9 | 1007 | 0.060 | Plate | 0 | 146 | 32 | 117 | 129 | 414 | 581 | 26 | 191 | 1,636 | 84% | |
| 10 | 1012 | 0.125 | Plate | 229 | 8 | 32 | 90 | 432 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 451 | 1,255 | 97% | |
| 11 | 1013 | 0.150 | Plate | 1,103 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,103 | 30% | |
| 12 | 1028 | 0.500 | Ring - 10" OD x 8.5" ID | 0 | 189 | 0 | 48 | 259 | 93 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 174 | 73% | |
| 13 | 1010 | 0.020 | Sheet | 0 | 54 | 102 | 183 | 45 | 54 | 123 | 92 | 119 | 775 | 94% | |
| 14 | 1017 | 0.750 | Tube - 3/4" | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 12 | 558 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 50% | |
| 15 | 1015 | 0.375 | Plate | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 375 | 0 | 0 | 375 | 98% |
| 16 | 1018 | 0.015 | Tube - 1.0" OD | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 230 | 0 | 41 | 0 | 279 | 97% | |
| 17 | 1001 | 0.005 | Sheet - 1.0' x 23.75' | 171 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 171 | 23% | |
| 18 | 1016 | 0.500 | Tube - 0.50" CD | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51 | 6 | 54 | 33 | 27 | 33 | 207 | 98% |
| 19 | 1023 | 0.010 | Sheet - 1.0' x 23.75' | 0 | 99 | 14 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 131 | 98% | |
| 20 | 1027 | 0.015 | Sputer Target - 2.0' x 5.0' | 0 | 105 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 105 | 98% | |
| Other | - | - | - 17 Other Items | 217 | 38 | 57 | 86 | 100 | 41 | 52 | 43 | 35 | 666 | 100% | |
| | | | | 40,513 | | | | | | | | | | | |


Alloy 1

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| Sales Rank | Material | Gauge | Description | 1999 Invoiced Sales - Pounds per month | | | | | | | | | | Total | Cum% |
|------------|----------|-------|----------------------------|--|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|--------|-------|------|
| | | | | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | | | |
| 1 | 2001 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 75" CD | 288 | 898 | 2,988 | 3,698 | 2,468 | 888 | 657 | 528 | 1,382 | 11,622 | 27% | |
| 2 | 2031 | 0.020 | Sheet Annealed | 761 | 521 | 838 | 671 | 889 | 1,004 | 3,975 | 27 | 7 | 8,681 | 48% | |
| 3 | 2035 | 0.020 | Sheet Annealed | 1,638 | 116 | 1,138 | 634 | 528 | 576 | 1,672 | 703 | 517 | 7,520 | 65% | |
| 4 | 2041 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 75" CD | 0 | 51 | 395 | 3 | 378 | 0 | 2,894 | 0 | 0 | 3,668 | 74% | |
| 5 | 2043 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 483 | 444 | 0 | 77 | 116 | 361 | 1,421 | 77% | |
| 6 | 2027 | 0.020 | Plate Annealed | 0 | 0 | 0 | 277 | 322 | 63 | 0 | 0 | 104 | 12 | 202 | 13% |
| 7 | 2002 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1" CD With Cap | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,003 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,003 | 83% | |
| 8 | 2029 | 0.015 | Sheet Annealed | 137 | 122 | 431 | 18 | 37 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 338 | 5 | 1,133 | 88% |
| 9 | 2025 | 0.010 | Sheet Annealed | 0 | 0 | 424 | 0 | 251 | 412 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,087 | 88% | |
| 10 | 2051 | 0.022 | Welded Tube 1.25" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,044 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,044 | 91% | |
| 11 | 2036 | 0.012 | Foil Annealed | 551 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 551 | 92% | |
| 12 | 2034 | 0.125 | Plate Annealed | 0 | 36 | 78 | 63 | 34 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 238 | 0 | 418 | 93% |
| 13 | 2045 | 0.030 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 370 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 41 | 41% | |
| 14 | 2044 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 241 | 108 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 385 | 95% |
| 15 | 2047 | 0.030 | Welded Tube 1.50" CD | 0 | 0 | 255 | 143 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 398 | 95% |
| 16 | 2039 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 5/8" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 181 | 142 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 323 | 96% |
| 17 | 2052 | 0.026 | Tube 1.25" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 302 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 302 | 97% |
| 18 | 2038 | 0.015 | Sheet Annealed | 108 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 56 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 202 | 97% |
| 19 | 2046 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1.5" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 44 | 17% |
| 20 | 2022 | 0.016 | 4" Repair Disk | 0 | 8 | 8 | 14 | 0 | 84 | 7 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 137 | 98% |
| Other | - | - | - 36 Other Items | 77 | 118 | 64 | 67 | 113 | 133 | 44 | 24 | 117 | 75 | 1,072 | 100% |
| | | | | 42,708 | | | | | | | | | | | |


Alloy 2

4-56



Alloy 1

4-59



Alloy 2

4-58

| Sales Rank | Material | Gauge | Description | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Total (Pounds) | Monthly Average | Standard Deviation | % RSD | |
|-----------------------------|----------|-------|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------|------|
| From 0.030" Sheet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 1011 | 0.002 | Foil | 618 | 1,075 | 1,215 | 1,188 | 1,020 | 290 | 1,550 | 849 | 1,017 | 8,896 | 988 | 372 | 98% | |
| 3 | 1003 | 0.005 | Sheet | 263 | 576 | 584 | 812 | 617 | 969 | 572 | 399 | 909 | 5,661 | 629 | 235 | 37% | |
| 7 | 1002 | 0.010 | Sheet | 20 | 56 | 287 | 173 | 41 | 204 | 560 | 143 | 276 | 1,768 | 196 | 188 | 169% | |
| 13 | 1023 | 0.010 | Sheet - 1.0' x 23.75' | 0 | 99 | 14 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 131 | 15 | 32 | 223% | |
| 17 | 1001 | 0.005 | Sheet - 1.0' x 23.75' | 171 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 171 | 23 | 36 | 243% | |
| Monthly Subtotal | | | | 1,072 | 1,812 | 2,105 | 2,217 | 1,679 | 1,462 | 2,722 | 1,368 | 2,222 | 2,022 | 15,403 | 2,053 | 569 | 28% |
| 90% Input Required at Yield | | | | 1,191 | 2,011 | 2,333 | 2,463 | 1,854 | 1,626 | 3,024 | 1,520 | 2,447 | 18,400 | 2,053 | 569 | 28% | |
| From 0.125" Plate | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 1004 | 0.015 | Sheet | 68 | 611 | 1,263 | 1,617 | 1,917 | 803 | 321 | 377 | 404 | 5,931 | 696 | 284 | 90% | |
| 16 | 1018 | 0.015 | Tube - 1.0" OD | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 230 | 0 | 41 | 0 | 279 | 31 | 76 | 245% | |
| 20 | 1027 | 0.015 | Sputer Target - 2.0' x 5.0" | 0 | 105 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 105 | 12 | 35 | 303% | |
| 18 | 1016 | 0.500 | Tube - 0.50" CD | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 51 | 6 | 54 | 33 | 27 | 33 | 207 | 23 | 22 | 94% |
| 14 | 1017 | 0.750 | Tube - 3/4" | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 12 | 558 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 568 | 68 | 185 | 292% |
| 13 | 1010 | 0.020 | Sheet | 0 | 54 | 102 | 183 | 45 | 54 | 120 | 92 | 119 | 775 | 86 | 54 | 63% | |
| 5 | 1009 | 0.030 | Sheet | 0 | 122 | 614 | 275 | 422 | 360 | 686 | 246 | 177 | 2,502 | 322 | 224 | 70% | |
| 6 | 1008 | 0.040 | Sheet | 321 | 101 | 191 | 486 | 8 | 98 | 263 | 176 | 690 | 2,334 | 258 | 214 | 83% | |
| 9 | 1007 | 0.060 | Plate | 0 | 146 | 32 | 117 | 129 | 414 | 581 | 26 | 191 | 1,636 | 182 | 194 | 107% | |
| Monthly Subtotal | | | | 1,191 | 3,102 | 4,039 | 3,764 | 4,403 | 4,107 | 5,034 | 2,952 | 4,023 | 4,023 | 28,912 | 3,614 | 1,213 | 33% |
| 90% Input Required at Yield | | | | 1,309 | 3,590 | 4,639 | 4,167 | 4,893 | 4,663 | 5,594 | 2,783 | 4,525 | 35,913 | 4,104 | 1,213 | 30% | |
| From 0.250" Plate | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10 | 1012 | 0.125 | Plate | 229 | 8 | 32 | 90 | 432 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 451 | 141 | 185 | 131% | |
| 11 | 1013 | 0.150 | Plate | 1,103 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,103 | 135 | 365 | 250% | |
| Monthly Subtotal | | | | 3,396 | 3,698 | 5,071 | 4,251 | 5,232 | 4,714 | 5,663 | 2,768 | 4,923 | 4,923 | 17,119 | 2,140 | 785 | 35% |
| 90% Input Required at Yield | | | | 3,670 | 4,385 | 6,339 | 5,321 | 6,656 | 5,894 | 7,002 | 3,478 | 6,219 | 49,165 | 5,463 | 1,273 | 23% | |
| From 4.0" Sheet Bar | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8 | 1014 | 0.250 | Plate | 6 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 14 | 38 | 175% | |
| 15 | 1015 | 0.375 | Plate | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 375 | 42 | 125 | 300% | | |
| 11 | 1013 | 0.500 | Disk - 10" dia | 275 | 0 | 353 | 0 | 581 | 0 | 330 | 414 | 1,017 | 3,173 | 357 | 107 | 95% | |
| 12 | 1028 | 0.500 | Ring - 10" OD x 8.5" ID | 0 | 189 | 0 | 48 | 259 | 93 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 174 | 707 | 89 | 121% | |
| Monthly Subtotal | | | | 4,012 | 4,096 | 6,092 | 6,139 | 7,333 | 6,799 | 7,907 | 3,998 | 7,684 | 7,684 | 28,811 | 3,601 | 1,213 | 33% |
| 90% Input Required at Yield | | | | 4,012 | 4,096 | 6,092 | 6,139 | 7,333 | 6,799 | 7,907 | 3,998 | 7,684 | 7,684 | 28,811 | 3,601 | 1,213 | 33% |

| Sales Rank | Material | Gauge | Description | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Total (Pounds) | Monthly Average | Standard Deviation | % RSD | |
|-----------------------------|----------|-------|----------------------------|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|-------|----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------|-------|
| From 0.015" Sheet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 2001 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 75" CD | 288 | 898 | 2,988 | 3,698 | 2,468 | 888 | 657 | 528 | 1,382 | 11,622 | 1,291 | 500 | 70% | |
| 5 | 2043 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 483 | 444 | 0 | 77 | 116 | 361 | 1,421 | 146 | 162 | 120% | |
| 7 | 2050 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1" CD With Cap | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,003 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,003 | 101 | 33 | 254% | |
| 16 | 2038 | 0.015 | Sheet Annealed | 108 | 0 | 0 | 13 | 56 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 202 | 23 | 37 | 163% |
| 17 | 2048 | 0.015 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 122 | 12 | 47 | 223% |
| Monthly Subtotal | | | | 456 | 1,265 | 3,476 | 3,181 | 2,792 | 1,213 | 1,205 | 967 | 1,548 | 1,382 | 11,622 | 1,291 | 500 | 70% |
| 90% Input required at yield | | | | 456 | 1,265 | 3,476 | 3,181 | 2,792 | 1,213 | 1,205 | 967 | 1,548 | 1,382 | 11,622 | 1,291 | 500 | 70% |
| From 0.015" Sheet | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 | 2031 | 0.020 | Sheet Annealed | 761 | 521 | 838 | 671 | 889 | 1,004 | 3,975 | 27 | 7 | 8,681 | 962 | 114 | 123% | |
| 4 | 2041 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 75" CD | 0 | 51 | 395 | 3 | 378 | 0 | 2,894 | 0 | 0 | 3,668 | 462 | 263 | 233% | |
| 14 | 2044 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 32 | 241 | 108 | 4 | 0 | 386 | 43 | 63 | 193% |
| 16 | 2039 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 5/8" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 181 | 142 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 323 | 34 | 52 | 209% |
| 10 | 2041 | 0.020 | Welded Tube 1.25" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,014 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1,014 | 113 | 338 | 300% |
| 13 | 2045 | 0.030 | Welded Tube 1.0" CD | 0 | 0 | 0 | 370 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 371 | 41 | 42 | 122</ |

Case Summary

| Material | Monthly Demand | Monthly Sigma | Period (Weeks) | Average (Pipeline) | Period Sigma | Service Level | Reliability Factor | Buffer | Safety | Total |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|--------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------|
| Alloy #1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 0.125" Plate | 4,104 | 1,213 | 1 | 947 | 583 | 95% | 90% | 958 | 191 | 2,100 |
| 0.030" Sheet | 2,053 | 589 | 1 | 474 | 273 | 95% | 90% | 450 | 92 | 1,020 |
| Alloy #2 | | | | | | | | | | |
| 0.125" Plate | 5,181 | 3,053 | 1 | 1,196 | 1,467 | 95% | 90% | 2,412 | 361 | 3,970 |
| 0.015" Sheet | 1,808 | 1,175 | 1 | 417 | 564 | 95% | 90% | 928 | 135 | 1,480 |

Estimated Inventory Requirements

- Demonstrate applicability of risk pooling and postponement, EOQ modeling, and inventory sizing to improve customer service in make-to-order job shop setting
- Demonstrates value from getting and looking at data

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