From the Editors

The Eighteenth-Century Novel

7 Introduction  
   Nancy E. Johnson

11 Expressive Individualism and the  
   Origins of Bourgeois Morality  
   Nancy Armstrong

25 There's No Place Like Home for a Brothel;  
   Or, Why There's No Place in the World  
   for Clarissa Harlowe  
   Tina Iraca Green

39 “In the Kitchin”: Honor Among  
   the Servants in Tom Jones  
   Jennifer Kaufman

47 “Journeys of the Heart”: Laurence Sterne’s  
   A Sentimental Journey and Jack Kerouac’s  
   On the Road  
   Kevin Cavanaugh

55 A Great Experiment: Sterne’s Reflection  
   of Human Conversation and Thought  
   in Tristram Shandy  
   William Van Cleave

Poetry and Translations

63 Translation of Folco de Baroncelli  
   Catherine Aldington

66 “Adopt a Highway”  
   Dennis Doherty

68 “Saints”  
   Dennis Doherty

70 “Three Photographs of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain”  
   Robert Singleton

72 “Lucy’s Ghost”  
   Robert Singleton

73 “Packing”  
   Robert Singleton

74 Excerpts from “In the Stations  
   of the Wheelchair”  
   H.R. Stoneback
77 “L’Addition, S.V.P.”                        H.R. Stoneback
79 “The Times Book Review and
   Sister Maria’s Prayer”             H.R. Stoneback
81 “Two Spelling Mnemonics”            Pauline Uchmanowicz
82 “Yellow House”                       Pauline Uchmanowicz
83 “Middle Age in the Ivory Tower”      Pauline Uchmanowicz
84 “Hedges”                             Robert H. Waugh
85 “Philemon and Baucis’ 1658”          Robert H. Waugh
86 “Polderland Drizzle”                  Robert H. Waugh
87 “Fireflies on the Fourth of July”    Robert H. Waugh

Graduate Essays

88 Pens, Paint, and Intercourse on the Floor
   of the Spanish Earth: Thomas Hudson,
   James Joyce, and Stylistic Concerns in the
   Writing of Ernest Hemingway           Lawrence Beemer
96 Strange Bedfellows: James Boswell
   and William Hogarth on Marriage
   in Eighteenth-Century England         Rebecca Cummings
106 “Education Rooted in Experience”:
   The Pedagogy of Norman Studer          David Fish
116 A Look at the Soviet/Russian Hemingway:
   A Way It’ll Never Be Again?            Radmila Genyuk
129 Marxist Literary Theory: a Prolegomenon Timothy Gilmore

139 News and Notes
141 Guidelines for Submission
142 Contributors
From the Editors

As we go to press, Professor Fiona Paton is completing preparation for the Fourteenth Annual English Graduate Symposium, “Beat Literature, Beat Culture: Critical Engagements,” to be held on April 8, 2002. This promises to be a full and engaging evening, with seven papers by New Paltz graduate students on the program. Joyce Johnson, author of Minor Characters and Door Wide Open, will give the keynote address, entitled “Beat Women: A Transitional Generation.” Next year’s symposium will be directed by Professor Pauline Uchmanowicz and have poetry as its topic: “‘This Be the Verse’: Poetry Past and Present.” Watch the Graduate Bulletin Board for further announcements and a call for papers.

The present volume of the Shawangunk Review features the proceedings of the Thirteenth Annual Graduate Symposium, “The Eighteenth-Century Novel,” which Professor Nancy E. Johnson, in her last act as symposium director, has edited and furnished with an introduction. On behalf of the graduate program, we would like to commend her for a job well done. We would also like to express our gratitude to Professor Nancy Armstrong of Brown University, the keynote speaker, for granting us the right to publish her address.

This is the second volume of the Review to include poetry and translations by New Paltz faculty and friends. Special thanks to Catherine Aldington for permission to reprint “The Sacrifice” from her bilingual (Provençal-English) edition of selected poems by Folco de Baroncelli (Gregau Press). We plan to continue and expand the Review’s focus on poetry, and we encourage submissions of poetry, and translations of poetry, from graduate students and faculty as well as other readers.

We also welcome submissions concerning any area of literary studies: essays, explications, book reviews, scholarly notes and queries. This year, five New Paltz graduate students have contributed essays on a healthy variety of topics. Lawrence Beemer traces the influence exerted by Joyce’s Ulysses, especially in the “Penelope” episode, on Hemingway’s narrative technique. Rebecca Cummings examines the institution of marriage in eighteenth-century England through a comparative study of Boswell’s London Journal and Hogarth’s Marriage à la Mode. David Fish gives us a portrait of Norman Studer, New York educator and folklorist, based upon records from the Studer archive in the Carl Carmer Center (here at New Paltz). Radmila Genyuk discusses the critical reception of Hemingway’s work in the Soviet Union during the Stalin era and analyzes a
representative Russian translation. Timothy Gilmore writes an introduction to Marxist literary criticism, explaining its theoretical principles, historical development, and revolutionary aspirations.

We will continue to publish our “News and Notes” column, and we ask that readers continue to provide information regarding the many distinguished achievements of our former and current graduate students. For example, we would like to know the details of conference participation, publications, grants, and honors, as well as news regarding progress of our M.A. graduates in Ph.D. programs and reports about teaching and employment activities. Please submit items for this column to the editors. Also, we will include in future issues an “Abstracts of M.A. Theses” section. Degree candidates are encouraged to consult with their advisors and to submit a Thesis Abstract of approximately 150 words for publication in the Review.

Please see submission guidelines, page 141. The deadline for all materials for Volume XIV of the Review is December 15, 2002.

Kudos to Jason Taylor, our Managing Editor in charge of layout and production, for his artistry and efficiency.
The Eighteenth-Century Novel
The Thirteenth Annual Graduate Symposium

Introduction

Last spring, students, faculty, and guests from the New Paltz community gathered together to celebrate the eighteenth-century British novel—those formidable, daunting tomes that often promise to show “virtue rewarded” or “redemption earned.” If, however, one surrenders to a reading of these texts, which are so often constituted of a fluttering exchange of effusive letters from “your most obliged, humble, and obedient servants,” one finds much more than instruction for moral comportment. One is almost always rewarded with an excursion into the frolicking escapades of clandestine lovers, the playful adventures of a young lady’s entrance to London society, or the tragic saga of young love and life lost because of tyrannical parents or a malicious rake. One might also discover an investigation of the most erudite intellectual matters: a rigorous philosophical argument on the parameters of human knowledge, on the formation of the legal subject in the social contract, or on the crisis of integrity in an increasingly secularized world. In any case, the eighteenth-century novel is far more than entertainment and diversion for young girls, as it was so often characterized at the time of its rise and development.

Responding to the varied richness of the genre, scholarship on the eighteenth-century British novel has changed dramatically in the last two decades. It has been infused with a renewed vigor that has placed the novel at the forefront of eighteenth-century studies. No longer does the novel take a back seat to the poetry of the period, to the stunning iambic pentameter satires of Dryden, Pope, and Johnson. The resurgence of interest in history, gender, and the intersections of cultural discourses has contributed to the fresh approaches we are seeing in criticism of the novel. To study the novel, students are now delving into the economics of Adam Smith, the jurisprudence of Lord Kames, the epistemological theories of John Locke, and the moral inquiries of David Hume. They bring to the text knowledge of eighteenth-century domestic life, journalism, coffeehouses, and foreign policy. As a result, current criticism of the novel opens for the reader a window to the vast intellectual and aesthetic world of modernity.

The exciting new directions of criticism on the eighteenth-century novel were very much in evidence on the evening of April 4 at our Thirteenth Annual
Graduate Symposium, when we enjoyed the presentation of four graduate student papers and a keynote address by the renowned scholar of the British novel Nancy Armstrong, Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Brown University. After a warm welcome from the Director of Graduate Studies, Professor H.R. Stoneback, and gracious introductory remarks by Professor Phyllis R. Freeman, Dean of the Graduate School, our graduate students delivered splendid papers on four eighteenth-century “blockbusters”: Clarissa, Tom Jones, A Sentimental Journey, and Tristram Shandy. Professor Armstrong responded to each presentation with thoughtful commentary and then, in the second half of the evening, gave her learned, enlightening, and inspiring talk on bourgeois morality and the eighteenth-century novel. Collected here, in this volume of the Shawangunk Review, are the essays from our evening. Together they offer a fine example of the innovative developments in scholarship on the eighteenth-century novel.

Professor Armstrong, who holds an endowed chair at Brown University, has written extensively on the novel. The publication of her book Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (1987) was a watershed event in the history of criticism on the novel because it was one of the first to consider the influences of the politics of the domestic and the forces of sexuality on fiction. She has also written on topics as diverse as Puritanism and the imagination, nineteenth-century British realism, and the representation of violence. Armstrong brings this vast intellectual experience to her essay “Expressive Individualism and the Origins of Bourgeois Morality,” where she considers the dissemination of bourgeois morality through the novel. While she defines bourgeois morality as “a way of reading, assessing, and revising” categories of identity and the cultural apparatus that supports them, Armstrong also regards it as a social attribute, such as economic rank, that elevates one’s status in society and, likewise, bolsters a nation. To discuss the role of the novel, she then focuses on a paradox of modernity in Western culture: individuality, which society claims to cherish and protect, must be constrained or even repressed if it threatens the individuality of another. The novel comes into play as it tries to mediate these contradictory impulses between the individual and the collective. Armstrong explores varying facets of bourgeois morality, such as contractual and sexual morality, in Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Moll Flanders and Roxana, as well as Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice.

The first of the graduate student contributions is Tina Green’s essay, which brings us into the Harlowe household of Samuel Richardson’s monumental, eight-volume novel, Clarissa. In “There’s No Place Like Home for a Brothel; Or,
Why There’s No Place in the World for Clarissa Harlowe,” Green uses the social theory of Jürgen Habermas to discuss the relationships between the private and public spheres in Richardson’s novel. The eighteenth century, Green observes, was the historical moment when we see efforts to distinguish the private from the public domain; however, we also see at this time not only resistance to the separation, but also an abundance of evidence that contradicts the notion of any neat divisions between family life and the world of economics and law. While Green defines the relationship between private and public as a dialectic, she takes us to three “places” in the novel that exemplify her readings of duality: the Dairy-house at Harlowe Place, Harlowe Place itself, and the brothel run by Mrs. Sinclair. In each instance, the dominance of the private or the public is undermined by the other. This duality, Green concludes, is a provocative conflict in the novel that ultimately leads to the central tragedy of the narrative: Clarissa’s death.

In the tradition of the ongoing Richardson/Fielding debate in eighteenth-century studies, Jennifer Kaufman transports us into the much lighter world of Henry Fielding and his novel *Tom Jones*. In her essay, “‘In the Kitchin’: Honor Among the Servants in *Tom Jones,*” Kaufman takes us “downstairs” into the world of servants and examines their efforts to appropriate honor, a virtue that until recently was thought to be an exclusive attribute of the aristocracy. Kaufman reads *Tom Jones* as a manifestation of the growing rift between rank and honor; no longer did the former guarantee the latter. When the servants “in the kitchin” try to mimic the social order “upstairs,” the result is a playful lam-pooning of assumptions that external rank determines internal values and decorum. The servants’ crude application of the trappings of honor exposes the roots of ambition, dominance, and power that inform claims to virtue. Using Michael McKeon’s study on the origins of the novel, Kaufman finds that through the example of the servants, Fielding’s text signifies the displacement of honor with the more “modern” notion of moral responsibility.

Kevin Cavanaugh’s article on “‘Journeys of the Heart’: Laurence Sterne’s *A Sentimental Journey* and Jack Kerouac’s *On the Road*” reminds us of the intimate links between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. He compares the two novels and the motif of the journey that structures both texts. In a contextual discussion of sentimentalism and sensibility, as they were understood in the eighteenth century, Cavanaugh examines the picaresque-like movements of Sterne’s protagonist Yorick and Kerouac’s leading man Dean as they embark on their respective quests. What Cavanaugh finds is that the two characters have a great deal in common. They are both struggling with the impulses of feeling and
the forces of reason, and they are both in search of the same sentimental goal: knowledge of life that transcends rationality and unites all “through the passions of the human heart.” The two hundred years that separate the publication of these two texts vanish in the wake of a common sentimental pursuit.

Continuing the tradition of Sterne studies at SUNY New Paltz, William Van Cleave’s paper, “A Great Experiment: Sterne’s Reflection of Human Conversation and Thought in Tristram Shandy,” draws us into the delightfully disheveled world of this very modern novel. Van Cleave’s take on Sterne’s “radical experiment” with fiction is that the author is attempting through a mélange of tangents and digressions to replicate human thought, emotion, and conversation. In the stream-of-consciousness form of the novel, he finds an exploration of Locke’s articulation of the tabula rasa and the association of ideas. He also discerns an effort, on Sterne’s part, to represent time, to make it visible, to make it tangible. Through all of his digressions and his intentional unintentionalities, Van Cleave suggests, Sterne is engaging in a new and intimate relationship with the reader, one that beckons the reader into the text and shows her an image of her own thought processes, including that of reading.

Nancy E. Johnson
Expressive Individualism and the Origins of Bourgeois Morality

Nancy Armstrong

Contrary to prevailing critical opinion, bourgeois morality is not a value in and of itself so much as a way of reading, assessing, and revising both existing categories of identity and whatever cultural apparatus may authorize them. From this perspective, bourgeois morality cannot possibly draw its tremendous and enduring authority from any institutional religion, the Bible, or Judeo-Christian ethics in the most general sense. Bourgeois morality appears to emanate from the very core of an individual, as that individual confronts and opposes socially inculcated systems of value. Often suspicious of pleasure, unconcerned with profit, and heedless of life's little necessities, bourgeois morality appears to be the assertion of individuality itself. In fact, however, bourgeois morality adds something to an individual that entitles him or her to a more gratifying social position than one based on mere economic rank. In the process, bourgeois morality also authorizes as humane and good any social order that affords such individuals their rightful places. I cannot call this supplement “material” in any familiar sense of the term. But I will nevertheless insist that bourgeois morality inflects the material wealth of a modern nation and its ruling elite just as powerfully as the elements of birth and rank inflected the ancien régime. We can consequently think of bourgeois morality as our own distinctive brand of magical thinking and the novel as one of the most effective means of disseminating it. Let me explain.

Whenever we refer to a society of individuals, we unwittingly pose a contradiction in terms. As the inheritors of liberal Western culture, how else do we define someone's individuality if not in terms of his or her deviation from some social role, norm, or stereotype? How else, on the other hand, does civil society ensure the right of any one individual to express that individuality if not by limiting each individual's right to self-expression?—the premise being that one individual cannot fully realize his or her individuality except by encroaching on another's ability to do so. To cherish individuality is consequently to agree that certain constraints be placed upon it. This paradox translates into the situation confronting the protagonists of our most enduring works of English fiction. In order to be good members of society, those protagonists must fit in; they must observe the same contract observed by their fellow citizens. At the same time, in
order to represent the unexpressed claims of individualism, those protagonists must give expression to their individuality by bending the rules that define their given places in society. Self-expressive individuals are misfits. From its very beginning, the novel took it upon itself to solve this contradiction by creating fantastic situations in which one could indeed become a good member of society precisely by risking social exclusion.

The novel resolves the inherent conflict between individual interests and those of the collective in one of two ways. The social order might expand, grow more flexible, and acquire heterogeneity, as it incorporates excluded elements of the individual. Alternatively, the protagonist might grow deeper, more complex, and internally conflicted, as he or she incorporates the norms of the culture and subordinates his or her antisocial impulses to them. In the first instance, society becomes more flexible and inclusive as it incorporates and sublates the excesses of individualism. In the second instance, the novel produces an antithetical effect: we end up with a morally constraining social order composed of individuals who have sublimated, exhausted, or otherwise personally come to terms with their own worst desires in ways that make them seem mature and more interesting. Such characters have incorporated within themselves, as their distinctive structure of consciousness, the contradiction between a morally authorized individualism and a morally authorized normalcy. Many a novel demonstrates the formal compatibility of these two ideologically incompatible resolutions. Jane Austen’s heroines especially so. They not only come to regret some act of irreverence toward the finely gradated social hierarchy in which they live but also marry into higher positions than their money and upbringing warrant. My talk this afternoon will examine the formal strategies of British fiction that sought to reproduce the social contract out of the most unlikely cultural materials. I will pay special attention to a change in the relationship between self-expressive and self-governing individualism—a change, I believe, that allowed both individualism and the British fiction that represents it to endure from the eighteenth-century to the present day.

**Contractual Morality**

If Daniel Defoe can be called the first novelist and exponent of possessive individualism, it is chiefly because *Robinson Crusoe* inadvertently defined resistance as the necessary expression of certain qualities of mind, especially the tendency to be as critical of oneself as of others—qualities worthy of written expression. I will not dwell on the self-criticism Crusoe turns on himself as he disobeys his father, grows increasingly skeptical of the traditional Christian god, and reasons
his way into complete self-sufficiency. For purposes of this talk, I am more interested in a form of authority that emerges only when Crusoe discovers other men on his island. To coexist with these people, he must hold them to the same code of conduct that he brings to bear on himself, one that increasingly acknowledges its philosophical debt to theories of the social contract. According to John Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*, an individual does not simply step into his father’s position but earns his citizenship only as he comes to understand the law. To understand the law is to obey it and thus to fulfill the precondition for governing others. Citizenship therefore depends entirely on one’s ability to harness the very aggression by means of which one expresses his or her own individuality. In this respect, the modern state can be understood as a defensive formation, a collective dedicated to protecting not only its citizens but also their dependents, indeed all those unfit to be citizens, from any form of aggression that would encroach on their rights to property and personal autonomy. The modern state is justified, in other words, by the need to defend individualism against forms of aggression that often bear uncanny resemblance to expressions of that very same individualism. Bourgeois morality distinguishes, first, self-expression that springs straight from the heart from those professions and practices of virtue that culture and circumstance dictate. Paradoxically, however, bourgeois morality also distinguishes those passions and drives that we harness for the general good from those that disrupt the social order.

The first half of Crusoe’s story reads as a striking example of the paradox of individualism. His compulsion to classify and map the natural landscape of his island exceeds the limits of his position as a stranger there and spills out onto the surrounding landscape. As he lends order to this information, he also acquires control over the unstable elements of nature, which—as he learns from a bout with food poisoning—including his own body and mind. As the island subjects him to its natural order, he in turn subjects the island to rational control. It becomes his in the process. Defoe’s purpose in this part of the novel is rather self-evident, and generations of commentators, including Rousseau and Marx, have provided a rich legacy of readings that testify to this. Less interesting to readers is the process by which Crusoe becomes governor of a peaceful cosmopolitan nation, for in so doing he no longer represents an individual’s individuality so much as an aggregated citizenry that exacts the sacrifice of individuality in return for the protection of private property. From the perspective of such a government, an individual’s willingness to stay in place is what makes him or her a good citizen. No longer at war with the corrupt institutions of early modern culture, those who resist the status quo on this island act in defiance of the general
good. We can regard the curious process by which Crusoe assumes the role of “governor” over the variegated population that washes up on shore as a product of this paradox.

The paradox of individualism, as I construe it, is one and the same as the logic of the social contract. This contract demands that the individual willingly restrain his individuality, in the form of desire, in exchange for the state’s protection of that individuality, in the form of property, against the desire of other individuals. To constrain his fellow individuals, Crusoe must not only place similar constraints on his own desire, but also remain in a defensive position. By never bothering to ask what Crusoe desires, literary criticism pays inadvertent tribute to Defoe’s skill in representing Crusoe’s insatiable desire for property not as acquisitive desire, but as a sequence of defensive moves aimed at preserving his autonomy. Moreover, Crusoe’s rise to leadership comes to us as a series of conflicts in which he rescues other individuals from overt forms of savagery. Against the physical brutality of cannibals and mutineers, Defoe pits Crusoe’s literacy, which includes his ability to count, map, measure, classify, and disseminate fictitious accounts of the island and its inhabitants to those who lack such intellectual mastery. The whole purpose of the manual labor which he eventually delegates to Friday is to create the property that he proceeds to defend by means of intellectual labor alone. At the same time, once there is neither father, nor abusive sea captains and plantation owners, nor female cats, cannibals, and mutineers against whom to defend himself, the moral energy seems to drain out of the story, despite Defoe’s elaborate efforts to maintain his hero’s minority status and defensive posture. Such are the wages of his success that Crusoe ceases to be an admirably resistant hero.

Sexual Morality

By means of observation, information gathering, and classification—precisely the faculties associated with enlightenment rationality—Crusoe gains control over a self endangered by forces that he proceeds to conquer. In doing so, he becomes the virtually invisible figure of the self-governing subject. Moll Flanders and Roxana work every bit as hard as Crusoe. Rather than rely on the products of labor whose steady flow can be ensured by reason, Crusoe’s female counterparts trade in sexual favors. When they gain control of their labor, they also gain control over their sexuality and, with it, the power to trade up to positions of social respectability. Where early modern cultures would have it be their father’s, brother’s, guardian’s, or owner’s prerogative to trade them, Moll and Roxana seize the opportunity to trade themselves to men. The point I want to
stress by comparing their fate and Crusoe’s is that in taking possession of their bodies, these female protagonists acquire modern sexuality, the one form of irrationality that cannot be governed by reason. Only morality can govern sexual desire and make it serve the logic of the social contract. In entering the marriage contract, a woman agrees to exchange sexual desire for a form of desire that restricts pleasure to practices that create and preserve the nuclear family. In other words, the protagonist must violate the prevailing rules of kinship that give the father sole right to exchange his daughter in order that she might establish a radically new principle of social bonding. According to this principle, each individual finds one other individual who can transform his or her sexual desire into that form of love compatible with bourgeois morality.

In this respect, Moll Flanders and Roxana make a special contribution to the cultural logic that I am calling bourgeois morality. Robinson Crusoe’s story suggests that before he can constitute something approximating the ideal society, the citizen-subject must be reconstituted from the ground up. He must express himself through the acquisition of property, but he must also curtail that same acquisitive impulse and share his island with other acquisitive individuals. In assuming the position of governor, Crusoe appears to have done exactly that. Similarly, we might say, Moll and Roxana assume positions within respectable society from which they survey and evaluate their former behavior, positions therefore indicative of their capacity for self-government. Judging by the critical response to these novels, however, one has to ask if Defoe did in fact allow his female protagonists to become full-fledged individuals. Too many readers conclude that, to the contrary, Moll and Roxana succeed in a way that simply serves to expose the predatory nature of prevailing social relations.

The man who coerces sexual favors from a woman without agreeing to assume her father’s role is flying in the face of the contract between the householder and his dependents, which had long served as a metaphor for the ideal contractual state. In place of anything resembling a Christian soul, Locke substituted the rational ethic of the social contract, which goes something like this: In partnership with his wife, each householder ideally reproduces his own rationality in each of his offspring. The individual reared in such a household would respect other households, just as he respects each and every member of his own, simply because such reverence for the autonomy of others is necessary to the preservation and prosperity of each. To coerce sexual favors either from a commoner like Moll or from a woman fallen in social position, as Roxana is, would be to invert this principle. Indeed, we find the corruption of the old society increasing incrementally as Defoe’s heroines ascend the ladder of power and
expose those on top who routinely corrupt their economic dependents. But even those who can excuse Moll and Roxana on grounds that their seducers are the ones to overturn the social contract find it difficult to accept Moll’s lack of remorse for inadvertently marrying her brother and all but impossible to forgive Roxana for colluding in her daughter’s murder. Roxana can give us special access to the history of bourgeois morality.

Despite her final words of repentance, Roxana repeatedly crosses the line distinguishing the exploited dependent from the licentious parent and becomes no different from those who have corrupted her. She reproduces these qualities in her servant Amy, thereby reproducing the corruption of the class into which Roxana was born. To trade up is, in this case, to exchange the self-possession required of the moral individual for a self who is exploited by other such individuals. Roxana ends her story by calling attention to the inverse relation between her moral worth and her social position:

… after some few Years of flourishing, and outwardly happy Circumstances, I fell into a dreadful Course of Calamities, and Amy also: the very Reverse of our former Good Days; the Blast of Heaven seem’d to follow the Injury done to the poor Girl [her daughter], by us both; and I was brought so low again, that my Repentance seem’d to be only the consequence of my Misery, as my Misery was of my Crime. (379)

Defoe died in 1731. Fourteen years later, a version of the novel appeared that responded to the problem created by the relationship between Roxana, her servant Amy, and the daughter who threatened to expose their past promiscuity. This edition included a second volume that expanded the heroine’s reversal of fortune to include a protracted account of her repentance and budding parental concern. Yet another revised edition published in 1775 proved equally popular with late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century readers. In this edition, in the words of a modern editor,

the narrator’s very vocabulary becomes more respectable, and her actions, while still to be repented, are considerably less criminal. In particular, that strangest and most disturbing part of the plot, the relentless pursuit of the narrator by her discarded daughter, is entirely omitted. Instead, in lengthy additions to Defoe’s text, “Roxana” discovers the joys of being a good wife and mother. (Mullan 338)

Do these revisions by later hands indicate that Roxana was originally crafted to be morally reprehensible in a way that Crusoe, though demonstrating a similar lack of parental concern, was not? Not necessarily. I believe that Defoe and his readers were more concerned with the economic consequences of being female
than with a woman’s capacity for maternal feeling. Indeed, I would argue, her material circumstances rather than her emotional inclinations would have determined a heroine’s morality in the period prior to Samuel Richardson’s *Pamela*. Roxana might well have acquitted her responsibilities as a parent when she paid a couple to give her children a relatively wholesome upbringing. This being the case, we must assume that later editors of the novel were trying to bring Roxana’s behavior into line with the moral standard of a later historical period.

The contract that *Roxana* strikes up with the reader is another matter. By representing itself as the memoirs of a woman of pleasure who has little choice of profession, Defoe’s female picaro did for writing what the considerably more modern Jane Eyre would do for speech. She defined it as an act of resistance. It is true that both Moll and Roxana write from a position of hard-won respectability that signifies a life of unrestrained desire rather than one of contractual obligations met and exacted in return from others. In this respect, neither achieves the physical autonomy that embodies modern individuality. Not so, however, for their writing. Their stories are as consistently and sharply critical of the sexual practices of the old regime as any that Samuel Richardson wrote. As a result, their degree of textual self-possession contradicts their acute lack of sexual self-possession. Richardson’s first two novels could indeed be accused of exploiting the advantages of both the male and the female picaresque, as Defoe had formulated them. Let us but imagine Crusoe in a petticoat, using personal letter-writing to fend off nearly constant sexual assaults, and we have Pamela, whose body is nothing if not her own property. Further, let us imagine Moll and Roxana resisting the blandishments of their masters with the same compulsion that drives Crusoe to resist his father, god, nature, and foreigners. Then strip those women of the anonymity characterizing servants and prostitutes, and have them tell readers capable of similar indignation how they were forced to receive unwanted sexual advances on pain of losing their economic livelihood. In thus transforming Moll along the lines of Crusoe, we get a discursively aggressive protagonist rather like Clarissa.

**A New Class Ethos**

If we accept the premise that bourgeois morality comes from and attaches itself to the logic of the social contract as the individual resists all other bases for social relationships, then the question we must ask of Richardson is why he chose to focus on the father-daughter relationship. Locke, in contrast, thought exclusively in terms of the father-son and even the parent-son relationship when he formulated his version of the social contract and tried to figure out how it
might reorganize social relations. As novelists began to imagine the logic of the social contract reproducing itself at the micro-level, household by household, however, the daughter emerged as the more appropriate vehicle of cultural reproduction. Well before Defoe, the dissenting tradition had argued for a government that began at home and as a moral obligation. But during the early eighteenth century, the novel gave the old formula a new and decisive twist. The daughter’s fate came to represent that of the individual and to place certain limits on self-expression. If the wayward daughter reflects poorly on her father to the point of threatening his position in the community of men, then the coercive father would reflect badly on that entire community by defining it as unfit to care for a population of dependent individuals. The only way around this double bind, as Richardson saw it, was to authorize the daughter to choose a husband for herself, a man of a class above hers but one who valued her more for her qualities of mind and heart than for her physical charms and social position. Pamela engineers this kind of marriage by writing letters, and she elevates her entire family in the process. But still more compelling than Richardson’s first attempt at fiction was the international bestseller Clarissa, which put its stamp on all subsequent fiction of the European nations and their colonies. Bourgeois morality, as we now know it, first emerged in narratives designed to harness sexual desire for specific bio-cultural ends. These narratives implied that such desire could only be so harnessed and redirected by the writing that they themselves exemplified.

Between the prolix epistolary novels of Richardson and Jane Austen’s precisely wrought fiction, the novel took a quantum leap. Henry Fielding’s claim that Richardson’s heroines used self-restraint to entrap wealthy suitors implied that the fiction which offered so many scenes of seduction and professed so many scruples was nothing more than a tease as well. Austen leaves no room for readers to imagine that her heroine’s reluctance to enter into relationships with men is anything less than genuine when her narrator follows her heroine’s words and gestures back to their sources in feelings of which that heroine herself is unaware. The voice of truth, in this case, describes neither the heroine’s thinking nor that of the author so much as the voice of a culture telling us how heroine, author, and reader ought to think. Austen’s narrator endorses only small acts of resistance to the elaborate rules governing sexual relations among an extremely narrow slice of English society, acts of rebellion performed strictly in words, yet acts that constitute sublime moments of individuality. Austen’s heroines tend to say no to offers of marriage that would mean a definitive move up the social ladder and a secure economic position for life. Their refusals erupt
in minor scandals. Indeed, so incredible is Elizabeth Bennet’s resistance to marriage with Mr. Collins—to whom the Bennet’s country residence has been entailed—that he dismisses her blunt refusal as “usual with young ladies [who] reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept, when he first applies for their favour” (81). To do away with any resemblance between her own motivations and the coyness of a Richardsonian heroine, Elizabeth wastes no time in assuring the over-confident Collins: “I am not one of those young ladies (if such young ladies there are) who are so daring as to risk their happiness on the chance of being asked a second time. I am perfectly serious in my refusal.—You could not make me happy, and I am convinced that I am the last woman in the world who could make you so” (81-82).

This signature move on the part of the Austen heroine marks the perfect realization of the paradox I am pursuing. By refusing to consent to marriage in the terms it has been proposed, she becomes a rule-breaker in the only way that can be morally authorized. She holds out for a contract based on a certain quality of feeling, heedless of how doing so might jeopardize her economic security. This feeling arises directly from Elizabeth Bennet’s resistance to Mr. Darcy’s hauteur, his class-coded displays of superiority, and the disproportionate luxury of his friends and family when compared to her own precarious circumstances. This is not resistance that can be overcome in a wink or softened with money. Indeed, so intense is the antagonism between his rank and hers that her father, who would ordinarily be delighted to marry off a daughter to a man of Darcy’s position, feels compelled to ask her: “what are you doing? Are you out of your senses, to be accepting this man? Have you not always hated him?” (282). Upon hearing his daughter recant those feelings, Mr. Bennet continues: “He is rich, to be sure, and you may have more fine clothes and fine carriages than [your sister] Jane. But will they make you happy?” (282). To ensure that this question elicits a resounding no from her readers, Austen has already provided the example of Charlotte Lucas, who consents to marry the otherwise unworthy Collins simply because he will provide her with a comfortable home. Elizabeth recalls that she “had always felt that Charlotte’s opinion of matrimony was not exactly like her own” (96). Even so, she continues, “she could not have supposed it possible that … [Charlotte] would have sacrificed every better feeling to worldly advantage. Charlotte the wife of Mr. Collins, was a most humiliating picture!” (96). In speaking Lizzie’s unspoken thoughts, the novel and the entire culture implicitly share her indignation.

If Charlotte Lucas’s marriage is clearly not an example to follow, are we then to assume that *Pride and Prejudice* advocates a marriage contracted in defiance of
those principles? Would the novel have us find Lizzie's marriage superior to those of her sisters simply because there was little or no resistance for them to overcome? Austen puts these questions to rest as her heroine conquers Mr. Bennet's incredulity “by [her] repeated assurances that Mr. Darcy was really the object of her choice, by explaining the gradual change which her estimation of him had undergone, relating her absolute certainty that his affection was not the work of a day, but had stood the test of many months suspense” (283). The episode where Elizabeth stands before Darcy’s portrait as his housekeeper sings her master’s praises is the episode that scholars most often identify as the moment when the heroine falls in love. Lizzie indeed rereads the signs of the class above hers as anchored, in Darcy’s case, to qualities within the man that allow her to recalculate his worth in terms of bourgeois morality. Indeed, of this encounter the narrator inquires:

What praise is more valuable than the praise of an intelligent servant? As a brother, a landlord, a master, she considered how many people's happiness were in his guardianship!… How much good or evil must be done by him! Every idea that had been brought forward by the housekeeper was favourable to his character, and as she stood before the canvas, on which he was represented … she thought of his regard with a deeper sentiment of gratitude than it had ever raised before. (185)

Were this novel’s purpose only to re-subordinate the upstart heroine by convincing her of Darcy’s superiority in her terms as well as his, *Pride and Prejudice* would never be considered the exemplary novel that it is. While it is true that Elizabeth is won over as the signs of Darcy’s rank come to represent the virtues of the responsible head of household, Austen assigns him the task of further enlightening the heroine:

As a child I was taught what was right, [he confesses] but not taught to correct my temper. I was given good principles, but left to follow them in pride and conceit…. Unfortunately an only son, I was spoilt by my parents, who though good in themselves … allowed, encouraged, almost taught me to be selfish and overbearing, to care for none beyond my own family circle, to think meanly of all the rest of the world, to wish at least to think meanly of their sense and worth compared with my own. (276-77)

With this statement Darcy re-inscribes the signs of rank that spoke so eloquently to Elizabeth at Pemberly within the very tradition of meaning that maintained the very status distinctions that the novel has called into question.

With his next statement, however, Darcy lends new moral value to traditional rank by means of an economically coded explanation that identifies Elizabeth as the source of value added: “Such I was, from eight to eight and
twenty; and such I might still have been but for you, dearest, loveliest Elizabeth!” (277). First, he explains, she stripped away the value of his rank: “By you, I was properly humbled. I came to you without a doubt of my reception” (277). Then, he continues, she demonstrated that such value, in and of itself, had very little value: “You shewed me how insufficient were all my pretensions to please a woman worthy of being pleased” (277). In this way, he concludes, she made it possible for him to acquire value of a superior kind: “What do I not owe you! You taught me a lesson, hard indeed at first, but most advantageous” (277). Thus out of the mutual antagonism of the codes they respectively embody—he to her family and rank, she to his conviction that his family and superiority of rank mean moral superiority—a subtle synthesis emerges: a new “truth” that attaches traditional signs of class to the morality of the social contract. The novel itself affords access to this truth. For it simultaneously revises the basis of class superiority and teaches the reader, much as Darcy claims that Elizabeth taught him, to transform the signs of mere rank into those unselfish social principles which the novel associates with the constraint of sexual desire and thus with bourgeois morality.

**Morality as Discipline**

As envisioned by the eighteenth century, the social contract exacted from individuals a promise to curb their individuality. Enlightenment intellectuals—and I would include Austen under this umbrella—saw this curb on selfishness as the first and best guarantee of full citizenship. To their way of thinking, such self-restraint entailed no loss of individuality but, quite the contrary, self-restraint indicated an accretion to the self of individual rights. The Enlightenment individual was a rights-bearing subject, even if she were a woman whose only claim to such rights rested on the largesse of the man whom she married. During the decades following the French Revolution, however, English fiction launched a critique of the very individualism that earlier fiction had brought to life and disseminated in popular narrative form. Those novels for which we remember the first three decades of the nineteenth century began to question what Defoe and Richardson represented as the wholly positive exchange of aggression towards persons and property for individual rights and the sanctity of private property.

Given that its original mission was to authorize the emergence of expressive individualism, we should not be surprised to find the novel’s relationship to bourgeois morality growing progressively vexed as nineteenth-century novelists sought to outlaw the very forms of desire that it had once been fiction’s stock and trade to promote. During the Romantic era, fiction took local cultural
economies, on the one hand, and the practices of a cosmopolitan leisure class, on the other, and synthetically produced a culture at once national and novelistic. To accomplish this feat, however, the novel itself had to change its narrative form and reverse its ideological mission. The novel abandoned the task of imagining an increasingly democratic nation and began to represent the nation as one that required of its citizens progressively greater feats of sublimation. Bourgeois morality was simultaneously transformed in the manner forecast when Robinson Crusoe achieved hegemonic authority over his island kingdom. Bourgeois morality was for Victorians, as for readers of the previous century, something that appeared to come from within the protagonist as that individual resisted limits placed on self-expression by his or her position in society; morality had to be one’s own rather than someone else’s. At the same time, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, the novel grew suspicious of individualism, much as Crusoe did, and sought a means of harnessing its energy for collective purposes. Indeed, to push the analogy between the nineteenth-century novel and the closing chapters of Crusoe’s story further, we might say that fiction began to think of itself as the means of discipline rather than resistance. Thus Crusoe imagines a fictional “governor” and assumes that role for the mutineers who populate his island. As Crusoe takes on this role, we find it increasingly difficult to value him for the plucky individualism that compelled him to resist father, landowner, or god, for he begins to exercise the very authority that he himself resisted in all three.

Moving to the end of the eighteenth century, we can see this problem disappearing into the narrowing gap between the plucky heroine and the narrator whose collective wisdom she must embrace in order to become mistress of Pemberly. The narrator might be characterized as Elizabeth Bennett’s best self, hovering just outside of her consciousness until the highly individuated protagonist develops her own powers of surveillance and partakes of that purely cultural form of authority. Later fiction would transform bourgeois morality into something on the order of Defoe’s governor and Austen’s narrator. Neither a function of individual desire nor a form of social authority, bourgeois morality comes to constitute a category that is separate from both and mediates between them. In his ingenious reading of Rousseau’s *Contrat Sociale*, Louis Althusser calls attention to the discrepancy at the heart of contractual rhetoric on which its persuasive power depends. The contract represents itself—and this, I would argue, holds true of the English version as well—as a voluntary act on the part of the pre-social individual. That individual does not lose individual agency by submitting to the laws of the state, because he submits of his own volition, as
Friday does when he places his head beneath Crusoe’s foot. In submitting to a collective composed of individuals who have themselves similarly submitted, moreover, the pre-social individual gains his freedom, because he has submitted to no one else but himself. The presupposition is that any and all individuals will not only submit but, in so doing, come to understand themselves and their interests in much the same way.

This fantasy can never be realized, as Althusser points out, without some third party to ensure that the exchange between individual and collective is, in fact, an exchange between an individual and an aggregate of more or less similar individuals. For the ideology of exchange to become both psychological and socio-political reality, he insists, there has to be a cultural apparatus to determine that many different individuals imagine their relation to the real in approximately these terms. He finds that education supplies this third, or mediating, component of the social contract. Fiction was crucial to making bourgeois morality synonymous with the values of Western culture itself. In contrast with both domestic culture and the official institutions of education, the nineteenth-century novel would provide a form of mediation that appeared to be no more than mediation, because it declared itself fiction rather than truth. Like Defoe’s figure of the governor or Austen’s narrator, however, that fiction had a peculiar power to constitute the two parties whose relationship it mediated. In speaking for the collective, Defoe’s governor and Austen’s narrator reshaped in some irreversible way the authors who created them, much as Rousseau’s pre-social individual remade himself as a citizen in the act of agreeing to submit to the state. So too is the second party or aggregate of citizens changed each time another individual agrees to submit. Crusoe is not all that happy as successive waves of immigration change the character of his collective identity, which soon after his departure becomes unstable, prone to factionalism, and given to expressing individual differences through violence rather than words.

Let me now conclude by insisting that no other medium then available could have reconstituted the imagined relation between individual reader and national readership quite so well as the novel. By means of the reading contract that it established, the novel not only revised the way that literate people imagined both parties of the social contract, but also put a moral stamp on exchanges that guaranteed the normalcy if not the homogeneity of its readership. To authorize cultural practices that relied, as Crusoe did, on a largely imaginary form of government, however, fiction had to change horses in midstream. It had to outlaw precisely the precocious woman who had such great appeal for eighteenth-century readers. The unmarried woman continued to embody the
principle of expressive individualism in later fiction, but her ticket to happiness through an advantageous marriage no longer rested on her power to refuse anything less than she deserved. Happiness came to depend instead on her ability to renounce desire and accept a position, as Jane Eyre did, that initially seemed significantly beneath her. In this way, British fiction replaced self-expression with self-government as the key to social success.

Works Cited

By only its second sentence, Samuel Richardson’s novel Clarissa references the public sphere, as Anna Howe reports in a letter to her friend Clarissa Harlowe that the Harlowe family has become “the subject of public talk.” Six paragraphs later, the matter of the private sphere surfaces as Miss Howe recalls Clarissa’s oft-mentioned desire for privacy:

So steady, so uniform in your conduct: so desirous, as you always said, of sliding through life to the end of it unnoted; and as I may add, not wishing to be observed even for your silent benevolence; sufficiently happy in the noble consciousness which attends it: Rather useful than glaring, your deserved motto; though now to your regret, pushed into blaze, as I may say. (1:2)

So begins the dialectical struggle between public and private in Richardson’s novel, and fittingly, it begins in the domestic sphere of Harlowe Place, home to Clarissa and her ruthless relatives. Although one might unconsciously connect the domestic sphere exclusively with the private realm, one soon understands that the Harlowe household is no inner sanctum. Rather, the public/private paradox that is introduced in the novel’s opening letters and intensified in those that follow, particularly as it relates to marriage and the home, communicates its own mixed message: there is no place like home for public matters, and conversely, there is no place like the public sphere for discussing private matters. It is precisely this dichotomy—the opposition and convergence of the public and private spheres—that fuels the conflict within the novel and forces a resolution that can only be tragic. Unfortunately, Clarissa cannot find a place in either milieu that she can live with, and so she simply cannot live. Beyond this, and despite the intense lobbying by Richardson’s friends beseeching him to save his heroine, Clarissa must cease to be.1

In a departure from the contrivances of his earlier novel Pamela, Richardson assumes a realistic approach in Clarissa that reflects the interconnectedness of social and economic forces at work—especially upon women—in his day. Without the deus ex machina construct that saves Pamela, Clarissa’s plight deteriorates as her isolation increases. She does not enjoy the refuge of a private
place, nor is she able to assert a public identity as a single woman. For all of her virtue, Clarissa, like King Lear’s Cordelia, another daughter with jealous siblings who has been cast off by her father, is destined to meet a tragic fate. For Clarissa, it is her virtue, not to mention her fierce will, that compels her martyrdom. More than that, however, it is the untidy mingling of private life in the public realm that dooms Clarissa. Surrounding the interaction of individuals within the novel is a “fluid body of public opinion,” and in the process women are “often forced to choose between the world’s public opinion or demands and what they know to be virtue” (Golden 144).

Clara is at odds with social convention since she will not accept the choices offered by even a repentant, and aptly named, Lovelace, or by her family (though they withhold their sanctimonious regret until she is sufficiently dead). Actually, she is given only one choice: marriage. She can marry Lovelace, the regretful rapist, or she can marry the wretched but rich Mr. Solmes. She rejects both offers. Even if Richardson did not intend it, Clarissa can be viewed as a feminist who fights the constraints of a patriarchal world to the death. Or perhaps Clarissa is just one tough Puritan! No, Richardson may indeed be delivering a more didactic message via Clarissa’s relentless piety, but in the process he also delivers a scathing social commentary on the eighteenth-century status of women in relation to marriage and property.

Although Terry Eagleton supposes that the novel’s subversive effects “far exceed its author’s intentions”(ix), one would hardly dare to gauge Richardson’s intentions when considering the voice of the intelligent and spirited Anna Howe on the subject of matrimony: “to be cajoled, wiredrawn, and ensnared, like silly birds, into a state of bondage, or vile subordination: to be courted as princesses for a few weeks, in order to be treated as slaves for the rest of our lives” (1: 160). Anna’s discourse is not unlike that of Maria Venables, written by Mary Wollstonecraft as she laid the groundwork for modern feminism some fifty years later. Richardson’s confinement of Clarissa to various houses and the imprisonment of the perfectly sane Maria in an asylum at the suggestion of her husband are strikingly similar. Particularly relevant to a discussion of these issues within the novel is the public/private dynamic that contemporary theorist Jürgen Habermas identifies in relation to eighteenth-century English society in his The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. More specifically, there exists in the novel a duality of place that reflects the public and private forces at work in society. Quite literally, each house that Clarissa lives in not only expresses the public/private dialectic, but also reflects an underlying economic component.
The so-called “history of a young lady” that Richardson penned in 1747-48 reflects a public/private association that Habermas has identified as symbiotic in nature. Habermas is primarily concerned with the emergence of a public sphere in eighteenth-century English society, and he locates the prime example of the public sphere within the proliferation of coffeehouses, which were hot beds for class-mixed, public assembly and debate (32-33). Habermas does point out that unlike the French salon, in which women played a vital role, English coffeehouses did not admit women, and so his idea of public openness has its limitations. Nancy Armstrong’s *Desire and Domestic Fiction* takes up the discussion of how gender informs the public/private division, applying a complex new filter to Habermas’s distinctions. Habermas’s main contention, however, is that “private people came together as a public” in eighteenth-century England in a way previously unseen to create a public sphere (27). Habermas’s own definition inherently integrates the private individual in that public realm in such a way that the line between the two seems indistinguishable.

Within Habermas’s historical analysis is the assertion that it was the specific subjectivity found in the patriarchal conjugal family that informed the public debate of private persons with one another. Richardson himself cues the reader that a “public debate of a private person” is in store through the title and subtitles that appear on the title page of the original edition. *Clarissa*, we are told, is a “History of a Young Lady: Comprehending the Most Important Concerns of Private Life” (xxxv). Interestingly, Habermas actually refers to the popularity of Richardson’s *Pamela* as evidence of the predominating influence of a middle-class reading public, whose taste in literature reflected its preoccupation with subjectivity as a means to self-understanding (43). Habermas terms this public preoccupation with the private realm as the “institutionalization of a privateness oriented to an audience” (43). What he seems to be suggesting is a private realm that really isn’t private at all. Such a phenomenon is the crux of *Clarissa*, and indeed it expresses at once the separation and unity of public and private. Before focusing on how this paradigm is illustrated in the duality of place within the novel, it is necessary that one glaring peculiarity about the novel be addressed, especially in relation to Habermas’s theory. This, of course, has to do with the matter of the epistolary form used by Richardson.

The literary form that is the ideal expression of the public/private paradox is none other than the letter. It is no accident that the eighteenth century is known as the “century of the letter” since the letter is the vehicle by which the individual can unfold his or her inner-most core in private subjectivity, and yet the mere act of writing those thoughts in a letter inevitably orients the individ-
ual to an audience (Habermas 48-49). Within the letter form, public gossip and general news as well as private thoughts are presented with equal billing. The letter truly is a catch-all for the individual who desires to speak his or her mind, and chances were in the eighteenth century that the intended recipient was not the only audience that the letter would have. It was likely to enjoy a much larger circulation since interception, copying, forging, collecting, storing, and publishing of letters were all common practices at the time. The subterfuge surrounding the letters in *Clarissa* reflects this historical reality. The assumption that letters would be copied and shared is reflected in the perfectly natural tone of Anna Howe’s request that Clarissa permit her to excerpt her letters “for the entertainment of my aunt and cousin in the little island, who long to hear more of your affairs” (1:50).

That individuals in the eighteenth century created multiple sets of letters by reproducing copies by hand for themselves and others may astonish the modern reader. It is no wonder that there was a market for model-letter writing guides. In fact, that was Richardson’s initial intent when writing *Pamela*, but when the plot eclipsed that purpose, turning the novel into a runaway bestseller, he no doubt realized he had stumbled onto a good thing. The epistolary novel, for all of its limitations, does reflect the medium of the day and was an effective way to deliver interiority and realism. According to John Richetti, Richardson’s “revolutionary perfection of the epistolary novel enabled him to depict a world where the subjective forces of individual will and consciousness can be observed trying to shape and even to master the objective social and historical forces which resist such manipulation” (3). If the epistolary structure moves the plot forward in a less than hasty manner, one must consider that the ultimate concern of realism is not plot but character. Richardson, after all, advised his readers to seek within the “minutiae” of life to gain human understanding (Brophy 81). In *Clarissa*, subjectivity is the thing. And if, as Habermas says, subjectivity is rooted in the privatized domain of the family, and if that subjectivity finds its voice in the literary form of the letter, one might suppose that the division between public and private places family life entirely in the private realm. Oh, that for Clarissa’s sake it were so! Even though within the “intimate sphere of the family people viewed themselves as independent,” they are ultimately tethered to the public sphere by economic and social considerations (Habermas 47-48).

An intimate sphere that one might suppose is thoroughly privatized, yet that actually realizes its ultimate definition by way of the public economic vernacular, is the home itself. While the sheer length of *Clarissa*—eight volumes in all—defies a comprehensive analysis of every setting, one can see through a lim-
ited, but representational, survey of the houses that Clarissa inhabits that a dual pattern emerges, wherein each house represents simultaneously the separation and the unity of the public and private spheres. Habermas concedes that eighteenth-century family life in England did in one sense “turn in on itself” in the “enclosed space” of the family (46). The privatization of life is visually apparent architecturally as smaller dining and drawing rooms replaced large, raftered halls; courtyards were diminished in size and moved from the middle to the back of the house; and individual rooms replaced communal family rooms (Habermas 44-45). Still, the public character of the house remained intact in rooms like the parlor, where guests were entertained, and as Habermas notes, “The line between public and private extended right through the home” (45-46). Physical expressions of privatization in the home may suggest autonomy, but the underlying concern of the middle-class family for economic preservation took precedence over any illusions that threatened it. Three examples of “place” in Clarissa that reflect the duality of public and private with a resounding reference to economic matters are the Dairy-house, Harlowe Place, and Mrs. Sinclair’s brothel.

The Dairy-house, the idyllic country home that Clarissa’s late grandfather built for her, is clearly the closest incarnation of the private sphere. Before she was economically relevant to the Harlowe family’s future, Clarissa’s identity may have been forged through her relationship with her generous grandfather. Once Clarissa’s grandfather dies and makes her his beneficiary, however, her economic capacity is activated, moving her from the private realm (even if it is an illusory one by virtue of her economic dormancy) to the public realm. The subtlety of the duality of the Dairy-house may be considered in a Habermasian context that explains this pastoral setting as one privatized by its remoteness and exclusivity; the Dairy-house is, after all, custom-made for one guest in particular: Clarissa. The ultimate duality of the Dairy-house rests on its function as a nurturing, private environment where Clarissa’s virtuous and pious character may have been formed, and as a public emblem of the inheritance that incites family resentment and conflict. The fluctuation of public and private with respect to Dairy-house is tinged with irony in that Clarissa avoids Lovelace’s initial visit to Harlowe Place because she is at work at the Dairy-house. As a dairymaid, she is out of the public role as a daughter to be courted. It is also this accident of fate that allows Arabella, Clarissa’s older sister, to misinterpret Lovelace’s attention. Precisely because Clarissa is harbored in the privacy of the Dairy-house, Lovelace’s blunder in addressing the wrong sister dooms Clarissa in the eyes of the envious Arabella. Greed is compounded by rejection in Arabella, and her
wrath gathers even more strength in the company of her brother, who has his own festering vendetta against Lovelace. Most of all, the Dairy-house is the public symbol of why James and Arabella so resent their younger sister: greed and envy. The Dairy-house as a source for all that is cultivated and loving in Clarissa and as a source of the resentment of her family makes it a compelling symbol of public/private duality.

Harlowe Place conveys yet another complex view of duality as it relates to the public and private spheres. If the Dairy-house seems most aligned with the private realm, then it is posited against the view of public life rendered by the Harlowe household. The private refuge that Clarissa may have enjoyed at home is disturbed when Lovelace entered the scene. Even if, in Habermas’s terms, Clarissa experiences an illusory freedom during the years when her grandfather is alive, it can only be temporary (47). The moment that Clarissa’s home becomes merely a house occurs the day Lovelace enters it as the supposed suitor for Arabella, whose failure to win Lovelace for herself precipitates Clarissa’s problems. One day Clarissa is enjoying upper-middle-class English country life, and the next she is cast out of her role of daughter and into her role as an economic commodity of the family. Perhaps these roles were one and the same for daughters in eighteenth-century England. Or in the words of Clarissa’s brother, James, daughters are “but encumbrances and drawbacks upon a family … daughters are chickens brought up for the tables of other men” (1: 66). If, as Habermas notes, the real function of the bourgeois family was imbedded in economics, Clarissa as an asset to be liquidated is a foregone conclusion even before Lovelace arrived on the scene. If landed families, in particular functioned to perpetuate the inheritance of property and reinforce social conformity, the Harlowes are “just doing their job,” with a resolve so stubborn that they will do what society demands, even if it kills one of them (Habermas 47).

The perimeter of the private sphere for Clarissa at Harlowe Place dissolves into a realm so fraught with public matters that Clarissa is forced to flee it to avoid a forced marriage to the odious Solmes. At first, Clarissa is denied access to her parents; eventually she is locked in her room and kept under the watchful eye of the insolent maid-Betty. Still, Clarissa is clever enough to maintain her correspondences by secreting her letters to a hidden drop spot under a brick in the garden wall. Writing is a source of power for Clarissa. Not only does it enable her to make plans for escaping the household, but it is the only means of expression for Clarissa’s voice. Clarissa’s writing reflects what Armstrong calls “a form of resistance, or ‘will,’ which poses an alternative moral economy to that of the dominant class” (114). In this vein, Clarissa’s “written presence” puts her on par
with Lovelace, just as Pamela’s “written presence into Mr. B’s text as if she were
equal to the dominant class is the effect of supplementation” (Armstrong 115). Clarissa’s resistance, like Pamela’s, depends upon her language. Clarissa’s letters are a “private confidence and political weapon … a jealously protected space” in which she never ceases “to be publicly at stake,” or they represent what Mikhail Bakhtin terms “dialogic language,” in that their private discourse is always public (Eagleton 51-52).

At Harlowe Place, Clarissa’s room is repeatedly searched, and her paper, quills, and ink are confiscated, save those she has hidden. Clarissa’s private chamber is transformed into public territory as servants and relatives invade her personal property and space. The most salient example exposing the dual nature of her room is that it is also the planned location for the forced marriage ceremony to Solmes that her family is plotting. Clarissa’s bedroom will take on the public function of a parlor or church to avert any plans she might have of escaping the ceremony. Marriage as an institution of eighteenth-century English society, even if not coerced, was generally an economic matter. Clarissa’s marriage to Solmes is no less an economic transaction than are those that take place within the domain of that oldest of houses—the brothel. It is a fitting progression, then, that Clarissa’s escape from Harlowe Place with the aid of the opportunist Lovelace should take her to Mrs. Sinclair’s.

Another, and perhaps the most extreme, example of the duality of place as it relates to the public and private spheres in Clarissa can be seen within the setting of Mrs. Sinclair’s brothel. It should come as no surprise that with Lovelace “in control of Clarissa’s living arrangements,” Mrs. Sinclair’s would be the most likely place to suit his predatory desires (Brophy 62). The movement to Mrs. Sinclair’s brothel signals Clarissa’s impending doom of being drugged and raped by Lovelace. Clarissa, of course, arrives at the house thinking it a respectable establishment since Lovelace’s co-conspirators convincingly play their parts as genteel ladies. The duality in this setting is overtly duplicitous compared to that exhibited at Harlowe Place. The artifice of Lovelace’s ruse heightens the doubling that occurs elsewhere in the novel, as Mrs. Sinclair’s establishment exposes the public/private paradox in terms correspondent with marriage. Marriage is a seemingly private matter that in reality is grounded in the public sphere by its economic functions, which guarantee a continuity of personnel and preserve and augment family-owned capital. The activity of the brothel reflects a similar symmetry of that private/public ordering, for Mrs. Sinclair’s patrons engage in the most private of encounters in a public realm. Is a “property marriage” to the insufferable Solmes any less degrading a transaction than those occurring at Mrs.
Sinclair’s brothel? Is the “clear sin” apparent in the inversion of Mrs. Sinclair’s name on even par with the sin of a property marriage to Solmes? Even the alliterative unity of the names—Solmes and Sinclair—aligns the two in parallel territory!

Clarissa’s other alternative is to marry Lovelace, her rapist. With options like these, can Clarissa’s fate be anything less than tragic? Ironically, the public sphere, which exerts so much control over her life, also denies her admittance as a single woman. Except for the openings that Mrs. Sinclair may have, Clarissa’s opportunities “to be” in the public sphere are extremely limited. This was, after all, a time when a woman walking alone in London or riding in a coach unescorted was considered brazen and a sign of moral degeneracy. The coffeehouse motto, *All People May Be Seen Here*, which seems to describe the fluidity of London public life mid-century, did not apply to women, and certainly not to single women. Clarissa’s decision to cling to her inner-most, autonomous self is only possible in the spiritual realm since the earthly world has no place for Clarissa—or at least no place that is acceptable to her. Clarissa refuses to be possessed, as she asserts in her will: “she is nobody’s” (8:185). If Clarissa is unable to find what Habermas terms “psychological emancipation” from social and economic constraints, Richardson proposes that her spiritual emancipation is her ultimate reward. Pamela certainly fares better. The “palace,” as Clarissa calls the coffin that she meticulously readies for herself, represents the only place for her. Ironically, only when Clarissa is locked tightly within the smallest of rooms—her coffin—will she be able to experience unencumbered liberty. Death is the ultimate private act within a sphere so private it can accommodate only one. Yet Clarissa’s death is a most public act as well. In her final moments, Clarissa is attended by no fewer than six people, who release a flurry of post-mortem letters to a larger public, revealing each detail of Clarissa’s final moments. The public that mourns Clarissa’s death is representative of society as a whole. Richardson’s lesson of the novel is delivered in democratic terms. For example, the deathbed scene, which can only be described as a *tableau vivant* with movement and much sobbing, provides a sampling of the gentry, middle, and lower class. On hand are Col. Morden, Mrs. Lovick, Belford, Mrs. Smith, the nurse, and the maid of the house. Similarly, the text points out that “great numbers of people of all conditions” follow the hearse from Harlowe Place to the church. In addition, Clarissa’s death is such a public matter that it takes Richardson a full volume after its occurrence to wrap up the loose ends of the novel. Clarissa’s death is powerfully public.

Writing, the medium that fuels Clarissa’s will in life, continues to work on her
behalf in death. First is the matter of the extended inscription and sketch on the coffin lid: “The principal device, neatly etched on a plate of white metal, is a crowned serpent, with its tail in its mouth, forming a ring, the emblem of eternity” (7: 345). In addition to the serpent, a winged hour-glass, an urn, “a white lily snapt short off” as well as three Bible verses are included in Clarissa’s coffinogram. As Habermas reminds us, any message written down supposes an audience and makes that message public. Likewise, Clarissa’s catalogue of letters to be delivered posthumously to “her friends” intensifies the public nature of her death. Clarissa’s lengthy will presents another example of her public legacy, as it cites a litany of commands and bequests, the least of which certainly is not the instruction to compile and copy her letters so that her tale may be known. One may observe that the power inherent in an eighteenth-century will is usually male power. The novel’s circular structure is manifested here, as Clarissa’s will at the end of the book closes the circle initiated by her grandfather’s will at the start of the book. Even the hearse that carries Clarissa back to Harlowe Place retraces the steps of her journey in a public way. It is fitting that her coffin is publicly announced by the tolling of the church bell as it arrives at the gate to Harlowe Place and is taken “into her parlour, and put upon a table in the midst of the room” (8: 161-162). Clarissa’s request that her body “not be unnecessarily exposed” to view (like her earlier desire “to slide through life unnoticed”) is simply out of the question (8:185). That the body makes it to the feet of her grandfather in the family vault is reassuring since the lid is fastened and unfastened with alarming regularity to allow the bereaved to gaze upon, sprinkle with herbs, or kiss the dead Clarissa.

What is one to make of Lovelace’s desire to pickle Clarissa’s heart in a golden receptacle never to be out of his sight? Fortunately, Clarissa’s earlier resolve that Lovelace has neither tainted her mind nor violated her will safeguards her corpse as well (7: 260). Lois Bueler explains Lovelace’s “mad demand for Clarissa’s heart” as a specious gesture in which he assumes the role of “defender against those who would maintain her fault,” that is, her family (115). Lovelace’s grotesque desire to have her heart literally seems less complicated. What he cannot win during her life he hopes to possess in her death. Possession and dominance are the features that identify Lovelace. His rape of Clarissa could have been no more satisfying for him than it was horrific for her. Since much of the novel rests on gender roles, one can see that Lovelace is both exhilarated and frustrated by his inability to conquer a woman—Clarissa. It is this same element of male control that likewise frustrates and infuriates the Harlowe men. Clarissa’s inheritance makes her “dangerously independent of her male rela-
tives,” and they struggle to control her (Bueler 43). Clarissa rejects both sexual and filial obedience to the men in her life and in doing so breaks the accepted and public norm for a woman. She becomes an outsider, yet in her exile she manages to locate within herself a private spiritual and mental reality. Clarissa clearly adopts a Berkeleyan approach in accepting that reality is indeed a matter of mental perception. She rejects the notion that Lovelace has violated her, perhaps in part because she was drugged during the experience, but also because she can neither perceive nor conceive of it. That she takes to wearing a white gown fortifies her virginal self-image and renders her the resident angel of the house. On one level this appears to work, as Clarissa seems to be truly at peace despite all of the suffering that she has endured; on another level, however, that peace is subverted by the fact that the suffering is killing her.

Conclusions

Clarissa’s “complete isolation” is crucial to the development of the novel, which is the “supreme criticism of property marriage” (Hill 330). Her isolation results from the fusion of the private realm of parental authority and the public sphere of economic activity in which that authority is based (Hill 329). Since Clarissa cannot return to her earthly father’s house, she must find sanctuary in her heavenly Father’s house. Frederick W. Hilles characterizes Clarissa’s movement from her earthly father to her heavenly Father as the circular manifestation of the engraved emblem of eternity on Clarissa’s coffin: the snake swallowing its tail. He also suggests that the shape of the novel on “the whole is a cycle” (82). Certainly the symmetrical references that occur at each end of the story are evidence of Richardson’s ability to finesse structure and meaning.

Even Clarissa’s heavenly home is a patriarchy, but it is one that Richardson assures us will bring about her spiritual triumph. As a Bildungsroman, Clarissa’s conclusion is especially powerful. Clearly, Clarissa undergoes both physical and spiritual crises that alter her development profoundly. Carol Houlihan Flynn notes that for Clarissa suffering “distills spirit, polishes and perfects the soul” (5). That being the case, Clarissa, from her childlike naiveté at the Dairy-house to her final deathbed days in her room at the Smith’s in London, indeed undergoes considerable distillation. Clarissa evolves into a complex woman, who is not only willing but also anxious to die for her principles rather than live a life that would bitterly compromise them. The events of the novel take place in a one-year span. The circumstances that dominate Clarissa’s existence are so forceful that the nineteen-year-old Clarissa at the conclusion of the novel is vastly different from the eighteen-year-old Clarissa at its beginning. Clarissa not
only discerns her identity and role in the world but also recognizes its severe limitations, or as Flynn notes, “for Clarissa, self-creation is also self-annihilation” (2). Because she cannot live within those bounds, she does not respond in an emotionally distraught, reactive sense but instead rationally arrives at the only perceivable solution available to her: death. When Clarissa realizes that neither the public nor the private realm of society offers her refuge, she looks forward to spiritual sanctuary via death. Clarissa puts word into deed by choosing “what is right” and being “steady in the pursuit of it” (1: 115). Clarissa’s reason based in moral conviction steels that steady pursuit, as does her credo that “steadiness of mind … when we are absolutely convinced of being in the right … brings great credit to the possessor of it” (1: 114). Clarissa may not be able to control her life, but she can control her death. Her evolution through the novel on this level progresses toward divinity replete with the “fasting female saint” (Doody 179).

On another level, Richardson creates a protagonist both powerful and staid, whose rejection of her circumstances fuels a desire either “to be” on her own terms or “not to be” at all. In rejecting the happily-ever-after resolution of marriage, Richardson himself transgresses the idea of a proper place for Clarissa in society. Death may seem the worst possible route to emancipation, but for Clarissa it is the only escape from the tyranny of her family, would-be husbands, and society at large. In creating an untenable predicament for a character that is impeccably good, Richardson provokes the expectation that there should be a place for such a character. By displacing Clarissa literally and figuratively from the world and driving her out of social existence, Richardson may admit that his only aim is to recommend the “highest and most important doctrines of Christianity (8: 343). Clarissa seems less a lesson on the rewards of faith than a warning about destructive earthly behavior, less about Clarissa’s spiritual end than about the material means by which she arrived there. In contemporary feminist terms, Clarissa’s death, which may be primarily a result of starvation, is “not the spiritual choice it purports to be, but a purely materialist escape mechanism reflecting a kind of social ‘absenteeism’” (Palazzoli 152). Or, as Donnalee Frega writes from a related stance, “Clarissa finds a way to subvert the limits of her ‘proper sphere’ without seeming to do so merely by manipulating the only resource in her power—her body” (127). In this vein then, Clarissa does have access to one private sphere: her body. Yet it is only when she manipulates the private sphere of her body in a public—not to mention fatal—way that her voice and the resounding power of her proclamation “No!” can be heard.

Eagleton insists that Clarissa’s death must be public since it is “in a profound sense a political gesture, a shocking, surreal act of resignation from a society
whose power system she has seen in part for what it is” (74). And if Michael McKeon’s observation about Pamela is correct—that in order for her reward to have meaning the “moral authority of the social order by which it is conferred must remain intact despite the evidence of social injustice manifest in the very need for her reward”—then what is Richardson’s message regarding the social dynamics of Clarissa (364)? Surely, Clarissa’s death reveals a crack in both the moral and social structure of eighteenth-century society. What edification does Richardson’s tragedy declare if not one that begs a response to the predicament of women in the author’s time? Eagleton suggests that the value of Clarissa lies not in what it “mirrors” or expresses about such issues but in the fact that it was a “material part of those struggles” (4). Eagleton further suggests that Richardson’s novels were “organizing forces of … the public sphere” (6). We know that Richardson circulated drafts of his novels to his friends—particularly a contingent of women friends—for comment. He also received a proliferation of letters about the works as they were read in serialized form, and his works were the cause of imitation and spoof (Fielding’s Shamela and Joseph Andrews). The social discourse that surrounded Richardson’s works defined a “family” that Eagleton says is “coexistent with the ‘public sphere’” (13). Specifically, it is Richardson’s focus on and elevation of the feminine character that “partly reads [women] to the public sphere” (13).

Still, like Richardson’s confidante Lady Bradshaigh and other women of the day, who lobbied the author to save the virtuous Clarissa, the reader hopes for a just conclusion. For all of the light that Richardson cast on women’s predicament in eighteenth-century society, it was, and still is, no doubt troubling that the only relief that a suffering Clarissa can hope for is death! Yet it is precisely Clarissa’s death that gives the novel its progressive edge. Not only must Clarissa die but she must do so in a very public way. Just as Clarissa does not heed the pleas of those around her to live, Richardson did not heed the pleas of his audience to let her live. Her death not only dams those who have harmed her—the Harlowe clan and Lovelace—but it likewise dams “a society where the rape of a Clarissa is possible” (Eagleton 74). The publicness of Clarissa’s death makes this ultimately private experience an indictment of political society. Unlike Pamela’s collusive resolution in which she takes her place in the patriarchy as the wife of Mr. B, Clarissa rejects a Cinderella-esque happy ending and refuses to marry the man who has destroyed her. With the lesson of Pamela fresh in his mind, surely Richardson sought to project a resolution fixed in seriousness. Mary Patricia Martin says Richardson’s task was “to convince readers of the importance and efficacy of reform without risking the reward that would obscure its
meaning” (595). Clarissa cannot cover the same ground that Pamela did. The sphere that Clarissa would occupy, if she could, would be the “new woman of the eighteenth century, fighting for economic survival and demanding respect for the sacredness of her individuality” (Konigsberg 32). No such sphere exists for Clarissa, and so she opts for transcendence of a different kind: spiritual. As Eagleton puts it, Clarissa gives us “a devastating demystification” of such myth; Clarissa gives us “the tragic reality” (39). The answer to Clarissa’s question, “O Death! Where is thy sting?” (8: 102), is that it is afflicted upon the living. That Richardson provides no reprieve for Clarissa is the sting for the reader. Within such an unsettling resolution resides the novel’s deepest impact, as the repulsive truths of reality rise to the surface for public view. Clarissa may have found peace by the end of the novel, but Richardson delivers no such reward to the reader.

Notes

1. In his introduction to the 1970 AMS Press edition of Clarissa, William Lyon Phelps notes that “the excitement aroused among all classes by their anxiety as to the ultimate fate of the heroine, may be partially understood by reading the letters addressed to the author. They flowed in thick and fast, coming from every quarter … beseeching Richardson, some with tears, and some with curses, to spare Clarissa, and close the book with the jingle of wedding bells.” Phelps also cites the concerns of Lady Bradshaigh, Richardson’s close friend: “In October 1748, she wrote, ‘I am pressed, Sir, by a multitude of your admirers, to plead in behalf of your amiable Clarissa…. I have but too much reason to apprehend a fatal catastrophe…. Therefore, Sir, after you have brought the divine Clarissa to the very brink of destruction, let me entreat (may I say insist upon) a turn, that will make your almost despairing readers half mad with joy.’” For these and more examples, see pp. xviii-xxii of Phelps’s introduction. See also Richardson’s Post Script to Clarissa.

2. Eighteenth-century Irish philosopher George Berkeley originated a philosophy of Idealism, which viewed the material world as mind-dependent; that is, physical reality exists only because the mind perceives it. This theory is detailed in his famous work Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710).

3. The subject of the exact cause of Clarissa’s death has been discussed in terms both metaphorical and physical. Pertaining to the latter, there is a fascinating discussion of Clarissa’s death as a result of anorexia nervosa in Donnalee Frega’s Speaking in Hunger.
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In the Kitchin”:
Honor Among the Servants in *Tom Jones*

JENNIFER KAUFMAN

Henry Fielding’s *Tom Jones*, published in 1749, is a novel about the search for identity. Sheridan Baker describes it as “representing the mythic mystery of everyone’s birth, of everyone’s natural nobility, of everyone’s search for identity” (vii). While the fundamental action of the novel follows the love affair between Tom Jones and Sophia Western, with all of its tortuous and exhausting plot twists, it also provides a critical and entertaining commentary on the courtly notion that there exists an inherent link between rank and honor.

By the mid-eighteenth century the concept of an inherent aristocratic honor was in crisis. The assumption that a relationship existed between rank and honor was an ideal that carried over from the chivalric age; by the early modern period it was no longer an obvious truth. *Tom Jones* scrutinizes the increasingly hollow nature of honor in the emerging modern period. It questions the moral ordering of a society caught in that critical moment when the established rules no longer fit and the new social order was struggling to define itself.

Michael McKeon, in *The Origins of the English Novel*, observes: “the traditional terms of social distinction in early modern England—‘degree,’ ‘estate,’ ‘order,’ and ‘rank’—are variously based on an idea of status derived from the personal possession, or nonpossession, of honor” (131). Here is the chivalric presupposition that external rank signifies an internal honor. The external signifiers of social distinction are easily identifiable through the designation of rank, yet “honor is [also] an essential and inward property” (131) and depends for its success upon the unity of external rank and the increasingly slippery concept of internal honor or virtue. Thomas Hobbes commented:

> the Value, or WORTH of a man ... is not absolute; but a thing dependent [upon] the ... judgment of another.... The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is that which is commonly called Honouring, and Dishonouring. (McKeon 163)

Hobbes’s line of reasoning—that one’s honor or dishonor depends upon the opinion of another—taken with McKeon’s assertion that outward rank traditionally signified inward virtue provides the framework through which to examine how the concept of “honor” functions in the world of servants in *Tom
Jones and how those servants attempt to construct an identity through the attainment of honor.

Tom Jones neatly manipulates the notion of an honor that depends upon the oftentimes faulty judgment of others. In seeking to achieve the distinction of “honor” in the novel, the characters, both employers and servants alike, engage in blatant self-promotion and frenzied social and professional opportunism as they actively attempt to convince others of their innate honor and virtue. Lampooning the fiercely observed order of precedence, both above and below stairs, Fielding exploits the courtly assumption that outward rank is an automatic signifier of inherent worth, virtue, or honor. In their confused attempt to apply an already outmoded aristocratic notion of “honor” to their lives in the “kitchin,” the servants in Tom Jones completely misappropriate the meaning of the word. They use rank as a vehicle for extorting respect from their fellow servants and respect as a means of constructing an identity.

Eighteenth-century England was governed by a strict social hierarchy. At the top were peers, those with the highest titles and the hereditary right to occupy a seat in the House of Lords; below them was the aristocracy, those who had lesser titles and no hereditary right to occupy a political seat; finally, there was the gentry, the largest and most fluid of the three categories. The rigid hierarchy that existed among the peers, the aristocracy, and the gentry also existed among the servants. In a country obsessed with origins and the order of precedence, the power structure below the stairs mimicked the rigid hierarchy above the stairs. Just as their employers constantly sought to define and redefine their place in the established power structure, servants jockeyed for positions of authority below stairs in order to reinforce their crude understanding of rank as an automatic signifier of honor—and respect as an outward signifier of their individual identity.

Tom Jones satirizes the deft politicking for position among the servants from their point of view and creates characters who are motivated by a very real ambition to elevate themselves in the eyes of their fellow servants. Daniel Pool explains the intricate hierarchy of the servant’s hall:

Status was taken very seriously by those in service…. The butler and the housekeeper, together with the lady’s maid and (gentleman’s) valet … were the upper servants…. As such, they were entitled to respect and deference from the under staff…. [I]n the servants’ hall, the upper staff sat in the head places at dinner … with the other servants ranged along the side of the long table; visiting servants were seated according to the ranks of their [employers]. (222)

It is not surprising, then, that the conventions of respect observed between a baronet and a knight would also be enforced between a lady’s maid and an upper
house maid; it is how seriously these distinctions were taken, with all of their consequent assumptions about honor, that Fielding mocks in *Tom Jones*. Fielding scrutinizes the increasingly faulty assumption that there is an automatic correlation between rank and honor through the characters of Honour, Sophia Western’s personal maid, and Partridge, Tom Jones’s traveling companion cum servant.

Honour was “the most exalted [maid] … the only maid free of the house-keeper’s control … [as she] attended [only] the lady of the house” (Pool 227). Assigning the designation of “Honour” to a servant, albeit an upper one, gives an early and unmistakable indication that the concept of honor had significantly decreased in value by the mid-eighteenth century. During an initial encounter with Honour, the reader is given an understanding of her “birth.” Honour asserts: “my Father and Mother were married, which is more than some People can say…. I am a Christian … [and] my grandfather was a Clergyman” (135). Seeking to reinforce the image of her innate superiority with her employer, Honour simultaneously presents herself as legitimate, Christian, and descended from gentry—all outward signs which would lend themselves to reinforce Sophia’s courtly belief that her maid, Honour, was possessed of an inward “honor.” During a disagreement with Sophia, Honour asserts: “I shall never desire to part with your Ladyship.… why, I should never get so good a Place again” (136). Well aware that her rank as lady’s maid protects her from the abuse of the other servants, Honour has no desire to separate from Sophia until a better opportunity presents itself.

As the novel progresses, Sophia’s love for Tom is discovered by her father, Squire Western, a hard-drinking, horse- and hound-obsessed huntsman, who vows he will qualify Tom to “run for the Gelding’s Plate” (200) if he continues “poaching after [his] Daughter” (199). Honour, well aware that Squire Western desires to marry Sophia off to the odious Blifil in order to consolidate their contiguous estates and enlarge the family holdings, is torn between her “attachment to *Sophia*” and “her own Interests” (226). She briefly considers “sacrificing *Sophia* and all her Secrets to Mr. Western” in the hopes that “she might probably make her Fortune” (229). With the prospect of “a handsome reward” (229) from Squire Western dancing in her head, Honour carefully considers both sides of the argument. In the end, Honour decides that “a Journey to London appeared very strongly in Support of *Sophia* … in the next Place … she knew *Sophia* to have much more Generosity than [Squire Western]; so her Fidelity promised her a greater Reward than she could gain by Treachery” (229). The tempting combination of travel and money overcome Honour’s doubts, and her misguided
notions of “fidelity” triumph over her “treachery” for the time being, but only after Sophia solemnly promises that she will “reward [Honour] to the very utmost of [her] Power” (228) should the plan succeed. Honour’s confused notion of fidelity is plainly available for the right purchase price.

In order for them to escape undetected, Sophia convinces Hounour that she must somehow manage to get herself fired. Knowing the fastest cause of a servant’s demise is the deliberate flouting of authority, Honour seeks out Aunt Western’s maid, a woman who outranks Honor through her employment by the senior woman of the house as well as through her convoluted genealogy, which is higher: “for her Grandmother by the Mother’s Side was a Cousin, not far removed, to an Irish Peer.” Her wages “were greater,” and “she had been at London, and had of Consequence seen more of the World” (230). The combination of birth, money, and travel entitle Aunt Western’s maid to expect deference from Honour—a deference she is as willing to exact from Honour as Honour is unwilling to give it to her. It is worth pausing to comment that the good ladies never compete for the moral designation of virtue, like the unworldly, good Sophia Western; instead, they only consider the matter of external status as a guaranteed passport into the world of honor. As Mrs. Fitzpatrick, that unfortunate wife of an Irishman commented: “For by whatever Means you get into the Polite Circle, when you are once there, it is sufficient Merit for you that you are there” (376).

After a volley of insults, Honour “strutted by Mrs. Western’s Maid ... and violently brush[ed] the Hoop of her Competitor with her own” (231). Performing the eighteenth-century female equivalent of bumping, the two square off, and in the end “the Victory belonged to the Lady of inferior Rank, but not without some Loss of Blood, of Hair, and of Lawn and Muslin” (231). Never let it be said that a slight physical altercation between ladies as a way to prove superior honor and breeding is out of order. Succeeding in their plan for Honour’s dismissal, they begin their journey to London.

Mirroring the journey of Honour and Sophia are the travels of Tom Jones and Partridge. Partridge maintains his dignity in the face of dire circumstances through the assertion: “I was not born or bred a Barber, I assure you. I have spent most of my time among Gentleman, and tho’ I say it, I understand something of Gentility” (270). As with Honour’s assertions regarding her background, Partridge seeks to confirm his status to Tom through his “scraps of Latin, some of which [he] applied properly enough, [and] tho’ it did not savour of profound Literature, seemed yet to indicate something superior to a common Barber, and so indeed did his whole Behavior” (271). In Tom, he senses an opportunity and agrees to be at Tom’s “service, and ... Disposal ... and ... beg[s] only to attend ...
in the Quality of [Tom's] Servant” (275). Gambling on the hope that he will be able to reunite Tom with his estranged surrogate father, Squire Allworthy, thereby gaining a financial reward for his efforts, Partridge attaches himself to Tom.

Once Honour and Partridge have established their spotty pedigrees, the action of the novel follows them into the “kitchin” at the Glouster inn, where they converge for the night. Partridge informs his fellow servants “that tho’ he carried the Knapsack, and contented himself with staying among Servants, while Tom Jones (as he called him) was regaling in the Parlour, he was not his Servant, but only a Friend and Companion, and as good a Gentleman as Mr. Jones himself” (280). In further attempting to reinforce his status among the servants during their travels, Partridge tells and retells the story of Tom Jones. He uses Tom’s story as “an Entertainment for [his] good Friends in the Kitchin” (331) and as a way to secure their respect while at the same time holding himself apart as “no Man’s Servant” and boasting: “for tho’ I have had Misfortunes in the World, I write Gentleman after my Name” (332). Partridge’s education gives him an understanding of the traditional moral ordering that provides the essential link between rank and honor. And though he holds himself apart from the other servants, he does not alienate them in the same way that Honour does.

Honour correspondingly attempts to shore up her position among the servants; however, her awkward imitation of Sophia’s flawless deportment only serves to earn her the “universal Disesteem and Hatred” of her fellow servants. Unlike Partridge, who understands the moral responsibility that accompanies honor, Honour crudely equates rank with honor. It is Honour’s complete lack of honor that is revealed in the Glouster kitchen through her abusive behavior toward the staff, combined with her conflicting assertion that she is “extremely nice, and [has] been always used from [her] Cradle to have everything in the most elegant Manner” (348). Her brutal syntax and ill-mannered behavior, juxtaposed with her claims of superiority, heighten the comic perplexity of the situation and completely belie her claims of being “extremely nice.” At this moment, Honour serves to illustrates “the Reverse” of Sophia’s “loveliness” (346), and after having “eat very heartily, for so delicate a Person” (348), she invites Partridge to join her as he looks “somewhat like a Gentleman” (348).

Sophia Western is a paragon of womanly virtue: she functions in the novel to illustrate the crucial moral responsibility that must hang in the balance between honor and virtue. In mimicking Sophia’s behavior without understanding the moral responsibility that must necessarily accompany the distinction of lady, Honour’s behavior completely alienates her from her fellow servants and negates any respect that her title of lady’s maid would allow her to claim. At this
moment she fully represents the modern condition. She assumes the burden of applying a moral code to her life while failing to realize that virtue has become a necessary component of honor.

When Sophia is mistakenly identified as the alleged mistress of the Pretender, Honour rushes to her defense “for she thought her own [character] was in a very close Manner connected with [Sophia’s]. In Proportion as the Character of her Mistress was raised, hers likewise, as she conceived was raised with it; and on the contrary, she thought the one could not be lowered without the other” (391). Honour doesn’t understand that her dishonorable behavior is a reflection on Sophia, but she does understand that Sophia’s reputation is a reflection of her own, and “her Pride obliged her to support the Character of the Lady she waited on” (391). It is likewise with Partridge, who “greatly magnify[ed] the Fortune of his Companion, as he called Jones; such is a general Custom with all Servants among Strangers, as none of them would willingly be thought the Attendant on a Beggar: For the higher the Situation of the Master, the higher consequently is that of the [servant]” (416-17). If Sophia’s virtue represents Honour’s concept of honor and Tom’s fortune represents Partridge’s concept of honor, then the safeguarding of these two commodities facilitates their assertion of an independent identity among their fellow servants.

Honour’s machinations become more complex as the novel progresses, and she is ultimately caught out between her lukewarm desire to assist Sophia on the road to true love in the hopes of financial reward and her desire to attach herself to a more elevated household. Honour ultimately gains employment with Lady Bellaston in return for her silence after she discovers the clandestine affair between Tom and Lady Bellaston. For all of her worldly wisdom, Lady Bellaston has struck a deal with the devil; in asking Honour to keep a secret, “for a Secret … is often a very valuable Possession” (527), she has acquired a servant who will require a lifetime of tips to ensure her silence. Honour, in her own defense, asserts: “evere Persun must luk furst at ome ... no other Boddi can blam mee for exceptin such a Thing when it fals in mi Waye” (535-36). Our final image of Honour is through the eyes of Lady Bellaston, who “having secured the Evidence of Honour … saw sufficient Reason to imagine [that Honour] was prepared to testify” to “whatever” Lady Bellaston pleased—including committing a perjury against Tom that will contribute to his being pressed into military service. Honour may have attached herself to a lady with a coronet on her coach, the outward and very public signifier of rank, but in the process she has lost the moral ordering of Sophia Western’s world. Honour’s willingness to betray Sophia and Tom ultimately represents the modern concept of honor in crisis. She asserts
her individual identity through a higher rank, but she consigns her virtue to the murky shadows of Lady Bellaston’s sexually corrupt world.

Partridge, “though he had many Imperfections, wanted not Fidelity” (581). Unlike Honour, whose fidelity is always available for the right purchase price, Partridge stays the course. Doing all in his power to assist the romance between Tom and Sophia, in the end Partridge is pensioned off at £50 a year, the proud owner of his own school and the intended groom to the local sex kitten, Molly Seagrim. Partridge ultimately represents honor rewarded. He understands that honor is nothing without the moral guideposts which must, by definition, accompany virtue. His construction of an individual identity, that of school master, is achieved through his crucial understanding of the fidelity that goes hand in glove with honor and virtue.

In addressing the question of how to deal with the concept of honor in crisis, Michael McKeon comments that the form of the novel “emerged in early modern England as a new literary fiction designed to engage the social and ethical problems the established literary fictions could no longer mediate” (133). Fielding’s comic exploration of honor in crisis is indicative of the enormous social and ethical upheaval that occurred in the mid-eighteenth century, a period of rapid growth and upward mobility in the gentry. Growth and mobility brought with it troubling questions about the place, or lack of place, for the newly prosperous gentry in the existing social structure—questions that Fielding then transferred to the servants in *Tom Jones* in order to exploit the comic potential of a society in a state of flux.

Servants in the eighteenth century had no day-to-day family ties. Many were sent into service at a very young age and were dependent upon their employers not only for their livelihood, but for their sense of belonging and identity. The concept of individual identity, and certainly that of constructing an individual identity, is a thoroughly modern one. However, if we are to agree with Sheridan Baker’s assertion that *Tom Jones* is about “everyone’s search for identity,” then we must include the servants in that search. Like their social-climbing employers, Honour and Partridge use their understanding of rank and honor as an assertion of their individual identity. It may very well be a claim that is questionable, and oftentimes unsteady, but it is a vehicle that enables them to lurch toward the modern understanding of respectability.
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“Journeys of the Heart”: Laurence Sterne’s *A Sentimental Journey* and Jack Kerouac’s *On the Road* 

**KEVIN Cavanaugh**

“… ’tis a quiet journey of the heart in pursuit of NATURE, and those affections which rise out of her which makes us love each other—and the world, better than we do.”

—*A Sentimental Journey*

Throughout the span of English and American literature, the motif of the journey has come to represent both an exile and an escape, both a longing for home and a desire to explore the unknown, both a coming of age and an acceptance of mortality. However, throughout many of these texts a common theme can be found. The journey often becomes a spiritual quest that searches for or reclaims the most important values in life, what William Faulkner, in his Nobel prize Address, called the “verities of the human heart”: honor, courage, love, pity, compassion, hope, pride, sacrifice. In the late eighteenth century, a literary movement occurred in England which hoped to champion, in a sense, that idea of the reclamation of a value which the writers felt would lead to a truer understanding of life. Called both Sentimentalism and Sensibility, one of the main goals of the movement was to value the workings of the heart over those of the head, or, in other words, to value one’s ability to feel over one’s ability to think. One of the more famous novels of the time period that combined the ideals of sentimentalism with the motif of the journey was Laurence Sterne’s aptly named *A Sentimental Journey*, published in 1768. The episodic tale of a man’s travels through France and the lessons he learns of sensibility along the way, Sterne’s work had far reaching influence, as one can see by studying one of the more famous travel novels of twentieth-century American literature, Jack Kerouac’s *On the Road* from 1957. Both Yorick in *A Sentimental Journey* and Sal and Dean in *On the Road* set off on their journeys in order to find the ultimate goal of sentimentalism: an understanding of life that transcends the rationality of the human brain and connects us all together through the passions of the human heart.

Before discussing these novels, however, I must stop to discuss briefly the ideas of sentimentalism and sensibility. According to Janet Todd and Ann Jessie Van Sant, although the definitions of the terms “sentiment” and “sensibility”
were once divergent—the former meaning a “rational thought,” the latter the “faculty for feeling” (Todd 7)—over time, the two became interchangeable as sentiment began to be associated with feeling (Van Sant 5). It is in this merging that I would like to discuss the idea of the sentimental novel, and in turn sentimental characters, since I believe it is this definition for “sentimental” that Sterne employs in his work.

Within the first dozen pages of the text, after briefly explaining the difference between “idle travellers” and “travellers of necessity,” Yorick distinguishes himself from the rest by stating that he is a “Sentimental Traveller” (Sterne 11). According to Ernest Nevin Dilworth, “the Sentimental Traveler keeps his mind open and his heart warm in order to enjoy the amazing effects that good, unvarnished Nature has on both body and spirit” (82). Dilworth’s definition works into the goal of the sentimental novel in that it advocates the use of the heart over the head, since an open mind is one that does not jump to over-analyze or outweigh the influence of a “warm heart.” However, one can certainly argue whether Yorick himself is a traveler of sentiment and sensibility. He sets out on his journey unaware of his actual destination or reason for travel, as he impulsively and without much forethought decides mid-conversation to travel across the English Channel to discover if they truly “order … this matter better in France” (3). Although we are left to wonder what particular matter Yorick means, within a few sentences, he sits down to dinner in Calais.

However, shortly after arriving in France, Yorick comes in contact with a begging Franciscan friar whom he lambastes for having “no other plan in life, but to get through it in sloth and ignorance, for the love of God” (7). Yorick shuns the friar, refusing him any alms, and sends him on his way. These actions are hardly those of a man of sensibility, one attuned to the workings and nobility of charity. Rather, Yorick’s base rationality gets the better of him, and he fails to allow his sympathies, if he has any at this time, to influence his actions. Yet it appears that Yorick learns quickly from his mistakes, for he immediately reflects upon his behavior: “I have behaved very ill; said I within myself; but I have only just set upon my travels; and shall learn better manners as I get along” (8). Yorick’s reflection is an example of the original definition of sentiment, since in essence it is a rational thought. He thinks about the mistake he has made and vows not to let it happen again. As the book progresses, however, his responses to the world around him change, as can be seen in the chapter titled “The Mystery: Paris”:

It was a tall figure of a philosophic serious, adust look, which pass’d and repass’d sedately along the street…. By his pulling off his hat, and his attitude
Yorick’s immediate response to take out his money shows that he has developed the new sense of sentimentalism, reacting from sympathy rather than thought. The book itself, along with Yorick’s education, seems to work as a transition, then, from the earlier definition of sentiment to its current correlation with sensibility.

Similarly, Kerouac uses the ideals of sensibility to develop the hero of his book, Dean Moriarty. Like Yorick at the beginning of A Sentimental Journey, Dean is often seen throughout On the Road acting impulsively, without much, if any, forethought. No example better shows this characteristic than Dean’s driving. In Part III, Dean and Sal are escorting a Cadillac limousine to Chicago in heavy traffic. Sal Paradise narrates:

Dean came down on all this at 110 miles an hour and never hesitated. He passed the slow cars, swerved, and almost hit the left rail of the bridge, went head-on into the shadow of the unslowing truck, cut right sharply, just missed the truck’s left front wheel, almost hit the first slow car, pulled out to pass, and then had to cut back in line when another car came out from behind the truck to look, all in a matter of two seconds, flashing by and leaving nothing more than a cloud of dust instead of a horrible five-way crash. (236)

Dean values the emotional rush of his actions over the rational fear that would keep a less impulsive person from putting him or herself in the same dangerous situations. However, as with Yorick, the split-second decisions teach Dean “a style of dealing with reality, which achieved increments in consciousness beyond what other men could gain from the same experience” (Nicosia 290). The impulsiveness, then, brings the characters closer to the knowledge of life which they seek.

Perhaps the strongest comparison between Yorick and Dean in terms of sensibility and sentiment is seen in their relations with women. Yorick claims: “women—God bless them all!—there is not a man upon earth who loves them so much as I do” (Sterne 83). And in an almost direct echo of this sentiment, Dean states, “Oh, I love, love, love women! I think women are wonderful! I love women!” (Kerouac 140). In both books, the heroes love and leave women with great regularity, calling into question a bit their rational ethics as far as society’s norms for relationships are concerned; however, these relations with the female sex help to bolster both Yorick and Dean as men of sensibility. In the eighteenth century, women themselves were seen as naturally prone to sensibility because of their “inherent fragility” (Kraft 109). Women, then, become “avenues for fine
feeling” (Kraft 113), or, in other words, conduits through which men can reach a more sentimental state. By working from their hearts in their relations with women, Yorick and Dean prove to be moved by pathos over logos, by love over rational thought, and therefore they can be labeled “Sentimental Travelers.” Furthermore, as Ian Jack states in the introduction to A Sentimental Journey, there is a “connection between sexual attraction and the finer feelings in man and woman” (xx). Therefore, by freely pursuing their sexual desires, the characters come closer to an innate sensibility.

By Sterne’s standards, physical sex and sensibility are closely related through eighteenth-century physiology. According to Van Sant, “as a key idea in physiology … sensibility concerns the process of sensation, states of awareness, and sympathetic responsiveness” (14). In other words, sentimentalists believed that in a moment of sensibility there is a physical reaction which causes people to feel the way they do. Sterne humorously shows us an example of this idea in the scene in which Yorick obtains directions from a grisette in Paris, and then proceeds to feel her pulse to test her heart’s strength:

… most willingly will I say something very civil to you for all these courtesies. Any one may do a casual act of good nature, but a continuation of them shews it is a part of the temperature; and certainly … if it is the same blood which comes from the heart, descends to the extremes (touching her wrist) I am sure you must have one of the best pulses of any woman in the world. (53)

The grisette’s abundance of sympathy and compassion makes her heart beat faster than that of others of less sensibility. In a similar respect, Dean’s physical reactions in moments of sentiment show him to be a man of Sterne’s idea of sensibility: “Fury spat out of his eyes when he told of things he hated; great glows of joy replaced this when he suddenly got happy; every muscle twitched to live and go” (Kerouac 114). And perhaps nothing makes Dean happier or pushes him “to live and go” more than women.

Beyond their love of women, though, both Dean and Yorick show a sort of childlike desire to take in everything around them. Dean repeatedly tells Sal and the rest of the characters in On the Road to be aware of their surroundings, or to “dig” everything. For instance, upon seeing an old man on a mule wagon, Dean states: “Yes! Dig him! Now, consider his soul—stop awhile and consider” (113). He then relates to Sal his experiences as a youth working on a farm in Arkansas. By “digging” his surroundings, Dean becomes aware of the interconnectedness between himself and those he comes in contact with, hence increasing his abilities to sympathize with those people. Yorick’s interactions work in a similar way. As critic Arthur Hill Cash states, “Yorick … searches for moral sentiments. If
Mundungus would look ‘neither to his right hand or his left, lest Love and Pity should seduce him out of his road,’ Yorick, searching all about for Love and Pity, would not worry if he got nowhere” (33). By finding love and pity in almost all of the people he comes in contact with, Yorick also increases his capacity for sympathy and, in turn, his sense of sensibility.

By focusing on each moment of their respective travels, Yorick and Dean represent a major theme of most spiritual journeys: the trip itself is more important than the destination. Beyond this fact, the two also begin to understand a fundamental aspect of sentimentalism in relation to Time. Early in A Sentimental Journey, Yorick states: “What a large volume of adventures may be grasped within this little span of life by him who interests his heart in everything, and who, having eyes to see what time and chance are perpetually holding out for him as he journeyeth on his way, misses nothing he can fairly lay his hands on” (28). As Ian Jack states in the introduction, “What concerns Sterne is not time as measured by watches and calendars, but time as measured by the beating of his own heart” (xvii). Once again, by placing more importance on the heart than on a rational linear concept (such as measurable time), Yorick begins to live more deeply and moves a step closer to a greater understanding of life and a deeper connection to those who share the world with him.

Kerouac pursues this idea of Time in great detail in On The Road. The discussion begins roughly halfway through Part II when Dean states: “That Rollo Greb is the greatest, most wonderful of all. That’s what I was trying to tell you—that’s what I want to be…. He’s never hung-up, he goes every direction, he lets it all out, he knows time…. You see, you go like him all the time you’ll finally get it” (127). When Sal pushes him to reveal what he means by “it,” Dean simply replies, in capitals and with exclamation points (in a interesting bow to sentimental literature), “IT! IT!” (127). The reader does not get a full explanation of Dean’s philosophy until nearly a hundred pages later, but the correlation to Yorick’s ideas of time are evident. In discussing an alto saxman who has “IT!” Dean states: “All of a sudden somewhere in the middle of the chorus he gets it—everybody looks up and knows; they listen; he picks it up and carries. Time stops. He’s filling up empty space with the substance of our lives” (206). The “IT!” becomes a meditative state in which linear time is eclipsed by a more organic rendering, something in tune to the Biblical ideal of “God’s Time”: infinite, continuous, interconnected. The goal for Dean and Sal’s journey is to reach that state; however, like Yorick, they will not attain that goal until their travels are nearly complete.

Both Sterne and Kerouac bring their characters, in typical journey-literature
style, out of the city and into the pastoral regions of foreign countries in order to fulfill their quests. Yorick leaves London and ends up in the mountains of France; Dean and Sal leave New York, via Denver, and travel to the jungles of Mexico. What the characters find in these rather divergent topographies ends up as quite similar, however, and brings them the knowledge they seek: all people can connect to one another by opening their hearts and sensibilities and becoming attuned to the world around them. Yorick first begins to feel this way after meeting Maria, a young woman who has recently lost her lover. By the end of their meeting, Yorick is weeping with the woman and declares: “I am positive I have a soul; nor can all the books with which materialists have pester’d the world ever convince me of the contrary” (114). His experience with Maria and revelation that he is connected to a higher power through his soul sets him up for his important interaction with a peasant family deep in the mountains. It is with this family that Yorick realizes the great bond he has with others through living life by his heart, as their great hospitality moves him deeply: “I saw a testimony in every eye, not only of an honest welcome, but of a welcome mix’d with thanks that I had seem’d to doubt it. Was it this; or tell me, Nature, what else it was which made this morsel so sweet—and to what magick I owe it, that the draught I took of their flaggon … remain[s] upon my palate to this hour?” (119). His interaction with the family allows Yorick to reach Dean’s concept of “IT!” Time has stopped and he remains eternally connected to the people whom he opened his heart to, and who opened their hearts to him.

In his novel, Kerouac decides to let Sal Paradise, his semi-autobiographical narrator, have this same epiphany of interconnectedness. Although Sal’s experience is a bit different from Yorick’s, the lesson he learns is much the same. While trying to sleep in oppressive jungle heat, Sal climbs on top of the roof of his car to try to cool off: “Lying on top of the car with my face to the black sky was like lying in a closed trunk on a summer night. For the first time in my life the weather was not something that touched me, that caressed me, froze or sweated me, but became me. The atmosphere and I became the same” (294). Unlike Yorick, Sal learns his lesson by communing with the natural world around him; however, the knowledge he gains allows him the same insight into human connectedness, as the conclusion to Part IV shows. First, he and Dean meet a group of young Indian girls, whose devout interest in the men causes Dean to declare: “Ah, this breaks my heart! How far do they carry out these loyalties and wonders! What’s going to happen to them? Would they try to follow the car all the way to Mexico City if we drove slow enough?” (299). Sal’s reply shows that his experience in the jungle has given him deeper insight: “‘Yes,’ I
said, for I knew” (299). By the end of this section, Dean leaves Sal sick in Mexico City to go back to New York because he has to “get back to his life” (302). Although Sal is upset, his new-found wisdom allows him to “understand the impossible complexity of [Dean’s] life” (303). Like Yorick, by reconnecting to a higher understanding, call it God, Nature, or IT!, Sal is able to sympathize with his friend, grasp the motivations of his actions, and, therefore, find a degree of sensibility that provides him the deeper knowledge of life for which the sentimental travelers are searching.

Sterne once said that he set out to write A Sentimental Journey as a “work of redemption” (xv), and, in a letter to Sir William Stanlope in 1767, wrote: “[My] Sentimental Journey will … convince you that my feelings are from the heart” (Howes 185). Written from the heart, Sterne’s novel teaches us, his readers, a way to redeem ourselves, to live within our own hearts and reconnect to the world around us. Nearly two hundred years later, Jack Kerouac gave his readers a similar lesson. As his biographer Gerald Nicosia writes, “the heroes of On the Road, no matter how far they travel in the external world, are ceaselessly penetrating deeper into their own souls” (343), and “through the spiritualization of their own lives, Sal and Dean respirtualize America” (345). Although none of the travelers in these books reaches a real destination, as the tale of Yorick’s adventures is cut off mid-sentence and Sal and Dean end up almost exactly where they started from, the destination is not the point. Each of these characters travels to reconnect with himself and the collective consciousness that many try to find; and in the end, each of them is successful in these “journeys of the heart.”

Works Cited


In the novel named after him, which he narrates, Tristram Shandy notes: “For my part, I am resolved never to read any book but my own, as long as I live” (438). On one level, this statement is meant to make the reader laugh; on another, it suggests the uniqueness of the text. What kind of novel could make an author say he will read it to the exclusion of all other literature? A text that is so unique, both in content and style, that it bears resemblance to no other. We have some biographical notes as well as Sterne’s letters and commentary, all of which help to inform us, but the text itself consistently and purposefully engages the reader in a discussion with the narrator (and author) as well. Sterne intended Shandy to be amusing; he wanted his reader to laugh out loud as he read the text. Shandy is more than a good belly laugh, however; it is also a radical experiment with what the traditional novel is meant to be, and Sterne asks his audience’s participation in that endeavor. He is quite clear in his intent “not to be fed, but to be famous.” At the same time, he could not have created such a singular text with fame as his sole motivation. As Ian Watt argues, this text is made up of “undoubtedly essential expressions of Sterne’s tenacious struggle, under the most disheartening circumstances, to assert the social, intellectual, and emotional selfhood of his unique personality” (Riverside x). Nevertheless, it is difficult to separate that unique personality from the personalities of all the characters he creates in his great experiment. This text is not just an attempt by Sterne to capture the essence of Sterne, but an attempt to capture in writing the way we converse, think, feel, and interact with the world.

The relationship between reader and writer is an intrinsically elusive one. Questions about author intent, reader response, and the very substance of a text have plagued critics for centuries. As students of literature in the latter part of the twentieth century, we are taught to analyze the text and contemplate methodology; feminists have urged us to apply our own understandings, experiences, and lives to our reading; still other critics urge restraint, either encouraging us to believe that the text is a static entity or that much of the notion of author intent is conjecture. Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* inten-
tonally raises these issues in a radical, groundbreaking approach to the novel that still leaves critics dazzled and thrown off guard.

Writing the Mind

Sterne’s relationship with what today we call stream-of-consciousness writing is one of his most interesting experiments. Tangents of ten and even twenty pages are not unknown, although he would scorn the word tangent to describe any part of his master plan. Lengthy sermons, pages of Latin text, the author’s preface, which appears midway through Volume III, marbled pages, several stories, odes, blank pages that the reader is expected to fill, and lists of clothes and streets serve only as the most blatant of these intentional breaks with traditional novelistic convention. Sterne’s physical construction of his narrator’s brain actually supports his textual structure. Tristram says: “tis my father’s fault; and whenever my brains come to be dissected, you will perceive, without spectacles, that he has left a large uneven thread, as you sometimes see in an unsaleable piece of cambrick, running along the whole length of the web, and so untowardly, you cannot so much as cut out … a fillet, or a thumb-stall, but it is seen or felt” (371). He creates a biological example of stream-of-consciousness writing in his narrator’s brain. The difficulty, of course, is that Sterne’s randomness (both biologically and narratively) is in fact created with careful purpose and planning, an intentional randomness if you will.

The challenges such a randomness pose for the reader are many. At first, she must be willing to put aside the traditional plot Sterne is creating in order to study and obtain meaning from these tangents. Eventually, she learns to recognize that traditional plot does not exist and that the tangents are significant and even central (however contradictory the notion of a central tangent might seem). Moreover, she learns that form radically affects content, that how the story is told is actually far more important than the content of that story. Then she must ask herself why such an approach is being used.

In addition, there are countless occasions where Sterne experiments with stream-of-consciousness writing on a paragraph or even sentence level. He stops mid-paragraph or even mid-sentence to change focus, often identifying his strategy through a direct address to the reader. He repeatedly contradicts linear plot structures, merely as a matter of course, as he notes in Chapter IV of Volume I: “in writing what I have set about, I shall confine myself to [no] man’s rules that ever lived” (8). It is no small irony that the first third of the text takes place before the narrator has even been conceived. He often suggests a piece of information and then reminds the reader that he can check the source himself, as is
the case when he says: “I have not the time to look into Saxo-Grammaticus’s Danish history, to know the certainty of this;—but if you have leisure, and can easily get at the book, you may do it full as well yourself” (21). The first character introduced in Chapter VII is the midwife, and after devoting less than a page to that introduction, he leaves her for some twenty pages only to return and finally explain her relation to the story. Repeatedly, Sterne asks his reader to dive into the unexpected, and even the annoying, to experiment with the thought processes as they might be conveyed in writing accurately.

Locke’s *Tabula Rasa*

Locke’s concept of the *tabula rasa*, or clean slate, was prevalent at the time of Sterne’s novel. It served as a well-understood and popular theory of the day. On the surface, Locke’s idea is simple: the human being is born without any impressions, knowledge, or experiences—nothing but a blank slate. The portion of his theory that most intrigued Sterne, however, was the concept that ideas “which of themselves are not at all of kin, come to be so united in some men’s minds through chance, custom, and education that once any false or arbitrary connection has been made, one idea ‘no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it’” (Riverside xiii). Sterne interacts with that concept directly in his story when he says: “I mention this … as a warning to the learned reader against the indiscrete reception of such guests, who, after a free and undisturbed entrance, for some years, into our brains,—at length claim a kind of settlement there,—working sometimes like yeast;—but more generally after the manner of the gentle passion, beginning in jest,—but ending in downright earnest” (45). Sterne makes almost direct reference to Locke’s concept here but argues that struggling and intelligent humans can resist the temptation. From my perspective, he is merely poking fun at the unavoidable since he is clearly experimenting with the “unintentional” intentionality of his story almost constantly. This is manifested in stream-of-consciousness writing; hence, Sterne expresses ideas in his novel in an order that he believes Tristram (and at least in part he himself) would have thought of them. This is the way we think as humans, and so this is the way Sterne is writing, and in turn this is how he has Tristram tell his tale. He is figuratively putting brain on paper.

**Time and Narrative**

Time plays an essential role in any fiction, and the narrative of *Shandy* is no exception. Sterne makes the manipulation of time an exercise to be shared with
the reader—a practice that breaks out of the traditional approach to time and plot present in most novels of the day. Though he was not writing specifically about *Shandy*, Bakhtin suggests that “in the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible” (84). This is the very essence of Sterne’s experiment. The process of time transcends underlying meaning in the text to become visible, real, and tangible. It is an obvious, interactive portion of the text. Sterne makes himself extremely aware both of the time passing in the events that he unfolds and also of the time it takes the reader to complete the task of reading. To complicate the situation, he adds the writing time itself to the equation. In doing so, he makes the reader extremely aware not only of the process of writing (which is also evident when he places the preface midway through the text) but also of Tristram’s recognition of the reader’s awareness. As his tangents pile on top of other tangents, he admonishes the reader to “either laugh with me, or at me, or in short, do any thing,—only keep your temper” (11), a remark that not only shows Tristram’s awareness of the reader as a human being holding a text in her hand, but also his awareness of what that reader may be experiencing. Furthermore, the statement clearly is meant to make the reader laugh, either at its very existence, or at her reconceptualization of the author’s intent.

At times jarring the reader from her attempt to find strands of plot and linearity, Shandy reminds us of his intentional play with time. At one point, he notes that “it is about an hour and a half’s tolerable good reading since my uncle Toby rung the bell … so that no one can say, with reason, that I have not allowed Obadiah time enough, poetically speaking, and considering the emergency too, both to go and come;—tho’, morally and truly speaking, the man, perhaps, has scarce had time to get on his boots” (83). This sophisticated interplay suggests that the author (and narrator) wants the time that has elapsed in reading to be equal to both the time that has elapsed in writing and the time that has elapsed in the plot. At the end of one particularly abstract passage, he says: “I need not tell your worship, that all this is spoken in confidence” (32). This is particularly ironic since the reader as audience is aware of the fact that this text is published. Such a statement puts the author in league with the reader and also makes the relationship between reader and writer a private one—a one-on-one relationship, which is exactly Sterne’s point when he uses Locke’s concept of individual association. This association makes a reader engage with the text, but it also makes the text a private one for that particular reader because the meanings she finds in it are unique to her. This association is doubly
significant because Sterne is attempting the very same thing: an associative experience with his characters in the text that mirrors the associative experience he finds in people either in conversation or thought. Surely, Tristram’s father’s comment that “in our computations of time, we are so used to minutes, hours, weeks, and months,—and of clocks (I wish there was not a clock in the kingdom) to measure out their several portions to us, and to those who belong to us,—that ‘twill be well, if in time to come, the succession of our ideas be of any use or service to us at all” (151) is addressing not only his brother but also his reader and not only as Tristram relates it but also as Sterne feels it.

Tristram takes this one step further when he actually discusses the very topic he is creating: “My way is ever to point out to the curious, different tracts of investigation, to come at the first springs of events I tell;—not with a pedantic Fescue,—or in the decisive Manner of Tacitus, who outwits himself and his reader;,—but with the officious humility of a heart devoted to the assistance merely of the inquisitive,—to them I write,—and by them I shall be read” (54). He uses the abstract to describe the specifics of his text—the tangential nature, the stream of consciousness, and the intent behind both—not to over-intellectualize or “instruct” but rather to assist and entertain in doing so, to satisfy the curiosity of the human being.

**Purposeful Digression**

The connection between stream of consciousness and digression is a complex one, but they are certainly unified in *Shandy*, at least by Sterne’s intent to create them. The intentional is defined by Tristram as unintentional and yet presented as part of a plan, which, by its very definition, must have some intent behind it. He says mid-story: “in this long digression which I was accidentally led into, as in all my digressions … there is a masterstroke of digressive skill, the merit of which has all along, I fear, been overlooked by my reader” (57). While he claims his digression to be accidental, he also suggests that it is a “masterstroke,” implying an intention—one, in fact, that he continues to explain to the reader. He knows he is digressing, has no intention of “correcting” it, and yet claims it is unintentional. “Digressions, incontestably, are the sunshine;—they are the life, the soul of reading;—take them out of this book for instance,—you might as well take the book along with them;—one cold eternal winter would reign in every page of it” (58) stands as a statement of the importance and beauty of digressions in an author’s work. It also serves as a specific statement about *Shandy*, however. If the digressions were removed, the book would go “along with them” because, taking him seriously, the digressions are important and, taking him humorously,
because there would be nothing left of the text if they were removed. The knack, Tristram tells us, is in managing those digressions because they are “not only for the advantage of the reader, but also of the author;” largely because the tale stops moving whenever a digression takes place.

This intentionally digressive approach is only highlighted in his specific and direct conversations with the reader. Comments such as “it shall be solved,—but not in the next chapter” (87) and “My mother, you must know,—but I have fifty things more necessary to let you know first,—I have a hundred difficulties which I have promised to clear up, and a thousand distresses and domestic misadventures crouding in upon me thick and threefold, one upon the neck of another” (187) and “I begin the chapter over again” (371) are commonplace. They do not provide story flow; rather, they disrupt the story, intentionally, not only because the plot literally does not continue, but also because Tristram diverts the reader’s mind into direct dialogue with him. At times, Tristram also presupposes what the reader is thinking by actually taking her role. For example, he says: “—Tell it, Mr. Shandy, by all means.—You are a fool, Tristram, if you do” (164). His assumption of what the reader is thinking may in fact be a perception of himself as reader and therefore a part of the reading scheme.

**Intentional Unintentionality**

At the very least, Tristram is at the whim of the story as much as his readers when he says: “… we are got no farther yet than to the first landing, and there are fifteen more steps down to the bottom; and for aught I know, as my father and my uncle Toby are in a talking humour, there may be as many chapters as steps” (225). From this passage, Tristram has no say whatsoever in the story, no control even over its length, but rather is at the whim of the story to unfold for his telling. He shares the work-in-progress with the reader and, in doing so, makes her a part of the project. He also says at one point, “why do I mention it?—Ask my pen,—it governs me,—I govern not it” (334), once again showing a lack of control over his product, a lack of control which he shares with the reader. After deciding that it takes far longer for him to write about his life than to live it, he notes: “It must follow, an’ please your worships, that the more I write, the more I shall have to write — and consequently, the more your worships read, the more your worships will have to read” (228). These examples point out, once again, the intention to be unintentional. He literally creates narrative situations where he can put himself as Tristram at the whim of the story around him in an effort to share with the reader his style of writing as it reflects the reader’s style of thinking.
Tristram also frequently apologizes to the reader directly, as when he explains why he has let his chapter on chambermaids, green-gowns, and old hats suffice for his intended chapter on chambermaids and buttonholes, largely because some readers had informed him that his original intention was morally wrong (191). As he shares this experience of reading/writing with the reader, Tristram often claims a certain shared emotion with her as well. For example, he says that he is “obliged to be going backwards and forwards to keep all tight together in the reader’s fancy … I hang up in some of the darkest passages, knowing that the world is apt to lose its way, with all the lights the sun itself at noon day can give it — and now, you see, I am lost myself!” (370). He is aware of the complexity of his text but also of the difficulty it holds for the reader. He is laughing at the reader, but more with her, as when he says, ironically: “Now there is nothing in this world I abominate worse, than to be interrupted in a story” (386). This statement brings to the forefront the very nature of his tangents, and yet, if read in the reverse, tells us that those tangents are not off the topic of the story, or else he would be furious at all times since his entire text is made up of this kind of writing.

Conclusion

The relationship between text and conversation, between reader and writer, is a challenging one in *Shandy*. The notion of writing as conversation is addressed by Tristram himself, when he notes that “writing, when properly managed, (as you may be sure I think mine is) is but a different name for conversation” (87). He suggests that this is true because in writing, like conversation, one does not say everything, only a part. Such a practice is to be desired by the reader because the text can therefore leave something for her to imagine. This is not a radical or surprising idea—leaving something to a reader’s imagination is a pretty standard novelistic device—but what is radical is Tristram’s open discussion of it in the text.

I feel almost disloyal to Sterne’s project in presenting a linear argument about a text that is clearly meant to be exactly the opposite. I have explained several central attributes of the reader/writer relationship in *Tristram Shandy* and explored the relationship between human thought and this text. It is an intrinsically complex and therefore interesting topic, and I think Sterne would appreciate that fact perhaps better than anyone. The very nature of associative writing is at once annoying and awe-inspiring. *Tristram Shandy* is not an easy read by any means, and yet Sterne’s attempt to capture the way we think rather than the way we believe we think is truly radical, even today. The tight triangle he forges between writer, reader, and narrator allows him to have a frank and
theoretical discussion about writing and reader response as a part of a fictional and yet semi-autobiographical novel. Perhaps Tristram puts it best when he says: “Human nature is the same in all professions” (146). Sterne’s attempt is to capture that nature in his story but also to engage that nature in his audience. His relationship with the reader is a unique one, based on a love of his project and a desire to do what had not been done before.

Works Cited


Translation of Folco de Baroncelli

Catherine Aldington

Editorial Note: Catherine Aldington, daughter of the noted writer Richard Aldington, is a poet, translator, and President Emerita of the Association for Provençal Culture in les Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer, France. We were pleased to present a selection of her recent poetry in Volume XII of the Shawangunk Review, and in the present issue we include her translation of a poem by Folco de Baroncelli, who, as she explains in the introduction to her volume of his poetry, associated with some of the greatest figures of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Provençal literature and initiated many of the local celebrations for which the Camargue is now famous. He was also a breeder of bulls.

Catherine Aldington's “New Paltz Connection” dates from 1996 when Professor H.R. Stoneback, Director of the VIII International Hemingway Conference in les Saintes-Maries-de-la-Mer, invited her to be the Camargue Coordinator for the conference, which brought more than 300 scholars and writers to the ancient pilgrimage village on the Camargue Coast of the Mediterranean, including a number of New Paltz graduate students and faculty. In 2000, she and Prof. Stoneback co-directed the First International Richard Aldington Conference, at which several New Paltz faculty presented papers. She sends her greetings to her many friends at SUNY New Paltz and looks forward to seeing them again this summer at the Second International Richard Aldington Conference, “Writers in Provence.”

—The Editors
The Sacrifice

Venus, what can I offer up on your altar?
If, as in the past, we held the custom of sacrifices,
How humbly, how gratefully, I would have delighted
To bring you, from the marshes, the bull
Who is renowned from the Saintes Maries to the Cevennes.
With pride I saw him born in the wild herd,
For he comes from famous stock. Eagerly I watched
His horns grow to perfection as his breed demands.
Today his great shaggy withers
Exceed by a span his velvet back.
He is black as jet, his eye is dark, indomitable;
He has unrivalled horns, and the crowd becomes frantic
The moment he bursts like thunder into the arena.
He paws the ground, glaring and rumbling—
Woe to the wretched razeteur*
Who for glory or gain seeks to touch his forehead.
He is adored like a god and I named him Provence
In honour of this land…. Venus, I would have led him to you,
A rope on his horns, furious, rearing, held back
By twenty superb youths, trousers rolled up to their thighs,
For you, sweet pale Venus.
You have been good to me! I have known
The heavenly ecstasy hoped for by one in ten thousand
Of the pilgrims who, in ancient times, swarmed to your cities
And pressed into your temples.
All men believe they have found love, all strive
After ardour; sooner or later all give a shrill cry of pleasure.
But how many have bathed in your radiance?
How many have had their eyes marked by your irresistible finger?
How many have you taken by the hand, descending from Olympus
In human shape? Young men, you who speak of Love
As though it were like any other pleasant and transitory thing—
Be silent. Love is a great force
Which begets worlds and gives life to flowers.

—Le Cailar, 14 November, 1908

* In the Provençal games the object is not to kill the bull but to snatch a ribbon from between the bull's horns. The person who does this is the razeteur, who makes a series of running passes at the bull's horns.
Lou Sacrifice

Vènus, de qué iéu pode óufri sus toun autar?
S’avian, coume àutri-fes, lou biais di sacrifice,
Umble e recouneissènt, auriéu fa moun delice
De t’adurre lou tau que desempièi li clar
Di Santo enjusqu’i mount Cevenòu, èi celebre.
L’ai vist naisse em’ourguei dins l’escabot menèbre,
Car sort d’un sang famous. Ai regarda buta
Si bano segound l’èime óubliga pèr sa raço,
Atentiéu. Au-jour-d’uei a’n coutet que despasso,
Large e pelous, d’un pan, soune reble velouta;
Es negre coume un jai; a l’ue sourne e ferouge;
Es couifa coume ges e lou pople vèi rouge
Tant léu que dins lou plan intro coume lou tron:
Tiro braso,* espinchant de-galis, roundinaire,
E s’espóusso e malu au paure rasetaire
Que, pèr glòri o gasan, vòu ié touca lou front;
L’adoron coume un diéu e l’ai nouma Prouvènço
Pèr l’ounour dóu pais…. Vènus, dins ta presènço,
Embourgina, rabin, encabra, mantengu
Pèr vint droulas superbe estroupa jusqu’is anco,
Jéu te l’auriéu mena. Car, douço Vènus blanco,
Siés stato pèr iéu tant bono! Ai couneigu
Lou bonur celestiau qu’un ome sus dés milo
Di roumiéu qu’autre-tèms emplanavon ti vilo,
S’esquichant dins ti tèmple, avìè’spèr de gagna.
Tóuti creson d’avé l’Amour; tóuti s’óupilon
A crema; de plesi, quauque jour, tóuti quilon.
Mai dins ta lus quant n’i’a que se siegon bagna?
Quant n’as signa dóu det sus lis iue, decidado?
Quant n’as pres pèr la man, umano e davalo
De l’Oulimpe? Jouvènt que parlas de l’Amour
Coume de touto causo agradivo e mortalo,
Teisas-vous: l’Amour èi la grand forço eternalo
Que coungreio li mounde e qu’empregno li flour.

—Le Cailar, 14 Novembre, 1908

* In Provençal “tiro braso” literally means “pulls the coals out of the fire,” a resonant (and perhaps untranslatable) expression used to describe a bull pawing the ground.
Adopt a Highway

DENNIS DOHERTY

It's the most rewarding charge that you'll endure.
Take it, your home. Spiff the shoulders and approve.
You've got to steward the road, give vistas life,
keep the rest stop garbage from spoiling the sod
manicured or tortured in your own design,

to dip the road under bridges and span it
over faultlines, nudge it east or west per cast
of weather and whim, frame the caprice of jag
tor or curve creek in splay or pinion of rays.
Who's to thumb here the occasional hillock;
fan there the expanse of sand where sea begins?

Be a cook, crumbling crownlets of yellow, blue.
Spoons feed meridians with needles and fronds.
Ladle each skull cracking, spine snapping red wreck.
You'll never get a second chance. Photograph.
At dinner tell the tale of friend Finger Food

who swears it began when a woman rubbed musk
from her neck to his longing, consoled the chills
she coaxed at the corner of boyhood and man,
the mended crosswalk of sentiment and lust.
Surprise—of watered broken bits hardened fast.
Vulcanized scars, organic muscled tarmac.

How else reveal the absurdity of birds?
Tell a woodpecker from his signature hole?
We filter our pools with ground-up bug bone,
fuel our cars on the history of foot life.
Something made a moment; someone built on it.
There's more. That girl you knew who aborted Rome,
and the one you abandoned in San Miguel,
or the one you raised to smell bread, but smelled rats
(so you do, after all, fit her profiled bad man):
They're still talking to you, brides, daughters, come, come.
Adopt it all. Love as if it were your own.
Saints

DENNIS DOHERTY

The saints in the shoes by my bed
shrugged down to the arches as I
horned my way in and turned toward
the door a teen’s light step of noon

whose thumb dance on the curb alarmed
shop destined drivers that my leaps
and the throb in my smile which rose
from those candy and perplexed feet

tickled by these not so solemn
saints might be acts of a Manson
versus some kid rich with the need
for tree lined cicada hung streets'

unfurl to the park on the tongue
of ocean bay where waves birth rocks
and my toes purchased the juncture
where female arms stop the sun’s flame

and foam into illumined page
great with begetting of evening’s
increase like a peacock’s leaved fan
each eye an accruing idea

writing in seaslap song its own
speech of feet for the bridge across
the talk of saints on sands buoying
the found souls of stubs curled in joy

when night took the possible water walk
on the Sound on the Sound they said
book upon book the pontoon floats
holy iambic span save what sinks

till my legs turned lanterns on masts
moored with the far shore party boats
my torso its own oakum caulk
while this head breathes saints under tidepool dark.
Three Photographs of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain*

for Diane Smith

ROBERT SINGLETON

In photo one, he faces right, toward the edge of the photographer’s screen. His voice, if heard, would stutter, but seduce, teased out of hiding in perfect syllables as restitution for lives to come. His mind is another room, full of stove smoke and pious thought, his face, the inner recess, the serious eyes of the new professor.

He has learned to resist empathy, but the unkempt beard and the eyes laugh in spite of the rain that clamps the lips in a perfect crease. Resistance holds him stiff like an afterthought or a braked pen. Skittering in the photographer’s invisible braces, his knees buckle unseen below the frame, as his thoughts turn to Fanny in the state of Georgia.

In photo two, he dons the uniform of his country, grows a thick moustache and cuts his hair. Facing still to the right, he stares with slightly lowered gaze, poised between alacrity and pride. In the distant carnage he learns to admire solace while others die around him. “Live for the children,” he says.

This is fact and knowledge, the setting sun in the wounds of Petersburg. The declaration of the rights of man, the words in the foreshadowed deep

* Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain was professor of rhetoric, oratory, and modern languages at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine during the 1850s. He served four terms as governor of Maine and later served as Bowdoin’s president. He was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism at the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863.
of a pulpit in Brunswick.
He weeps and fasts in the coming dark
while the surgeons stitch him into a life of pain.

In photo three, his hair has turned to silver and gray.
The eyes are vivid above the moustache,
marching counterpoint to the black tie and suit.
He is now the soldier of education
who balances theology and change.
He congratulates the assassin of context,
knowing cowards will attempt to scale a wall
only if others uproot the road that leads to it.
Lucy’s Ghost

ROBERT SINGLETON

Lucy’s ghost follows me everywhere
as if we were family.
Lucy’s ghost and I are reading Sherman Alexie’s poetry under a tree.
She likes Sherman Alexie but confesses she doesn’t really understand his work.
She hovers around my head in a cloud of purple ink,
wearing a shawl of the same color over her shoulders.

She only allows me to see her
through the tightly woven storms our minds produce
or in a dream briefly remembered,
but this time she makes an exception
and tells me an anecdote about the Philadelphia Centennial
and the marvels she witnessed there.

All the trees around us have hoses coiled around them like rubber snakes.
She finds this amusing.
The clock on the church tower reaches eleven but only strikes once.
We are left to imagine the other ten, which we both do by counting out loud.
She finds this amusing too.
Her sense of humor is undaunted by the parade of her memories.

Her voice is like some metal wind.
Her voice is a lost gull.
Her journey re-acquaints us with the rain.
Birds fly out of it like the notes from a hot trumpet.
Packing

ROBERT SINGLETON

I slowly remove the old phonograph
from the back seat of the new car
under a full moon
by the Salvation Army bin in Rosendale
that will itself disappear
in two years with a host of objects
like this one.

It is an act of some emotion
even though a practical art.
Something shadowed—
Something measured—
then abandoned
like vanished capillaries
in the heart of an ancient statue
with an ache in its forehead
from its own
slow bronzing.
Excerpts from “In the Stations of the Wheelchair”*

H.R. STONEBACK

three straight nights sweetdreams:
I walk, run, then jump from cliff:—
Old Glory reclaimed

waking, believing dreams,
rise from bed, stand, free-hand:
then fall toward crutches

first time, note with precision all films, photos, of
FDR, standing

* * *

the machines that are
to make so much difference
the major did not

believe in the machines
I must believe in their
grammar of suffering

* The first excerpts here are part of an extensive haiku sequence. As presented here, the matter is not continuous; breaks in the sequence are indicated by three asterisks between haiku. Shortly before the events that are the background of these poems, the author had a lengthy conversation with the Poet Laureate, Billy Collins, in which it was generally agreed that everybody in America seemed to be speaking in haiku these days, that haiku seemed to be the new deep form and radical rhythm of American life. (Of course, this was a bar-room conversation.) I noted, for example, that all the announcements made over the loudspeaker on a recent cross-country Amtrak trip were made in the form of perfect haiku (e.g., “Attention! When the train is not stopped, it will be constantly moving”; perhaps a frustrated “orientalist,” or a deranged English major, is working for Amtrak.) Collins noted many examples of enigmatic and humorous haiku encountered in everyday life. Since that conversation, I have noted garage mechanics and newspeople and others speaking in haiku; and, after nine months on crutches and in wheelchair, I am able to confirm that haiku is also the natural form and rhythm of physical therapy, crutchwalking, and wheel Chairing.
doctor tells how to
get handicapped parking tag:
I stare, say nothing
today I perfected
the lateral transfer
from wheelchair to car

* * *

deglilts in bed trying
to recall which Impressionist
said: “We rise
from the depths of our
pain to paint”? and was that Renoir
who told Matisse:
“pain passes but beauty remains”?
Renoir, in his wheelchair;
nurse puts brush
in clenched arthritic
claw—paint spoor—bright and furious
loveliness is born
count the deglilts, work
the quads, paint the syllables—
flexed, silent, Words Rise
banish pious bromides,
art’s as short as life—
a song’s haunting echo
the dying fall of the sphinx-song—
nothing lasts long
nothing outlasts love

* * *
(from 9/11 sequence)

“We’re all New Yorkers now,”
five friends from five far states say,
whispered like prayer

“It will remain 9/11,”
he says, “until we get
that preening twit”

gentled by tragedy,
catharsis of community—
we watch, wait

gentled yet fierce, we remember:
salute the dawn
of 12 September

four hospitals, ten doctors
since 9/11—
it all seems personal

leaving Sloan-Kettering in wheelchair
I want to go
to ground zero

but we are stuck in traffic jam
at Saint Pat’s
I see the Christmas Tree

Together in tuneful
Christmas caves
we wait for it to be 9/12

fierce fragilities,
moiling mortalities =
imperatives of love
So this is the bill come due after fifty years, the long-deferred tab for stealing home, for endrun tackles; slo-mo cost of all those slam dunk and fast breaks, those ropeless cliffclimbs and freefalls, those dark snaky slimy stalagstuck cavecrawls; unpaid check for endless midnight Marine Corps forced marches, hobbling the last semper fi mile holding sarge's shoulders—that was not the first time, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, they said I had a trick knee, needed surgery. Account overdrawn: those neckwhipping bobsled runs down tunnels of ice; suicidal legsnapping toboggan spills down starsteep Hudson slopes; assassination attempts in communist countries, rockflung from sheer seacliffs, clutching at stoneshelves, crawling toward the café lights, bonebroke, refusing the hospital, tended by drunk Dr. G. Hemingway before boarding the furious flight that took me home, my first wheelchair-of-fortune ride.

—pegleg pragmatism zooming zigzagmatism
   King Arthroscopy on crutches
   Hugs Tiny Tim Cratchit
   riddle raddle ruddle knees and legs befuddled
   St. Anthony-bemedalled and St. Jude-candled
   this weird and wanton wheelchair walks on water—

In 1958 the Coach said: “You have trick knees, you need surgery, but you can wait.”
Now, in the sinister sodality
of silence among the smiling surgeons
the bill is delivered. The trick is paying
it, knowing you cannot run, or even walk,
away from it forever. But this wheel-
chair moves pretty fast. Watch me try this hill.
The *Times Book Review* and 
Sister Maria’s Prayer

H.R. STONEBACK

I. On Reading the *New York Times Book Review* at 3 AM before
Going to Surgery at 6 AM

I have read through every ad,
every review,
even the letters-to-the-editor:
the word “walk” does not occur
once in 42 pages.
I reject omens and signs
(most of the time)
but I make a note of this as first light
walks in my window.

II. Sister Maria’s Prayer

Nurse Carol shaves my leg, mid-calf to mid-thigh,
At 6 AM. She must have been an English major
Since she jokes about nematodes and neologisms—
I say I am Captain Kneenomo.
She says it is important to laugh before surgery,
Even at Kneeanderthal wit. When she leaves,

Sister Maria comes to my bedside
softly, her dark eyes still and wide.
She asks what I do—I say I am a writer and a teacher.
“What do you teach?” “Hemingway and American Lit.”
Then she asks: “What’s your Faith?” “You could say
Almost Catholic.” She smiles with her eyes.
“May I pray with you?” “Yes, please.”
Then she asks if it is OK for her to put her hand
on my shoulder while she prays.
“Yes,” I say, “but it’s my knee that’s bad.”
She smiles with everything this time.

And then she prays: “Lord let him
run this race with grace under pressure”—(my
thoughts wander, she knows Hemingway, I think of
inviting her to a Hemingway Conference, then I truly
hear her prayer)—“Lord let not pain and suffering
hinder the holy truth and poetic grace of every word
he writes, every word he speaks to his students.
Let him rise, and walk in the world with Your grace.”
She lingers, then she vanishes—
they roll me to the operating room,
I take her prayer with me to the cutting table,
holding her words tight as I go under the anesthetic,
holding her prayer that I might wake
and be worthy to live it.
Two Spelling Mnemonics

Pauline Uchmanowicz

A-r-i-t-h-m-e-t-i-c

A rat in the house may eat the ice cream:
rat yourselves out, vermin sliding down cake pans
in kitchen cabinets like Olympians glissading
the Alps. Add up how this
house is poisonous, learn that soon you
may Pied Piper to River Styx on crumbs you
eat, crystal shams, your thirst phase one of
the manufacturer’s money-back
ice job. Retreat now, or later you’ll
cream corpses, counting losses in the cold.

G-e-o-g-r-a-p-h-y

George eats old gray rats and paints houses yellow,
eats as lustily as sufferers of geophagy chew
old dirt due to famine or psychosis; his
gray fetish is not so strange, after all,
rats as food items go grow wild
and plentifully where he
paints, as starving artist or psych patient his quaint
houses don’t day, the trademark
yellow pox symptomatic of human sprawl.
Yellow House

Pauline Uchmanowicz

Strobe light, fire light  
ember of frankincense  
stoked by the lid  
of a wood-burning stove

Out dog-chewed windows  
snow piles wind  
a hydrant with a moat,  
marking a frozen castle  
 flyer orange flags  
as cozily as thimble-tinted stars displaying precession  
on equinox horizons  
 ring wobbling earth  
in a zodiac sampler

And on the pine wall  
adjacent to the icebox  
the crucified icon whispers  
God bless this home
Some hear prophecy in tap water, 
traffic passing or fire alarms, 
it's a matter of shifting loyalties 
like screening blurred to fore-
ground power lines and trees. 
In the thud, thud of stacking wood 
I hunt mammals resembling 
Standard English and zodiac stars 
marking their signs but—as 
existence with her crystal ball 
and tray of fortune cookies drags 
er her heels—am distracted by 
Bulfinch’s Mythology (inscribed 
“To a best dressed slave, Latin 
Banquet 1973”) and also Huizinga’s 
The Waning of the Middle Ages. 
In a time called Followers of Horus, 
sun gods make brutes from men. 
I search the land of mental referents, 
weaving A to Z, carving 
letters in the forest of philology.
Roses and holly, tatters of roses, tight
nubs of the still about to be red roses
and blowsy sprawls of roses still about
to be the roses once they were; and stiff
spikes of green holly, holly that is not
holly to be or holly that has been
but stiff spiked holly, green in no death now
and ever no death.

Roses, however, blurred
and deep in inner spices, roses spill
the spices of eternity and reach
you out of reach and reach you in reach, nod
and wag upon that springy thorny stem
next to the stiff imperious green holly
that can't be moved. And either still can stick you.
It's no joke now. The party is over. The old grey goose flaps at the cupboard reprieved, the palsy that afflicts the wooden table's cured, the plank at the doorway creaks desire, the jug pours wine. Just to look at the fire salts your tongue and your belly, your homespun crepitates to lace and flickers menace. Majesty slums and thunders, the room shakes mountainous intimacies; but not your wrinkles, they wax no combustion of flesh, the old death halts you and freezes you still, your fingers stiffen, you might as well be a tree, huffing and puffing away on the dirt floor, and root there. The charm of the young man basks behind his head and his face in the shadow smiles, the fire overcomes the fire in the dying impoverished hearth, he reckons you are not well and he hurries you on, together yes, in your ex-change of body that's known in the breaking of bread.
Polderland Drizzle

ROBERT H. WAUGH

The North Sea rains its slowest rains among our lambs; the softest fogs enlighten our quicksilver street; our Polderlands possess the longest pendulums.

Far away the cymbals, horns and kettledrums of the North Sea snore, of the North Sea beat; the North Sea rains its slowest rains among our lambs.

The straightest squares, the neatest terraces, the prams politest as they stroll our tidy urban seat, our Polderlands possess the longest pendulums.

The limpid telephone- and cable-wire hums the thinnest speculation; seven tulips heat; the North Sea rains its slowest rains among our lambs.

The densest gardenplots sit twiddling their thumbs, discussing whose manure fattens the reddest beet; our Polderlands possess the longest pendulums.

The most transparent window steadily becomes the flattest face, the dullest frame, the whitest sheet. The North Sea rains its slowest rain among our lambs; our Polderlands possess the longest pendulums.
Fireflies on the Fourth of July

ROBERT H. WAUGH

Chemical fires and bioluminescence
chase bodies through the wood, fire in the sky
showers, a willow wood of fire, a brace
of light that pulses white in the blackout sky,
comes up in your bowels and lungs, catches you out
in the black of the wood, and hours and hours later
torches itself loud back in the rocky hills
and laces up the bowels again. Green, blue and torch-fire
plunge spurting through the electric sky.

At hand
it's small and soft; a little pluck of fireflies
makes up the silent branches, there’s no word
spoken they speak of, no hand reaching out
they do not light, all that fire might as well be
anyone's fire and body, might as well
be your pluck, your touch, your torch, your hill, your cool
chemical fire and body fire and star fire.
Islands in the Stream can be read as a recapitulation of the themes and motifs that one finds throughout the writing of Ernest Hemingway. It is widely believed that this story was intended to be a part of the never-realized magnum opus, “Land, Sea, and Air,” and many of its ingredients would later be transformed into his masterpiece, The Old Man and The Sea. For his entire career Hemingway had been dissatisfied with critics who were unable fully to understand his intentions; the most pronounced elements of his Nobel acceptance speech highlight this discontent. In this particular novel, Hemingway restates with an increased clarity the same themes and concepts that had been prevalent in all of his writings; he lowered the waters, revealing more of his famed iceberg than ever before. For critics who prefer the short stories and novels of the twenties and thirties, Islands is almost too easy and up front. The long, reminiscent dialogues in the “Bimini” section have been called too autobiographical and appear to be nothing more than sentimental models for what we will read in A Moveable Feast. In contrast to his habits in previous fiction, Hemingway does not make any attempt to disguise the people that he knew. For example, in To Have and Have Not the anti-exemplary character Richard Gordon is intended to be a fictionalized manifestation of John Dos Passos; in Islands, however, Hemingway takes no steps to conceal the identity of his fellow writers. Pound is Pound, Ford is Ford, and most importantly Joyce is Joyce.

It is impossible to be familiar with Hemingway and not notice the frequency with which he refers to Joyce. In a letter to Bernard Berenson, he called Joyce “The best companion and finest friend [he] ever had” (Letters 789), and to Arthur Mizener he wrote that “Jim Joyce was the only alive writer that I ever respected. He had his problems but he could write better than anyone I knew…. I respected Mr. Joyce and not from reading his clippings” (Letters 696). Joyce and Hemingway maintained a close relationship and correspondence with each other; there are many anecdotes of their late nights on the town in Paris, but their relationship certainly was not limited to drinking and brawling. Of all of
the writers engaged in the life that would become *A Moveable Feast*, Joyce receives unusually high praise. Hemingway recognizes him as a master of his trade and sought him out for what he could learn from him. James Schroeter's article “Hemingway via Joyce” suggests a parallelism between the character of Pop in *Green Hills of Africa* and Joyce:

Joyce was the one who had been there first, who knew absolutely the literary landscape, who could see what constituted a working subject. He was the explorer, tracker, and guide who taught them what it was all about; not as the literary critic does by saying what is right or wrong after someone has already done it, but by doing it—the only kind of knowledge and teaching Hemingway ultimately respected. (102)

Hemingway was clearly a student of Joyce’s technique. He let Joyce read and advise him on his drafts, and he was very familiar with the manuscripts that would become *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. It wouldn’t be prudent to suggest that Hemingway’s style was in any way a parroting of Joyce’s, but it would be equally foolish to deny any influence. Hemingway was never an acolyte of Joyce; he expressed disdain for such idolization. In a letter to Arnold Gingrich he asserted: “I don’t worship Joyce. I like him very much as a friend and think no one can write better technically. I learned much from him” (Letters 384). He had learned enough of Joyce’s technique that he was sufficiently competent to parody the style of *Dubliners* in the last half of the second chapter of *Torrents of Spring*. Not surprisingly, *Torrents* is understood to be the book by which Hemingway shows that he as the student had successfully mastered the techniques of his masters.

*Dubliners* contains Joyce’s most conventional use of prose; compared with *Ulysses* or the *Wake*, it seems to be straightforward story telling. In *Hemingway: The Writer as Artist*, Carlos Baker records an anecdote in which Hemingway compiles a list of sixteen books that “he would rather read again for the first time than be assured a million dollar annual income” (175). *Dubliners* is on that list, and when the list was expanded to about twenty-five books, *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and *Ulysses* were both added. *Dubliners*, like Sherwood Anderson’s *Winesburg, Ohio*, is a collection of short stories which are thematically interrelated, have a natural progression, and are intended to be read as a singular text. Although the parts can be separated, and unfortunately often are, their ordered grouping in the collection strengthens their impact on the reader. Hemingway understood this design when collecting the stories that would become *In Our Time* and *Men Without Women*. In such essays as “Dubliners in Michigan: Joyce’s presence in Hemingway’s *In Our Time***,” Robert Gajdusek has
provided an excellent examination of the orchestration and construction of the two collections of short stories; he has also highlighted an great number of echoes, correspondences, correlatives, and patterns of shared symbolic constants. Gajdusek does not imply that the two authors “share a style” but argues that “they do share many aspects of technique, and they approach their dissimilar plights and beliefs with similar terminology, strategy, and ritual” (48).1

Ulysses, Joyce’s masterpiece, is an entirely different story. There is little or nothing in the biographical record that explicitly links Ulysses with Hemingway, although in one letter to Sherwood Anderson Hemingway does laud it as “a most god-damn wonderful book” (Letters 62). Many scholars would deny that Hemingway was influenced by one of the twentieth century’s most influential books, but I find significant evidence of such influence in Hemingway’s work. In his first novel, The Sun Also Rises, we see two echoes drawn from Ulysses. Among the myriad of reminiscences Molly Bloom has in the Penelope chapter, she remembers the bullfights and specifically the “ripping all the whole insides out of those poor horses” (18.634). It is precisely the violent death of the horses in the bullring that Brett Ashley finds most disturbing; she remarks that “they do have some rather awful things happen to them” (169). A more striking echo is the foundation of one of SAR’s key passages. In Joyce’s book, Haines is talking to Dedalus on the beach at Sandymount:

—You’re not a believer, are you? Haines asked. I mean, a believer in the narrow sense of the word. Creation from nothing and miracles and a personal God.
—There’s only one sense of the word, it seems to me, Stephen said. (1.611).

Hemingway adapts this line for his own use, carefully extracting many of the words and yet leaving all of the implications intact. Both Joyce and Hemingway place this conversation on the edge of a body of water to invoke the image of a baptismal font; in SAR the following two lines of dialogue occur between Jake and Bill during their fishing trip:

“Listen Jake,” he said, “are you really a Catholic?”
“Technically.” (129)

Carefully, Stephen neither confirms nor denies Haines’s inquiry; Jake is ardent in his belief. Hemingway echoes Joyce’s understanding that in Catholicism there is only one way to believe: by technically adhering to the rituals and beliefs of the church. Both passages are intended to indicate whether or not the protagonist accepts the Nicene Creed. However, there is a difference between the beliefs of these fictional characters that reflects the religious differences of their
creators. Dedalus and Joyce share the qualities of fallen Catholics; Jake has the surety of Hemingway, a recent convert. This essential difference in ideology sheds light on the contrast between the outcomes for *Dubliners* and *In Our Time*. The two works follow the same progression from initial loss of youthful innocence through sexual awakening, admittance into adulthood, marriage, and finally death, but it is at this last stage that the beliefs of the authors cause their narratives to diverge. *Dubliners* concludes in a wintry reconciliation with the mortal facts of death and remembrance; *In Our Time* leaves its readers with a different understanding. Nick Adams has embarked on a fishing excursion that takes him to the very edge of the mire and graves of the wasteland, but his newly acquired understanding of death is far more transcendental. Nick can choose the appropriate time to fish in the swamp and can come and go as he pleases.

The influence of *Ulysses* on Hemingway was not limited to allusions. Hemingway found an example of perfect technical expression in Joyce and employed it in his own fiction. In “On Writing” Nick exclaims that Joyce “made Mrs. Bloom up. She was the greatest in the world” (NAS 238). Baker refers to the last chapter of *To Have and Have Not* and suggests that “in a manner somewhat like the Molly Bloom sequence at the close of *Ulysses*, comes the soliloquy by Marie Morgan—a final chorus of lament for the slain” (Writer 218). As Joyce explained in a letter to Frank Budgen, it was his intent “to leave the last word with Molly Bloom—the final episode *Penelope* written through her thoughts and body” (Ellman 274). It may have been thematically similar for Hemingway to end his book with the thoughts of a woman who is left alone, but the similarity ends there. In Marie’s conclusion we do not see her through her “thoughts and body” as clearly as we see Molly. In the same book, Hemingway comes much closer to capturing this vision of character in the Dorothy Hollis scene in chapter twenty-four, which shows a woman alone with her thoughts while the men, as in *Penelope*, are sleeping. The interior monologue of this drugged and masturbating woman shares the repetitiveness, reminiscence, and sensuality of Molly’s soliloquy, but it lacks the power and wholeness that Joyce creates. If Hemingway is using *Penelope* as a model here, he has either tried to disguise it or has yet to realize the technique fully. Dorothy comes across to the reader as profane, whereas Molly, though sexually explicit, appears to be wholly natural and very nearly sacred. The *Penelope* section is Joyce’s attempt to reach a portrayal of the “Human, all too human”(Ellman 278), and the chapter “turns like the huge earth ball slowly surely and evenly round and round spinning”(285). Molly becomes an entity that is complete, can be viewed as a whole, and is timeless. The technique Joyce employs to accomplish this is a long interior monologue
that is constructed of short, associated statements that meander of their own volition and return to the frequently repeated crux word yes. The chapter is composed of only eight sentences; the first is approximately 2500 words in length. It is an enormous flurry of memory and sensation. Hemingway adopted this technique, though greatly reduced in magnitude, to capture the totality of a single moment, and he did it twice.

The sexual encounters between Robert Jordan and Maria in For Whom the Bell Tolls also follow the model of Penelope. Consider the following example:

For him it was a dark passage which led to nowhere, once again to nowhere, always and forever to nowhere, heavy on the elbows in the earth to nowhere, dark, never any end to nowhere, hung on all time always to unknowing nowhere, this time and again for always to nowhere. (159)

The passage seems to be unique compared with much of the rest of the book, but the technique is repeated in Robert’s second sexual encounter with Maria, the famed “Gloria” passage:

And where are you and where am I and where is the other one, and not why, not ever why only this now; and one and always please then always now, always now, for now always one now; one only one, there is no other one but one now, one, going now, rising now, sailing now, leaving now, wheeling now, soaring now, away now, all the way now…. (379)

The aim of these passages is to capture a single moment; actual time is stopped so that the reader may examine all of the thoughts and sensations that are occurring simultaneously. Hemingway wants us to understand the perfect stillness that allows his characters to “feel the earth move” (FWTBT 160). To accomplish this in his own writing, he needed to return to the technique of Joyce. It has long been understood that the limitation of writing is that it cannot describe events or details simultaneously. Because we read from left to right, written details must be ordered in a sequential fashion. Joyce challenged this restriction and distorted traditional prose to compensate for writing’s deficiencies in Ulysses. In the Wandering Rocks episode, he created a pattern of separated, short narrative lines. Each of these lines returns to at least one action that appears in an additional line. Because of shared events, the reader can come to understand that various narratives are overlapped in both time and space. In Penelope, Joyce is less concerned with action and place than with perception. Given any particular object, the human mind uses all of its faculties to determine the object’s nature and identity; these resources are all applied simultaneously and are not limited to the objective sensory perception, but also include emotions, relativity, and a sense of
history. The limitations of writing do not permit all of the details of an object or scene to arrive at once. To compensate, Joyce increased the speed at which the details arrive by eliminating grammatical obstruction. The frantic, impassioned repetition is magnified in the “Gloria” passage, where Hemingway returns to his crux words, *one* and *now*, with an even greater frequency; the same is true of his use of *nowhere* in the “Earth Moved” passage. He has also seeded his interior monologues with considerably more punctuation. He did this to increase the reader’s sense of the rapidity of thought. Rather than in a single, unstoppering stream, Hemingway writes in a quick, wild pulse that mirrors the heartbeat of his protagonist. Hemingway’s technique is dissimilar enough from Joyce’s that it is certainly his own, but the goals of the passages in question are the same, and clearly the same fundamental technique is employed in each of them.

The painting of Thomas Hudson also tries to capture the sensual totality of a single moment. When Hudson says that he is “going to paint it truer than a photograph” (IS 148), he is attempting to capture a truth about the scene that even a photograph could not. It does not imply, as Stephen Mathewson points out, “a hyper-realism, or what has become known as ‘photorealism’” (142). Mathewson’s observation should strike a strange chord in the ear of a discerning reader. The Photorealism movement in the arts began with Malcom Morely’s paintings of ocean liners in 1966, five years after Hemingway’s death. Even if the author had intended his protagonist to join an artistic movement that had not at the time existed, his phrasing is wrong. The basic tenet of Photorealism was to capture a scene with flat, plastic-based paints or other materials that would not betray brush strokes and to paint with a precision and clarity that a spectator could easily mistake for a photograph. The movement hopes to mimic a photo, but Hudson says that his painting should be “truer than” that. To begin to understand what Hudson wants to accomplish with his paintings, we should first consider what is missing in them. While sitting on the beach, young Tom points out that “a nude by papa would be nothing like that chapter by Mr. Joyce” (IS 75). This single line gives a great deal of insight into how Hudson paints at the beginning and how he would paint in the end. The line makes us reconsider Hudson as a “well ordered” painter. By ordered, it is meant that Hudson can isolate the individual elements in his painting and arrange them in their proper place. This aim is very different from Joyce’s in writing the *Penelope* chapter. The myriad of elements that make up Molly Bloom’s soliloquy are not separate from each other, but are all interconnected by the episode’s associative prose. The relevance of Joyce’s chapter becomes clear when considering which of the two paintings of the broadbill is going to be the most trouble for Hudson. The fish
leaping out of the water will be easy for him to paint, but the fish submerged is an entirely different story. Out of the water, the fish becomes a single element that can be isolated and treated by the artist. While submerged, the fish is a part of the ocean; the waters of the Gulf Stream move over its length and through its gills. The environment and fish are a part of each other. It is the connectivity of nature, its Gloria if you’ll permit me the word, that Hudson will try to capture in his painting, and it is the process by which Hudson comes to see this connectivity that constitutes the narrative of the book.

The correspondences of structure, theme, and technique as well as a number of clear echoes show that Joyce was much more than a mere cohort and drinking buddy of Hemingway’s; he had a significant impact as a teacher. Hemingway once remarked that “Any poet born in this century or in the last ten years of the preceding century who can honestly say that he has not been influenced by or learned greatly from the work of Ezra Pound deserves to be pitied rather than rebuked, it as if a prose writer born in that time should not have learned from or been influenced by James Joyce” (Baker, Life 236). Of course, he meant himself as well.

**Notes**

1. The ideas that Prof. Gajdusek introduces in this article are thoroughly expanded in his book *Hemingway and Joyce: A Study in Debt and Payment*.

**Works Cited**


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Strange Bedfellows: James Boswell and William Hogarth on Marriage in Eighteenth-Century England

Rebecca Cummings

As Samuel Johnson once said, “when a man is tired of London, he is tired of life; for there is in London all that life can afford” (Paulson 12). When a woman was tired of eighteenth-century London, it was probably due to the constraints of her domestic life, for the three options for women of a marriageable age during that time were not promising. A woman could have been a wife, a spinster, or a prostitute, and as either the former or the latter, she was subject to the man who acquired her. In his London Journal (1762-1763) James Boswell gives an account of his own acquisition of a woman in a faux marriage, while William Hogarth critiques the socio-economic institution of marriage in his series of paintings entitled Marriage à la Mode (1743-1745). These two “authors” transcend their respective genres—journal writing and painting—and present a vision of themselves that is grounded in British, and more specifically London, history and culture, illustrating the marked economic and social implications of the institution of marriage. By examining Boswell’s and Hogarth’s biographical and literary backgrounds, the marriage customs in eighteenth-century England, and the major themes of avarice, lust, and disease that are associated with marriage, we can clearly see the consequences of marriage for English women, though they are expressed through the voices of these men.

Though the marriages presented appear to be equally corrupt, Boswell and Hogarth came from vastly different social classes. Son to John Boswell, the first to inherit Auchinleck, James Boswell, who also inherited privilege from being the eldest son, comfortably lived “in the poetic Ayrshire landscape” of Scotland (Quennell 5). His aspirations seemed to be very high from the start: to become an exceedingly famous writer and to marry into a good family. His father, however, dissuaded his son from the writing profession and persuaded him to study law, for Lord Auchinleck’s strict character made him “the foe of every romantic impulse” (Quennell 5). William Hogarth was also constantly under the burden of his father, but it was because during the majority of young William’s life his father was indebted, and the family was confined to prison (Paulson 9). Thus, Hogarth opposed many of the upstanding English institutions that he found to
be unjust, and marriage served as a prime example of such institutions. In nearly all of his paintings and engravings, his portrayal of various cruelties and societal ills, such as torture, disease, greed, and lust, had both a self-serving and didactic purpose owing to his “inbred hatred of confinement by rules, precepts, academic assumptions, or whatever constricts the individual”; his craft was thus formed, for he wanted both to establish a democratic art academy and to redefine the genre of history painting (Paulson 13). Boswell, on the other hand, aligned himself with the literary greats of the time—Henry Fielding and Samuel Johnson—in order to secure his status. Paradoxically, it was by association with high society, which they often criticized, that both Boswell and Hogarth transcended their birth and worked in their genre of choice.

The career of neither Boswell nor Hogarth can be neatly categorized as “literary” or “artistic,” for journal writing can be seen as a type of historical retelling, especially with Boswell’s vivid portrayals of pubs, parks, and hotels that did in fact exist in London at that time, and Hogarth’s serial paintings can be read as a type of story told by images rather than by words, though there are a few words and names hidden throughout the paintings. Both “authors,” however, were vitally concerned with the idea of marriage, which they depict as a legally, but not emotionally, binding relationship. Though they approach the subject of marriage in two different ways—by presenting it historically or by satirizing it—they ultimately arrive at the same end. Boswell’s journal gives us a personal, yet contradictorily, distant glimpse of his feelings regarding marriage. That distance is created by the social commentary that allows us to take the events out of a literal context and place them historically. Much of what Boswell presents to us seems contradictory, for he was “a soul divided between his love of Scotland’s positive virtues and a passion for the social, intellectual, and literary excitement offered by London; between a deep respect for sobriety, order, and restraint and impulses that led him from the paths of right living and encouraged wild indulgences in ludicrous fancy” (Brooks 20). William Johnson Temple claimed he was “grave, sedate, philosophick [sic] friend, who used to carry it so high, and talk with such a composed indifference of the beauteous sex” (Quennell 7). While he may have been indifferent to the mental state of women, Boswell certainly sports an almost irrational attitude regarding their physical being and the acquisition of it. As he proclaims several times in his journal, in affairs concerning the heart and the mind, his mind usually stands defeated. Though during his trip to London “Boswell was discovering that deep dependence, emotional and intellectual, upon other human beings” was an essential element to life, he never made that connection with a woman, including Louisa, whom he claimed to
love “violently” (Quennell 8). Boswell accepts the conditions of eighteenth-century courting rituals more than he criticizes fraudulent marriage practices, for he initially benefits from his “marriage.” On the other hand, Hogarth seeks to criticize and moralize through his portrayal of a city couple. Hogarth’s works have been termed “graphic journalism” because “he has been said to use colours instead of language” (Cowley 1). The series *Marriage à la Mode* reads from the first painting to the sixth as episodes in the couple’s life and can be compared to the interaction between Boswell and his potential romantic conquests, the major difference lying in the legally binding pact of Hogarth’s unsuspecting victims. Hogarth “shows a determination neither to weaken the moral force of the series by distractions nor to offend those who could afford to buy the prints” (Cowley 8). While the painter could openly satirize an unidentifiable couple, it was quite another thing to attack the institution of marriage that was supported by both the church and the upper class. Nevertheless, most of Hogarth’s other works present him as a precursor to muckrakers like Upton Sinclair, but they are meant to be more of a Horation satire that harmlessly amuses while criticizing a general idea: the adulterous, wealthy husband who marries down to the licentious, common wife. This series was initially derived from John Dryden’s comedy *Marriage à la Mode* (1663) and the characters of Rhodophil and Doralice, who enter into the marriage lovingly but soon after become bored and consequently strayed (Cowley 5). The Earl and his wife in Hogarth’s *Marriage* do not represent these characters directly, or, true to Horatian satire, any of Hogarth’s contemporaries in particular, but we are expected to see them as thinking beings, not abstract types (Bind 108). Whereas Boswell presented real people, who were often either wealthy or famous, in the literal sense by naming most of his acquaintances by their first name in his journal, Hogarth presents real people in the bourgeois sense by illustrating the routine of everyday life. As a nascent artistic talent, Hogarth understood “that the public derived pleasure from seeing real people in paintings and prints” and that he would gain fame from that (Bind 73). The eighteenth century was a time of great change, particularly economic, which both Hogarth and Boswell sought to capitalize upon.

In this “a trifling age,” as Henry Fielding termed it, the institution of marriage deserved the attention of these two “authors” because it reflected the hierarchical order and obsession with status that plagued eighteenth-century England (Boswell 91, Golby and Purdue 30). Just as Boswell briefly mentioned the prostitute of the day or the woman whom he would marry, Hogarth took a similarly whimsical attitude when he fashioned his delicate, yet fleshy, brushstrokes after
the French Rococo in order to produce a fanciful, Romantic charm that ironically contradicts the loveless pair. Boswell wrote his *London Journal* ten years after the passing of the Marriage Act of 1753, which mandated that only weddings contracted in the church were legitimate (Golby and Purdue 47). The older generations, however, felt that this law was dispensable. This was beneficial to Boswell, for according to the old custom, claiming to be married to someone and then consummating the relationship solidified the marriage; in his pursuit of Louisa, he convinces inn-keepers that they are married in order to have a meeting place, and according to the older law, he would be responsible if anything happened to his wife. Instead, Boswell engages in premarital sex, which “might be an offense punishable in the Archdeacon’s court but, provided it took place after espousal, it was approved by popular opinion” (Golby and Purdue 47). Thus, popular opinion not only guided the work of both Boswell and Hogarth, but also directed the status quo. Apparently devoid of the contemporary notion of “family values,” another practice occurred frequently and was a part of the status quo: wife-selling. Since divorce had not yet been legalized, “wife selling was ritualised ceremony regarded by popular culture as a perfectly legitimate form of divorce,” where a pre-arranged bargain took place and the wife was awarded to the highest bidder, her price varying anywhere from sixpence to six guineas (Golby and Purdue 47, 48). Though neither Boswell’s nor Hogarth’s work portrays wife-selling, Boswell engages in the purchasing of a woman via prostitution, and Hogarth represents what amounts to the same thing with the marriage contract drawn up by the bride’s greedy father. Thomas Hardy’s *The Mayor of Casterbridge* does present a wife-selling to exemplify English women’s lack of power and the husbands’ abuse of it. Although marriages may have been unpleasant, “it was at least a destination, a state of definite arrival rather than an indefinite period of waiting,” and women who waited, or became spinsters, were thought to be destined to be the property of all men because they did not want to be the property of one (Malcolmson 134). Thus, marriage served as a form of entrapment for some and as a standard of comparison by others.

The primary way that marriage trapped women was through financial power, and if a woman was not married, she had to acquire financial power in some way. Attaining financial power was problematic, for one of the only available occupations for women was prostitution. No jobs that women worked, even those involving literature, were acceptable to eighteenth-century British society. In fact, women who were financially independent and did not hold titles, and even some who did, were often ostracized; those who were wealthy had reputations for
being eccentric. Yet a woman who married below her class could also be knocked from her pier on the social ladder, for as Boswell states, “To a woman of delicacy, poverty is better than sacrificing her person to a greasy, rotten nauseous carcass and a narrow vulgar soul” (Boswell 64). Whether married or prostituted, women in the eighteenth century were commoditized, bought and sold by their fathers, brothers, and neighbors, as is exemplified in Boswell’s two-guinea misunderstanding with Louisa and in the first scene of Hogarth’s Marriage à la Mode.

Though in his London Journal Boswell narrates rather than engages in meta-reflection, most of his personality can be derived from his portrayal of potential mates. In fact, although twenty-first century readers may be horrified to read Boswell’s statement, “I thought my seeking a lodging was like seeking a wife. Sometimes I aimed at one of two guineas a week, like a rich lady of quality. Sometimes at one guinea, like a knight’s daughter; and at last fixed on £22 a year, like the daughter of a good gentleman of fortune,” he does have moments where his Scottish birth becomes noticeable and he is able to distance himself from and criticize distinctively English practices (Boswell 59). Yet as is evidenced in eighteenth-century customs regarding courting and marriage, this opinion most likely shocked no one in his day. Nevertheless, women who appeared to be beautiful, well-bred, and wealthy were the only ones whom he deemed worthy of his love, and the fair actress Louisa proves to fill that position momentarily in his journal. As Boswell falls more “violently” in love with her, he seems to forget that little else exists except for his reputation and finances. However, when Louisa needs to borrow money, Boswell chivalrously hands over two guineas, a paltry sum of money, without stressing her debt. In fact, he posits the notion that two guineas are better than ten, which is the amount needed to cure a venereal disease. He assumes that Louisa’s virtue has kept her away from the diseased fate of prostitutes, and her career as famed actress seems to attract, not repel, him in spite of the ill repute given to actresses in general. This exchange begins their nearly contractual relationship, for this economic exchange renders her indebted to him and she claims to be “infinitely obliged to him” (Boswell 97). While her identity is now linked to his through obligation, Boswell assumes a false identity as “Mr. Digges” in order to secure his name when procuring various hotels for their recreation. Both pretend to be married in order to be able to sleep together in the same room and remain acceptable in society. In renaming himself, he erases his wandering passions and attempts to enjoy his new “wife.” In true Boswellian style, however, this enjoyment renders him incomplete, and he must move on. Boswell moves on to exploring the seedy
streets of London at night, forgetting his vow to avoid prostitution because he was, literally and figuratively, burned by Louisa.

Although prostitution is not socially linked to marriage, they are financially co-dependent, for if a husband casts off his wife for any reason, she will most likely be unable to support herself with her virtue or purity. In many ways, women who were widows or, even worse, abandoned by their husbands were damaged goods, and becoming a courtesan was a likely, if not their only, option. Even on a limited budget, there was a hierarchy of prostitutes and a variety of choices, from “the splendid Madam at fifty guineas a night, down to the civil nymph with white-thread stockings who tramps along the Strand and will resign her engaging person to your honour for a pint of wine and a shilling” (Boswell 83-84). Boswell did not stray away from English courtesans even though he could often be “glossy with conceit,” which suggests that his behavior was not only commonplace but accepted among the leisure class that he strove to be a part of (Quennell 8). Although Boswell would have liked to think himself a nobleman, he often acquainted himself with the seedier kind of prostitute, for he did not have the economic means to indulge in the choicest “goods.”

Hogarth’s first scene in *Marriage à la Mode*, entitled “The Marriage Settlement,” portrays a much higher and more “dignified” kind of life: that of the city couple. Though it was certainly not meant to represent all marriages and was even the companion piece to a future series portraying a jovial country marriage, Hogarth wanted to illuminate the wrongs of a marriage of comfort. While the characters in this painting engage the audience, the most captivating element is the grandeur and magnitude of the surroundings. Setting a tone for the rest of the series, the first room engulfs its inhabitants and even threatens to take over the subject. Hogarth intended this for both didactic and humorous purposes, for he wanted the pictures to be placed in English homes, which in sheer magnitude illustrated “the passion for building ever more elaborate houses … which is at the root of the whole sad story (Jarrett 146). In addition to the great rooms, Hogarth covered each wall in paintings of biblical, mythical, and classical figures along with portraiture. In “The Marriage Settlement,” the portrait of a king-like figure hangs above the Earl and Lord Squanderfeld, the bride’s father. True to the English patriarchy, where the king is the father of his country and the father is the king of his home, Squanderfeld holds a family tree to signify his social and economic legitimacy, and there is a minute branch broken, indicating that they are in fact commoners. This impurity in Squanderfeld’s bloodline reduces the bride’s worth and social standing and foreshadows her affair with the lawyer. The last scene depicts the daughter’s death with Squanderfeld carefully
plucking the gold band off of his daughter’s cold finger. Aligning himself with the great literary satirists, Hogarth uses the name “Squanderfeld” to foreshadow the father’s callous and greedy nature. In addition, other images in the first scene include those of martyrs and tortures to parallel the misuse and misappropriation of their children (Paulson 33). It is in this way that the Marriage à la Mode “embodies two themes: the struggle between the values of money and blood, the merchant and the aristocrat; and the heavy weight of the past, of one generation on another” (Paulson 38).

That the value of love seems to be present in neither Boswell’s faux marriage nor in the real marriage Hogarth depicts is another aspect of marriage in eighteenth-century England. Love is often confused with lust by Boswell, whose major interests reside in physical perfection rather than mental. He is constantly seeking to better his prospects for marriage, and though he wants “to be something,” he cannot until he has established what he wants out of life, especially in marriage, for his ideas contradict one another (Boswell 109). In Hogarth, lust lives in the husband while the wife finds love in a man who will kill her husband for love. Thus, dogs, representing fidelity, appear throughout the series in a variety of poses; to use contemporary dialect, Boswell is a “dog” himself with his constantly changing love interests. With Louisa, Boswell finds himself in the “fine delirium of love,” while at the same time he hunts for new prey (89). Although he stays faithful to his “wife” by not pursuing another lady or prostitute, Boswell still searches for “genuine reciprocal amorous affection,” or when a woman truly loves a man (84). He never takes the time to reflect upon his true feelings for Louisa because he is certain that they are feelings of love and not just lust. When dealing with reason and passion, two alternating themes in English literature, Boswell decides that, ultimately, “Judgment may know that all is vanity, yet Passion may ardently pursue” (79). Passion rules the heart of Boswell, and though he would not readily admit it, passion arose from lustful urges rather than romantic notions. In the course of the entire London Journal, he also uses the word “love” as a euphemism for love-making, dividing the word between a feeling (love) and an action (to make love). Although it is difficult to assign an exact meaning to Boswell’s notion of love, the pre-eminence of lust can be assumed, given his frequent visits to prostitutes.

Though Hogarth’s husband and wife appear to lack both love and lust for one another, they reveal these feelings by seeking others outside of marriage. Their problems initially begin in the first scene, where the bride leans over to the lawyer who has caught her attention. Seated perpendicular to her, the groom gazes longingly upon himself in the mirror. Scene two more clearly indicates the
marital distress, for both husband and wife have spent a late night carousing, as is indicated by the dog that curiously sniffs another lady’s bonnet. Chairs are overturned, books and sheet music are scattered, and a violin litters the floor, signifying the chaos that reigns in this union. Overhead, a painting of cupid, who looks upon the wife, foreshadows her tryst with the lawyer. Although Hogarth playfully positions husband and wife in a slumping position, the mood is rather gloomy, due to the “undercurrent of real emotion and feeling which transcends the comedy of manners. The possibility of affection between the young couple is destroyed by the false positions in which they have been placed by their parents, for they are forced out of a natural relationship based on love, into conventional roles as rake and woman of pleasure” (Bind 115). Ironically, the lawyer does in fact fall in love with the wife, although the same cannot be said for the husband and his lover. Appropriately named “Silvertongue,” the lawyer pursues and promises the wife happiness, as is evidenced in scene four. His fortune and status, exemplified by his portrait, which carefully peers at each of his guests, overpowers her sensibility; he seems to have won her affections at the expense of her uncaring husband. True to the depiction of St. Sebastian over Silvertongue’s head in the first scene, “the end of the lawyer will be a kind of martyrdom, when he is hanged for the murder he commits for love” in scene five (Paulson 33).

Interestingly, the wife remains by her dying husband while her lover flees through the window. She has maintained a dutiful and submissive role in the marriage in spite of straying, but the portrait above her head of a voluptuous prostitute suggests that the same cannot be said for her husband. Love and lust are often commingled and intertwined, but the only connection made between the two in Marriage à la Mode comes too late with her longing for his life during his death.

Disease, and not that of lovesickness, prevails in Boswell’s London Journal and in Hogarth’s Marriage, though no one dies from it. More specifically, disease symbolizes immorality via prostitution and marital infidelity, both of which the male protagonists engage in. Closely linked to corruption, disease broadly symbolizes impurity, irreverence, and irresponsibility—many of the character traits typical to Boswell’s reception of the fairer sex. Though we only know six scenes of Hogarth’s husband’s life, he has a similar casual attitude about the dangers of promiscuity, which is highlighted mainly in the third scene and in the traces of disease throughout the family, such as gangrene and various sores and blemishes. Boswell himself was a hypochondriac, but he apparently did not have a fear of narrow, windy streets at night.

Thus, Boswell ironically catches his disease from Louisa, whom he selects because she appears to be pure, and his friends even refer to her as Boswell’s
“ideal lady” (154). When he finds out through illness that she is not quite as pure as she looks, he abruptly stops meeting with her and assumes that she is a common whore, as if it were something to be looked down upon or that he has not been acquainted with. True to his actions, Boswell’s taste shows that “in human nature, there is a love for permanency, as well as a love for variety; taking his practical Scottish notions of marriage and career with him, he was soon spoiled by the multitude of amorous and leisurely opportunities in London” (Brooks 21). In fact, Boswell often mentions his health in regards to venereal diseases. As he initially stresses the importance of his health, he vows to wait until he finds “some safe girl or was liked by some woman of fashion” (Boswell 49). Women of fashion, much to the ignorance of Boswell, could be any type of woman, especially with the burgeoning middle class in the eighteenth century. Boswell also selectively ignores his Christian values, especially when he chooses to make love rather than attend church and engages in prostitution and pre-marital intercourse (117). Ironically, Boswell laments that he was “not so devout as [he] could have wished” but then brags about his sexual prowess and complains about his venereal mishaps (95). Through Boswell’s example, we see that disease can no longer be confined to the lower classes in spite of the desire of the upper class to do just that. In Hogarth’s series, the wealthier characters are, in fact, the ones with the disease, reversing the traditional stereotypes.

Hogarth’s Marriage appears to be covered head to toe with “beauty patches” on men, women, and children throughout the six scenes, for a variety of diseases afflict each character. Here, disease is hierarchical, for there are two major ones signified: those of luxury (the gout) and those of licentiousness (venereal diseases). Going back to the first scene, we see the father with a bandaged leg that symbolizes the gout. This scene presents “a history, a moral judgment, and a series of relationships” that connotes “a life of eating and drinking associated with aristocracy rather than the merchant class” (Paulson 31, 32). The Earl carries on this line of sickness and gives it to both his mistress and his child, for she has a beauty patch on her tiny face in the last scene. Referring back to the Bible, this patch implies that “the sins of the fathers visited upon their children” (Paulson 32). Sadly, it does not seem as if either the father or the mother takes the child into consideration, for like the dogs, she is off to the side in all of the scenes except for the last, symbolizing her final dominion over the family’s stained name. In scene three, the presence of venereal disease appears in the doctor’s chamber. A darker and more macabre scene than all of the others, a skeleton, a skull, and a gorgon are placed in a triangular fashion around the room, suggestive of the Holy Trinity. Undulating between “the sublime and the grotesque,” Hogarth twists the ordinary faces of the doctor and the Earl to form
near grimaces, for one is rejecting the defunct medicine while the other rejects the Earl (Cowley 19). Sharp objects also contort around the room in dangerous positions, foreshadowing the murder of the Earl and serving as a reminder of the dangers of disease. Though all of Hogarth’s characters die untimely deaths that are unconnected to disease, their literal death follows the death of the marriage.

The marriages filled with “ambition, greed, and discontent” in Boswell’s writings and Hogarth’s paintings are beneficial for neither the husband nor the wife (Jarrett 146). Ironically, Boswell lives much of what Hogarth satirizes in Marriage à la Mode, complete with disease and adulterousness. Through Boswell’s depiction of women in London life, we see a view of marriage that veers towards cynicism at times and towards complacency at others; perhaps the best consummation for him would be “to have Edinburgh and Auchinleck equally with London and soberness equally with passion” (Brooks 20). With the presentation of many of Boswell’s old-world Scottish customs in the setting of England, there exists a mélange of cultures that view the institution of marriage differently. Though Hogarth appears to be cynical in his portrayal of a London marriage, there is still hope, for the heir of this couple is a baby girl, who although blemished may find love and happiness. She may have even served as an ideal model for the beloved wife in Hogarth’s last project—a series portraying the whimsy and amore of a blissful country marriage.

Works Cited

It is always important for the educator to have two purposes in mind: the
discovery of differences and the discovery of similarities.

—Norman Studer

While the job of delving into one of the most overlooked resources at SUNY
New Paltz initially seemed a daunting task, I can now say that it was a magnifi-
cent stroke of luck—and perhaps even providence. The Norman Studer archive
in the Carl Carmer Center is a mother lode of information for students of the
Hudson Valley / Catskill Mountain region. The Studer papers are indeed fasci-
nating in that they reveal an individual’s pursuit of and relationship with his
sense of place. It becomes evident that Studer valued most of all his own root-
edness in certain places that he loved, and he tried to instill the same value in
his students and everyone he came into contact with. This value of being rooted
in the place where he was—his anachthonism—and moreover his esteem for
the people in that place was, I believe, central to his personal philosophy of edu-
cation, which he employed as director of both Downtown Community School
in Manhattan and Camp Woodland in Phoenicia, New York.

Of course, an examination of Studer’s educational philosophy would be sorely
incomplete if one were merely to focus on what it encompassed as a flower in full
bloom with fully developed roots, if you will, and ignore its germination and
growth. I shall attempt in this paper to address some of the key influences on and
the evolution of Studer’s philosophy of education by studying various documents
I have found in the Studer Archive. I will also address Studer’s special field of
study—folklore—with regard to his educational philosophy, as well as relate a
few responses of his daughter, Joan Studer Levine, to questions I was lucky
enough to pose to her concerning her father as an educator.

My conversation with Ms. Levine was a wonderful introduction to Norman
Studer, the man as well as the teacher. Besides remembering her father happily
as “a top-notch educator,” she provided me with certain invaluable biographical
details. According to Ms. Levine, Studer took a yearlong (teaching?) position in
Erie, Pennsylvania shortly after receiving his Master’s Degree from Columbia
University in 1934.¹ At Columbia he was introduced to and became a “disciple”\n\n¹
of John Dewey’s philosophy of Progressive Education, and he also had his first affiliation with the Communist Party. In 1935 he found himself back in New York with a job at the Elizabeth Irwin School, otherwise known as the “Little Red Schoolhouse.” It was during this time that Studer began traveling regularly to the Catskills, and by 1938 he had founded the summer camp near Phoenicia, New York called Camp Woodland. It was here that Studer’s educational philosophy really began to grow and be put into practice, beyond the relatively small scope of one classroom, into a community. When I asked Ms. Levine about the evolution of her father’s philosophy, she discussed his study of John Dewey and the tenets of Progressive Education. She said that it encompassed “learning by doing” and “democratic living,” and she stressed that, most importantly, students “should be rooted in community.” She went on to say that her father “took it a step further” out of philosophical abstraction into educational practice, and that the activities of Camp Woodland were “directed at that community.” As is always the case, particularities dispel abstraction. Ms. Levine also emphasized that her father truly believed that his was a “philosophy not only for [his students], but for himself.” This seems to me to be the mark of any truly great teacher.

In 1951, Studer left the Little Red Schoolhouse to teach at and direct Downtown Community School (DCS) in Greenwich Village, where he worked until 1970. Here, another stage in the development of his educational philosophy began to take shape. He organized many trips to the Catskills during the school year for students at DCS, and the “richness of the folks and folklore” of the region, in Ms. Levine’s words, continued to inspire him as an educator and as a person. Ms. Levine also noted that her father’s interest in the Catskill region was historical and cultural as well as educational. To me, this reveals a deep concern with his own understanding of the region’s sense of place—an understanding that he could pass on to his students and campers. Ms. Levine was quick to point out that the people in the community around Camp Woodland were also informed and educated by their contact with Studer and the people that the camp attracted from the city; she said that the “cement” that bonded the camp to the community was strong, and that this relationship “went two ways.” This was evidenced by the community’s support of Studer when he was called before the New York State Un-American Activities Commission in 1955. Ms. Levine said that her father “probably took the fifth” when the Commission asked about his affiliation with the Communist Party, but he was open about the proceedings with the community surrounding Camp Woodland, and the community stood behind him.
Another aspect of Studer’s educational philosophy and practice that cannot escape mention was his belief that children of all races and creeds are entitled to the best education available. He did his best to integrate children of diverse backgrounds in both DCS and Camp Woodland, making him a pioneer of “multi-cultural education”\(^2\) years before *Brown v. The Board of Education of Topeka* and a decade prior to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, in the heart of segregated times. Ms. Levine told me about the difficulty that the camp was initially confronted with on the eve of their annual Parents’ Weekend. Obviously, the fact that the camp was racially integrated meant that the parents of the campers were of diverse backgrounds, and since the facilities of the camp were geared toward the needs of the campers, it was necessary that the campers’ parents find lodging somewhere nearby. However, when the parents came to visit their children, they were often greeted with some measure of resistance from the community, some members of which had probably never even seen a black person before. To handle the situation, Studer went to all of the boarding houses in the surrounding area and guaranteed the proprietors business on that weekend on the condition that they not object to having people of different races in their homes. Any boarding house that did not agree was left off the list and out in the cold, so to speak. Needless to say, that list of boarding houses grew over the years as Studer’s efforts to diminish prejudice and intolerance in the community were more and more successful.

So how exactly did Studer put his educational philosophy into practice at Camp Woodland? The first line of the camp’s mission statement reads: “The prime requisite for education is that it be rooted in experience”\(^1\). An undated camp brochure states that “camp can be a place where city children strike deep roots in country soil”\(^4\)—a statement in support of guided anachthonism. Studer was concerned first and foremost with rootedness in place, inasmuch as one cannot be “rooted in experience” without being rooted in place. Physical features of the camp are described in the brochure, including the “level playing fields”\(^6\) that have a certain metaphorical resonance. Campers engaged in community-based activities, such as caring for the camp’s livestock, clearing trails for hiking, and building and expanding the camp’s facilities. The emphasis of all of this was that campers were to be active participants in responsible “democratic living”\(^8\): they each did their part for the good of the camp community. It is evident that Studer and his staff sought to create a welcoming environment for the campers, one in which they could live and learn comfortably and in harmony with their surroundings.

Sporting activities were also stressed as a major part of camp life. The
brochure says: “Frequent baseball games with the youth of neighboring communities put our sports program into the focus of friendship and neighborliness” (10). Needless to say, with Camp Woodland located in the midst of the Catskill wilderness, one of the primary objectives of the camp was “to develop and satisfy curiosity in children about the world of teeming nature around them” (16). The fine and practical arts played a large role in the camp curriculum, and, whenever possible, these skills were taught by homespun craftsmen from the surrounding area who made their living by doing such work as carpentry or pottery. According to the brochure, “Gradually the camp has built up a precious kinship with the … community—with the mountaineers, the dairymen, the rangers, fiddlers and hunters of the Catskills” (24, emphasis added).

Perhaps the camp’s most significant contribution, especially to the literature and lore of the region, was its focus on nurturing the living and breathing folk-songs and folktales of the Catskill Mountains. For the span of its operation from 1938-1962, with its annual folk festival, the camp was the self-described “center of the folk music of the Catskill region” (camp brochure 20). The influence of the camp experience on many of the noted folksingers of the fifties and sixties (such as Pete and Mike Seeger, Eric Weisberg, Joe Hickerson, John Herald, and Danny Kalb, who were either campers and counselors at Woodland or performers in the camp’s annual folk festival) has been much discussed, and may be slightly off topic here. However, this profound influence can be traced to Studer’s efforts to bring his campers a broad experience of country life, including their exposure to the true traditions of folksong and lore. Studer brought many local folks well versed in song and story into the camp as a part of this endeavor. He also took the camp experience as an opportunity to collect and study folksong and folklore. With Norman Cazden and Herbert Haufrect, Studer co-edited Folk Songs of the Catskills, the collection of Catskill Mountain and Hudson Valley songs that remains the definitive one to this day.

While searching for more information concerning Studer’s use of folklore in education, I ran across several pertinent documents, including an account of “Folklore in a Democracy,” the conference he held in 1945 for his staff and the parents of his campers at the Little Red Schoolhouse in New York. The account reports that the conference “grew naturally out of the discussions that followed [the] 1944 Folk Festival of the Catskills” at Camp Woodland (The World is a Neighborhood 11). Noted folklorists Ben A. Botkin and Louis C. Jones, who attended the 1944 Folk Festival, were also present as speakers at the conference. Charles Seeger, Harold Thompson, Elaine Lambert Lewis, Bess Lomax, Haufrect, and Studer also spoke. Lomax spoke about the OWI, or Office of War
Information, “which beams [folk music] … to all parts of the world in twenty-seven languages. [The programs] have taught the Chinese people to like Negro Spirituals and hill-billy music” (11). The unnamed writer of the account (Studer?) commented: “Here is a striking indication of the potentialities of folklore for promoting unity among peoples” (11). A concert and dance that featured George Edwards, blind Sonny Terry, Cazden, Haufrect, and Earl Robinson followed the conference. The account ends by saying that “the conference was a salute to the birth of the New York State Folklore Society and New York Folklore Quarterly” (11), which debuted there. The event is an example of how Studer was able to bridge the various communities that he was involved in—the folklore community, the camp community, and the community of the school at which he taught—for the purposes of education and cultural enrichment. Conversely, this was an opportunity for Studer to engage in dialogue with and be influenced by some of the most noted folklorists of the time.

There is no doubt that Studer was influenced by at least one of the folklorists who appeared at the conference: B.A. Botkin. Among Studer’s papers, I discovered an article by Botkin called “Applied Folklore: Creating Understanding Through Folklore,” which had been torn out of the September 1953 issue of Southern Folklore Quarterly and saved by Studer. Botkin was a rather big name in the field of folklore studies at that time, having been appointed head of the American Folksong archives in the Library of Congress (The World is a Neighborhood 10); he was also Folklore Editor of the Federal Writers’ Project from 1938-1941, as well as an active member of the American Folklore Society throughout the period. Botkin’s article is an attempt to distinguish between the literary study and the anthropological study of folklore, which he calls “applied folklore.” He says that “the applied folklorist prefers to think of [folklore] as ancillary to the study of culture, of history or literature—of people” (199), implying that applied folklore uses an interdisciplinary approach. One should note that Studer repeatedly calls for an interdisciplinary approach to education in several documents related to DCS and Camp Woodland. Botkin goes on to cite Ralph S. Boggs, who points toward folklore’s application in the “development of international consciousness and the promotion of international understanding” (200). This statement is reminiscent of the account of the Camp Woodland Conference eight years prior, though Studer’s version goes beyond values of “consciousness” and “understanding” all the way to “unity.”

The similarities between the notions that Botkin expounds and the philosophy that underlies Studer’s own educational and cultural practices are quite striking. For example, Botkin says:
The folk festival is an important form of utilization and application, for understanding as well as enjoyment, through participation and celebration of our ‘commonness’—the ‘each’ in all of us and the ‘all’ in each of us. For what we participate in here is not only a performance and a revival but cultural—intercultural—democracy. (200)

If one were to read the passage “blind,” one might take it to be vintage Studer. Botkin continues to explain that each participant in the festival is guided toward an “understanding by doing” (200). This too is reminiscent of one of Studer’s maxims: that “education must be rooted in experience.” Botkin echoes this notion once again when he says: “Folklore as experience passes naturally into folklore as understanding” (203). One feels that each man influenced the other with respect to their philosophical stance on folklore and use of it for educational ends.

This dialogue of influence is evident throughout Botkin’s article. In his description of how applied folklore is actually applied, Botkin discusses the work of Dr. Rachel Davis DuBois, of the Workshop for Cultural Democracy. He notes that DuBois, a Quaker, uses two techniques of applied folklore: the “group conversation” and the “parranda” (3) (203). The group conversation seems to me to be the equivalent of what happens when the farmers gather for morning coffee around the hearth as they plan their day and shoot the breeze—a phenomenon that I used to get to observe every weekend morning at 6 a.m. at Walkill View Farms as I baked the muffins. According to Botkin, “The group conversation is applied folklore in two senses” (203). In one sense, “it promotes understanding through participation,” as the participants, “under the guidance of a skilled leader,” discuss and commiserate on “themes of universal interest”; “[i]t becomes applied folklore in the second sense of festival as ritual” (203). Botkin explains further:

The group conversation resembles group therapy in that by getting back to their childhood memories the participants try to get back to when they accepted their culture and their neighbors.… [T]his technique may work … for the older generation … but for the children of this generation, brought up in the tension areas of large cities, it may take more than memory—it may even take reeducation and even psychiatric social work—to create understanding. (203-204)

In spite of all his quasi-psychological mumbo jumbo, Botkin (through DuBois) is correct in recognizing the group conversation, which I suppose is rooted for DuBois in Quaker tradition, as a form of folk festival. However, I believe that he is wrong in stating that this ritual may be less successful in benefiting “the children of this generation”—i.e., my father’s generation born during
the Depression. Though Botkin is also correct in implying that the effect of mechanized city life on folk roots has been devastating, “the children of this generation,” and in fact any generation, may engage in healing those damaged roots if the festival—the ritual—is indeed imbued with the highest folk arts of story and song. I feel confident that Studer would have agreed, considering that that is exactly what he put into practice at Camp Woodland with staggering results.

The second of DuBois’s techniques that Botkin discusses is the “parranda,” where a few families in the community open their houses to a group of students, who proceed from house to house (I suppose that this is how it is “progressive”). Botkin says that “the children leave the classroom and visit the homes of families of various cultural backgrounds” and participate in “food, songs, games, and dances” as well as learn “about customs through conversation and interview.” The observations and reactions of the students are then “reported back in the students’ compositions and integrated into the school experience through intercultural assemblies” (204). This too seems to be similar to activities that Studer had already implemented at Camp Woodland, such as his campers’ field trips to visit with many Catskill Mountain artists, artisans, and musicians. Botkin cites a Quaker proverb in summation of DuBois’s credo: “It’s the not me in thee which makes thee valuable to me” (203). That Studer felt a philosophical affinity with this notion seems obvious, yet Botkin’s article points to certain educational practices that Studer had been using at the camp for over a decade, just without the fancy names.

Botkin concludes his article with an excerpt from a panel proposal that he drafted with Charles Seeger in response to a perceived lack of attention to folklore and folk arts at the Third National Conference of the United States National Commission for UNESCO in January 1952. In the proposal, they essentially call for an interdisciplinary implementation of applied folklore in pursuit of understanding and acceptance of folk culture by and for the benefit of the greater American culture as a whole. Botkin’s closing words, which I’m sure held significant resonance for Studer, read:

It seems clear that as “members of the whole world” folklorists have a stake in culture and in the world community, and it is up to them to make themselves heard in the councils of cultural strategy, or else—. But there must not be an “or else.” (206)

While I think I’ve succeeded in making a mountain out of a molehill in my discussion of Studer and Botkin’s “dialogue of influence,” it seems clear that Studer kept this article not only because the two men were friends. I’m sure that Studer also felt that Botkin provided a valuable resource concerning folklore’s potential
use for educational purposes. Even if the practices that Botkin disseminates already had their analogues at Camp Woodland, one can see that Studer was always looking for opportunities to improve, expand, and experiment with his educational philosophy and practice.

Perhaps the quintessential explanation of Studer's pedagogy is in his article “The Place of Folklore in Education” from the spring 1962 issue of New York Folklore Quarterly. The article recognizes the reasons behind the academic interest in folklore that began in the mid-twentieth century and seeks to implement that interest as educational practice. It may also reflect a will to expand on Botkin’s notion of “applied folklore.” Studer’s premise is as follows:

We are fast becoming a nation on wheels and wings. This change...has created a culture of the displaced persons, removed from the roots that gave life a sense of community. As we become alienated from our roots we are being fed with a sterile and empty culture of commercialism... I see this turning back to the traditional folk culture as the expression of dissatisfaction with the spiritual nourishment of the times. (1)

The article is broken down into five brief topical sections, each discussing different reasons for and uses of folklore in education:

I. Folklore is an important part of our American heritage.
II. Folklore can aid in the development of roots in the region.
III. Folklore is an excellent introduction to the creative arts.
IV. Folklore helps in the development of roots in one’s group.
V. Folklore is a bridge between peoples.

In the first section, Studer outlines the ways in which folklore, and especially the folk arts, contributes to the education of the whole child, to use one of Studer's favorite phrases: “By knowing [a] song through the intellect and the feelings, the children come to learn in the deepest ways that art is functional ... that mankind has considered it as much of a necessity as bread and salt” (4). Studer calls for the infusion of folklore in history and literature curricula in the second section because it “illuminat[es] the everyday life of the people and reflect[s] their deepest feelings, hopes, fears, pleasures and pain” (4). He says that folklore “is the kind of personal record of human experience that can never be found in the official documents or the usual sources of history” (4).

In the third section, the tone of the article begins to resemble the principles of the Vanderbilt Agrarians when Studer says: “the machine has not erased regional differences in America and a sense of place is still, and will continue to be an important factor in the development of personality” (5-6, emphasis added). Studer mentions the success of this endeavor at Camp Woodland. He
also says that the educational means and ends of the third and fourth sections are “closely linked” (7). He points to the success that DCS has had in “help[ing] children of minority groups develop an identity with their own background, and thus acquire a feeling of dignity and self-esteem” (7) through folklore. The final section is, for all intents and purposes, the summation of Studer’s educational philosophy:

The ultimate effect of such use of folklore, we hope, will be to help youngsters become ideal citizens of a country whose official motto is *E Pluribus Unum*. This ideal person, we believe, should have deep and lasting roots in his own local culture, but should not be narrow and provincial. He should range far and wide over the earth in his capacity for entering into the cultures of other peoples, through folklore and through other forms of cultural interchange… If we are only interested in exploiting the quaint or curious, or the fine-pretty aspects of folklore, this movement will only be a passing fad in education. We will be on solid ground if we use folklore to deepen the students’ understanding and appreciation of human beings and their enjoyment of the simple, universal, and genuine feelings and emotions. Folklore is not an escape into the age of homespun; it is an attempt to enrich today with the humanism of yesterday. (8-10)

It is evident that Studer believed very deeply in the power of education to benefit the world and the people in it. Through the study of these few examples of his papers and the conversations I’ve had with his daughter and others, I feel confident in saying that by the end of his career Studer’s belief enjoyed much success as a reality. This paper is hardly a complete study of Studer’s philosophy of education, though I hope that it will serve as an overview of the evolution of his pedagogy; much more can and should be said about Studer’s career at both Camp Woodland and DCS. Though the future of his archive at SUNY New Paltz is somewhat cloudy, my hope is that such a valuable resource will be maintained with the utmost of care and will be available to other students of the region. To say that Studer has affected my own pedagogical approach would be an understatement. In effect, he has cemented for me the thesis of this course in regional studies. Besides demonstrating the hows and whys of “education rooted in experience,” he has led me by example to a significantly greater understanding, experience, and sense of place.
Notes

1. Ms. Levine told me that her father received a Ph.D. from Columbia, yet the dates of his graduation from the Columbia graduate program and the beginning of his employment at the Elizabeth Irwin School lead me to believe that he did not pursue a doctorate. Though I discovered Studer’s undergraduate (A.B. 1929) and graduate (A.M. History 1934) transcripts from Columbia in the archive, any record of his alleged doctoral studies failed to reveal itself to me. If I have committed any oversight, please forgive me.

2. While the term that Ms. Levine used has now become a jargonish buzzword in the fields of education and academia, it seems an appropriate one to describe Studer’s brand of truly integrated pedagogy.

3. A Puerto Rican term meaning “progressive party” (Botkin, 204).

4. While I did not discover any Warren, Tate, or Davidson among Studer’s books, I do suspect that they were some of his influences.

Works Cited
(All documents located in the Studer Archive, File 1, Drawers 1 and 2.)


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While Hemingway’s work enjoyed reverence and distinction when filtered through the Soviet literary consciousness, it also suffered the unavoidable modifications born of translation and politically prescribed interpretation. This paper explores this disparity in two parts. Part One examines the function of socialist realism in relation to Soviet criticism, specifically Ivan Kashkeen’s critical essays. Part Two explores the deficiencies of translation and their influence on Soviet perception of Hemingway’s work, specifically Ivan Kashkeen’s translation of “A Way You’ll Never Be.”

**Part One**

After his introduction to the Soviet public in 1934, Hemingway was simultaneously celebrated and lamented as a lost comrade, a potential communist who was not quite able to sever his bourgeois ties and embrace the new social ideal. They believed the ironic dissociation of his prose, along with his bleak depiction of western society, reflected the revered Soviet concept of critical realism. When presented with his early work, Soviet critics waited for Hemingway’s prose to reflect the cheerful and community-oriented principles of socialist realism.

The Soviet public was provided with guides, usually in the form of prefaces, for understanding the relationship of Hemingway’s writing to Soviet ideals. When coupled with the population’s dubious understanding of American culture, these guides presented the Soviet reader with a much different Hemingway than the one offered to the American public.

Konstantin Simonov opens his preface to *Kheminguei: Izbrannoye*, a collection of translated stories and novels of Hemingway, by declaring that Hemingway-the-writer cannot be separated from Hemingway-the-man. He explains that Hemingway depicts in his heroes that which he loves most in himself: strength, bravery, and immensity of spirit. After some reflective statement about Hemingway’s life, Simonov reaffirms Hemingway’s affinity with the Soviet public. The 1968 publication of this preface indicates that Hemingway’s merit in the Soviet Union had been established for some time. Simonov asserts that Hemingway’s life and writing describe Soviet ideals, that Hemingway is
close to “us” through his fearless pursuit of truth amidst the cruel and horrifying circumstances of his era.

Some of the publications and criticisms of Hemingway’s work came accompanied by a description of the American and European post-war cultural climate. The necessity of an introduction to elucidate the backdrop against which Hemingway wrote indicates the distance between the Soviet public and Hemingway’s work, a distance inherently detrimental to interpretation. Ivan Kashkeen’s 1935 essay includes such an introduction explaining the lifestyle of “The Lost Generation.”

Soviet critics offered little in the way of examining style and aesthetics as ends in themselves. Rather, they saw style and plot only as vehicles for conveying social and political messages. While they approved of Hemingway’s lack of gratuitous description, Soviet critics disapproved of his equivocal political position. While they enjoyed his terse, “realistic” prose, they also felt that Hemingway’s objectivity betrayed a belief that it is futile to dig below the surface of things.

This prescribed approach homogenized the Soviet understanding of Hemingway’s work into a singular union of the aesthetic and the moral, the political and the human, the writer and his protagonists.

Ivan Kashkeen, the first to translate Hemingway’s work for the Soviet public, was one of the few critics who attempted (at times with success) to separate craftsmanship from political agenda. The critical disparity between Kashkeen’s early and later essays corresponds with the ideological transitions of the Soviet nation. His early essays convey the disapproving attitude that is consistent with the initial standards of socialist criticism. Here, the critic contends that the dismal fates of Hemingway’s protagonists reflect the author’s own cynicism. In his later essays, however, Kashkeen examines the intrinsic merit of Hemingway’s style, contending that his style is more than a metaphor for futility. Kashkeen seeks to derive messages of hope and courage from the exploits of Hemingway’s protagonists. While he maintains that Hemingway’s heroes are victims of hopeless surroundings, he also admits that these heroes possess inner resources and are fortified by an internal code that attempts to thrive despite surrounding futility.

Kashkeen’s 1934 essay “Dve Novelly Khemingueya” offers a flattering evaluation of Hemingway’s style. When describing “The Killers,” Kashkeen comments on Hemingway’s “tendency to sharpen the perceptions of the reader, to teach him alertness, to focus his eyes to unaccustomed angles.” He asserts that the author deserves such “thoughtful, creative reading” (319). Because the Soviets valued Hemingway’s writing, they were eager to assist his emergence
from his “doomed ideology” (Brown 153). Identifying and solving Hemingway’s “problem” seems to be Kashkeen’s aim in his 1935 essay “Ernest Hemingway: A Tragedy of Craftsmanship.” Accordingly, the critic’s interpretation and subsequent evaluation of Hemingway and his work derive from a pre-established agenda.

Kashkeen opens his 1935 essay by inadvertently admitting a fundamental deficiency of the Soviet readership:

We have never seen Hemingway. In his wanderings over the world he has never visited our country and in order to imagine what he is like we have to rely, though not without reservation, on what others say. And from what they say there arises a legendary figure. (76)

The sentiments of these initial assertions echo throughout the essay. Kashkeen expresses a certain degree of bitterness concerning Hemingway’s physical and philosophical distance from the USSR and also intimates that the relationship of the Soviet reader to Hemingway’s work can only be vicarious.

Kashkeen then attempts to extract from the published testimonies of Hemingway’s friends an understanding of the author’s life and character. He examines the dichotomy of the public Hemingway and the private Hemingway that manifests itself through the plights of his protagonists. Kashkeen asserts that the author’s public disposition, the Hemingway who is a “hunter and fisherman, a fearless torero, a distinguished front line soldier, [and] an arrogant bully” is “but a mask” for his true personality which emerges through his work—a “morbidly reticent” man who “painfully [bears] the too heavy burden of life’s intricacies” (77).

Consequently, in this 1935 essay on Hemingway’s work, Kashkeen discounts the autonomy of style. Through obscured criticism born of myopic reading and second-hand biographical information, Kashkeen disregards Hemingway’s attempt to render an accurate and exact world in his prose, a world that filters through the general human consciousness rather than through the sensibilities of the particular author. For Kashkeen, the credibility of the work is determined by the credibility of the author. He states:

Hemingway shows us how complicated he is by his very attempts to be simple. A tangle of conflicting strains and inconsistencies, a subtle clumsiness, a feeling of doubts and unrest are to be seen in Hemingway’s earlier books as early as his presentation of Nick Adams’s cloudless young days, but as he proceeds on the way of artistic development these features show increasingly clear and the split between Hemingway and reality widens. (78)

Although Kashkeen does remark on T.S. Eliot’s influence, he does not seem to
recognize that Hemingway writes from a legacy that values “escape from personality” as the mark of a true artist. Rather, Kashkeen suggests that Eliot’s influence fostered the “ironic hopelessness” that permeates Hemingway’s prose (106).

Kashkeen suggests that In Our Time provides Hemingway’s commentary on the provincial, “stuffy” nature of American life. Nick, who Kashkeen claims is one of several Hemingway incarnations, expresses a need to escape his stifling home, his affectedly dogmatic mother, and his “puerile father” (78). Kashkeen overlooks the novel’s function as a Bildungsroman. He must overlook this, for the Soviet adolescent’s coming-of-age would not involve leaving home to search for identity and individuality. Rather, the young comrade’s initiation to adulthood would ideally entail his gradual, conceptual acclimation to the tenets of communism. Furthermore, the Soviet notion of sense of place and family existed only as synonyms for nationalism. This disparity between American and Soviet values may cause the critic to overlook the fact that Nick has a tender relationship with his father and that Dr. Adams’s integrity and compassion inform Nick’s value system. Perhaps this disparity also causes Kashkeen to overlook the fact that while Nick does leave home, he ultimately returns and finds comfort, rebirth, and redemption in “the good place,” in the woods where he and his father once fished.

Kashkeen’s evaluation of Hemingway’s attitude and writing reflects a conflicted blend of praise and censure. He contends that Hemingway’s “simplistic” prose echoes his philosophical ambivalence and conveys his attempt to escape political alliance and conviction. He argues that this ambivalence is a dangerous by-product of western “individualism,” which causes the indolent author to depict acts of “sanctioned treason” (83). Kashkeen accuses Hemingway’s protagonists of physical and moral “desertion”: Nick Adams deserts his home and flees to the war, but in war remains “a deserter at heart”; Tenente Henry, who leaves the front, is a deserter in fact as well as spirit (82).

Kashkeen remarks that the desertion theme is revealed as Hemingway’s works move from a “grin and bear it’ attitude” to a “lie down and take it’ torpor” (82). Ultimately, Kashkeen’s evaluations reflect the core conflict of the Soviet attitude toward Hemingway’s writing. While Hemingway, at this time a former expatriate, may intimate a sort of “loyal opposition” (Brown 10) to the unfavorable aspects of American culture (thereby reflecting the tenets of critical realism), Soviet critics believe that his protagonists do not move toward the optimistic and progressive assurance of a happy socialist ending. Consequently, Kashkeen maintains that Hemingway came to a crossroads: he established the
problem, but he refused to follow the path to its historical resolution. His heroes are left “broken” and hopelessly preoccupied with death, while “Hemingway is driven to mere craftsmanship and to our mind following the wrong trend” (87).

It must be difficult for a Soviet critic to recognize that Hemingway’s prose does “sanction” anything. It must be even more difficult for him to realize that because Hemingway’s writing describes life objectively, realistically, and accurately, it lends itself to a variety of moral evaluations—all unfortunately subject to the reader’s political and philosophical proclivity. That Kashkeen would perceive Hemingway’s lack of agenda as philosophical indifference follows logically from the precepts of socialist realism:

Hemingway tells us about the plaisirs et les jeux of the rich, he tells us about them with undistinguished sarcasm. But as for making sure of his own position, as for drawing the necessary conclusions from his instinctive disgust at the world of the philistine—that he cannot do, it is all too complicated. (81)

Kashkeen accuses Hemingway of being so “limited by the blinders of sceptical individualism” that he will not assert the only obvious moral position, that he lacks the fortitude to try and “save the world.” Therefore, both Hemingway and his protagonists select their doom through their own passivity, their “let’s have some lunch” attitude toward genuine adversity (83). Kashkeen asserts: “What is left him is surely the wrong path—simplify things as much as possible, play a solitary game of hide and seek, ‘eat, drink, copulate, fight the bull, take the dope’—in a word—be just like everybody” (82).

The tenets of socialist realism maintain that worthy art must embody a specific political subtext: optimism, collectivism, and anti-capitalism. According to Kashkeen, while Hemingway’s “Mr. and Mrs. Elliot” mocks capitalism, the story hedges on any genuine conviction. Kashkeen, like many Soviet critics, is dismayed by Hemingway’s proximity to and simultaneous evasion of the solution, the cure for his fatalistic hopelessness: Communism. Like his criticism, Kashkeen’s tone reflects a mixture of expostulation and encouragement. While he recognizes the artist’s integrity, he disapproves of his “stoic” individualism. While he understands that it is not Hemingway’s intention to save the world, he stresses that it is his responsibility at least to try. According to Kashkeen, Hemingway attempts

Not to save the world, but to see it and to remake at least a tiny bit of it, that’s what Hemingway wants and calls upon others to do. Il faut cultiver notre jardin, he seems to repeat after Candide and as his aim he selects the attainment of craftsmanship. In this he radically differs from his idle heroes, but nevertheless for an artist of Hemingway’s scope, for the head of the literary school to turn his back on really important themes and problems may only be qualified as an
escape into seclusion, as desertion. (87)

These are the conclusions born of socialist realism. Individualism facilitates desertion. Depiction of death reflects a fatalistic obsession with death. Tragedy suggests hopelessness. But this is all too simple, too obvious, too balanced on the precarious platform of spurious correlation. Yet sentiments such as these reflect the prescribed attitude of the Soviet readership. A culture that denies religion could not recognize that the nada-motif throughout Hemingway's work does not connote the dismal futility that Kashkeen suggests. The Soviet reader would know little, if anything, about Catholic mysticism, Saint John of the Cross, and nothingness as a condition of a soul that is ready for the influx of God's love. A critical approach that elucidated these themes would certainly have dire ramifications when confronted with government censorship.

Moreover, the terse, "realistic" nature of Hemingway's prose, his "rational cognition of reality" (Brown 10), was the quality by which Soviet editors affirmed his alignment with both critical and socialist realism. Ironically, Hemingway's realism discloses an honesty that, if properly understood, may compromise socialist ideals.

The notion that accessibility is born of erudition (that what you get out of a work of literature is a measure of what you bring into it) describes the central pitfall of Soviet readership. A nation that founds itself on denying the existence, or at least the integrity, of certain cultural classics—a nation that selects "appropriate," positive art and contrives a new legacy—limits access to the pool of cultural resources which would allow readers to delve into Hemingway's iceberg.

Consequently, the Soviet reader would not recognize that while the world can be dismal—and Hemingway would depict it as such, without contrived sentimental optimism—the core of his themes is love, compassion, and endurance, not as tools used to achieve or enforce social ideals, but as ends in themselves, as reflections of hope—honest optimism. Nor would they recognize that the manifesto of many modernist writers (e.g., Eliot, Faulkner, Pound) was an appeal to revive hope, to return to tradition, to "make it new," to remember the past and earn, in our own time, the legacy of greatness. They would not recognize that Jake's journey in The Sun Also Rises affords him an embodiment of "old" values, spiritual elevation, and a deeply personal love of life—that he is the fisher king who can redeem the wasteland. However, before they could derive the obvious correlation between the king's wound and Jake's, they would have to be familiar with the fisher king myth. Then, it would follow that Hemingway's "individualism" does not reflect the bleak isolation that is a by-product of materialistic, bourgeois values. Rather, it reflects a private, meditative journey to rediscover
the fundamental human values—sacrifice, loyalty, generosity, respect, and grace under pressure (which Kashkeen sees as cold, hopeless passivity)—which do not change through time and politics. They would not recognize this because while the hidden portion of the iceberg does hold a cure for this “realistically” depicted wasteland, the cure is highly spiritual, highly mystical, and not at all communist.

In August of 1935, Hemingway wrote an amicable letter to Kashkeen in which he addressed the critic’s concerns and invited him into a friendship. Hemingway opens and closes this letter by expressing his respect for Kashkeen. However, in his second paragraph, he draws a distinction between literary and personal criticism. While he addresses Kashkeen’s treatment of the works with seeming approval (“It is a pleasure to have someone know what you are writing about”), he also disavows the relevance of any personal evaluations (“What I seem to be myself is of no importance”).

At first, it seems curious that Hemingway should praise a critic who offers such a dubious review of his work. Hemingway resolves this peculiarity when he describes the nature of American criticism. He dismisses both the American bourgeois critics, who “do not know their ass from a hole in the ground,” and the “newly converted communists [who] are like all new converts … [too] interested in … schisms in their own critical attitudes” to offer any “honest” criticism (160). Hemingway’s mistrust of American critics stems from the subtle pretense of American criticism. While criticism was politically charged in both countries, American critics were more clandestine about revealing their (often awkward and unrefined) agenda. For Soviet critics, such an approach was a “matter of conscious public policy” (Proffer xviii). Kashkeen’s favor with Hemingway seems to have arisen from this unapologetic honesty, along with the comprehensive “accuracy” with which Kashkeen examined his work. Hemingway contends that American critics would write a “serious article” about his work without having read his last three books. Unlike American critics who (as Kashkeen asserts) assign “to him the products of their own imagination” (159), Kashkeen’s reflections are not contrived. He believes in what he says, and more importantly he wishes the author well.

Still, in a series of clear, brief, and simple statements, Hemingway informs his favorite Russian critic that while he respects him, he has no interest in his happy socialist solutions:

I cannot be a communist now because I believe in one thing: liberty. First I would look after myself. Then I would care for my family. Then I would help my neighbor. But the state I care nothing for … I believe in the absolute minimum of government.… A writer is like a Gypsy. He owes no allegiance to any government. If he is a good writer he will never like the government he lives under. (161)
With the suggestive understatement that distinguishes his prose, Hemingway advises Kashkeen that a politically geared critical approach can not facilitate an accurate reading of his work. Throughout his essay, Kashkeen attempts to determine Hemingway’s convictions, deciding that at best the author is ambivalent. Here, Hemingway not only dispels the notion of his philosophical vacillation, but also conveys the specific nature of his convictions. He believes in autonomy, the freedom to write without the influence and restriction of any bureaucracy, “Because the minute it passes a certain size it must be unjust” (161). He declares his independence from all forms of states, American and Soviet alike. Therefore, Hemingway indicates that hopeful messages about a better form of government will not appear in his work. He suggests to Kashkeen that he approach his criticism differently, without politics. But again, such discernment would require an accurate reading both of the letter and of the author’s works.

After elucidating his position regarding the relation of politics to writing, Hemingway confronts the final assertion of Kashkeen’s 1935 essay: “Now if you think this attitude leads to sterility and the individual becoming nothing but human waste I believe you are wrong” (162).

Kashkeen’s critical approach to Hemingway’s work reflects a significant change over the course of thirty years. One of Kashkeen’s last essays, published posthumously in 1964, conveys a more objective analysis of Hemingway’s style and reflects an approach that separates craftsmanship from politics. In “What is Hemingway’s Style?” Kashkeen re-examines the works that he discussed in the early essay. Now, Kashkeen admits that simplicity does not imply evasion: “It is the depth of perspective, the mass of the submerged iceberg which determines and provides the precious pithy simplicity that has nothing in common with a cheap and superficial simple-mindedness” (182). While his 1935 essay offers an almost grudging approval of the precision of detail and the suggestiveness of understatement employed in “A Big Two-Hearted River,” this later essay discusses, with unrestrained admiration, the story’s illustration of the “great master[s]” control of “the different forms of artistic essence that he wished to express in a given work” (181). “A Clean Well-Lighted Place,” formerly described as a narrative that revolves on a fatalistic axis (the impending, dark face of nada), now earns the status of “a poem in prose [that] contrasts the feelings of horror and compassion, light and darkness” (184). When examining the evolution of Hemingway’s style, Kashkeen maintains that the author’s “skeptical mockery” (formerly referred to as “cynical” and “crude”) has given way to “humanistic humor.”

A great many events and considerations can account for this shift in critical
assessment: the thaw (following Stalin’s death in 1953), which afforded writers a higher degree of expressive freedom; the evolution of Kashkeen’s relationship with Hemingway and his work; the critic’s reconsideration of his former evaluations in light of developments in the author’s more recent works—to name but a few. Whatever the cause, Kashkeen’s reflections in his 1964 essay certainly warrant admiration. Despite the hindrances involved in examining the literature of a foreign language and culture, this culmination of Kashkeen’s thirty-year investment in the study of Hemingway’s works reveals careful reading and insightful analysis.

Part Two

A combination of several factors—linguistic disparity, political considerations, and personal aesthetic bias—may have caused Kashkeen to take some liberties with his translation of “A Way You’ll Never Be.” The inherent differences in the structure of the two languages account for some of Kashkeen’s minor alterations. Furthermore, since accurate translation requires an understanding of nuances in both languages, the suggestive nature of Hemingway’s prose may have warranted Kashkeen’s occasional imposition of interpretation on translation. His more significant changes stem from the guidelines of Soviet censorship and his early assertions regarding Hemingway’s style. While in certain cases the anatomy of Russian syntax warrants an indirect or inverse rendering of an English sentence, often Kashkeen alters Hemingway’s phrasing without these linguistic imperatives. Regardless, the shape of Hemingway’s intended iceberg is warped through this Russian rendering.

Several of Kashkeen’s textual distortions are unavoidable products of the structures of the two languages. Some are relatively innocent. For instance, the translation of the story’s title assumes a slightly more specific implication. The Russian language has no all-encompassing word for the English you. Kashkeen applies vi, which is comparable to the Spanish ustedes in the dualism of its address: the formal you and the plural you. Consequently, the familiar you is excluded from the title’s connotation, thus denying the possibility of an informal address.

Other changes that result from linguistic disparity undermine the devices that distinguish Hemingway’s style. First, Hemingway’s signature understatement, “It was very good,” loses its subtlety and suggestiveness when Kashkeen translates the phrase as “Atakovalee horosho” (“They attacked well”). Since the word it functions differently in Russian (lacking the versatility of its English counterpart), the conspicuous complexity of Hemingway’s employment of the
word is lost on Russian readers. Second, Kashkeen omits the sentence explaining that “an adjutant is not a commissioned officer.” Because he replaces “adjutant” with “sergeant,” this sentence would conflict with the rest of his translation. Consequently, another marking aspect of the author’s style, his “aside,” is removed from the story.

Other alterations seem to be politically motivated. In accordance with Soviet editorial guidelines, Kashkeen omits or replaces any words or phrases that are overtly sexual. He replaces “actual rape” with the common Russian phrase “на самом деле” (“in a real situation”) and “smutty” with the more clinical “pornograficheskimi” (“pornographic”) when translating Hemingway’s description of the postcards surrounding the dead Austrian soldiers. Consequently, Kashkeen not only compromises the honesty of Hemingway’s scene, but also undermines (making it slightly less powerful) the cold uniformity of observation born of a shell-shocked mind. Kashkeen’s replacement of “crabs” with the Russian word for lice in Nick’s description of the grand American soldiers also strips the scene of its power and shifts the direction of the irony in Nick’s voice. A ramification of another editorial guideline is manifest in Kashkeen’s replacement of “comrade” with “предатель” (“acquaintance”). Kashkeen seems to alter this word to avoid the association of Soviet comrades with the perverse act depicted on the postcards.

Some changes may intimate Kashkeen’s attempt to “improve” Hemingway’s style. Kashkeen may have supplemented detail and augmented the tone of the story in order to afford the Russian reader a story less clandestine in theme and structure.

First, Kashkeen affords extra color to Hemingway’s characters, rendering them slightly more sarcastic or indignant. His exaggeration of certain terms augments the tone of the story and reconfigures the nature of character interaction. The verbal exchange between Nick and the lieutenant is rendered with more friction and sarcasm in Kashkeen’s translation. The officer did not make Nick “nervous.” Rather, according to Kashkeen, he “irritated” (“раздражал”) Nick. In Hemingway’s version, the lieutenant’s inquiry regarding Nick’s identity is met with a clear and direct response: “The tessera tells you.” The Nick of Kashkeen’s translation is more insolent: “Мало вам тессера” (“Is the tessera not enough for you?”). Hemingway applies the adverb “cheerfully” to indicate the tone of Nick’s retort, “Don’t be a fool.” Kashkeen translates the retort into a Russian colloquialism that is inherently charged with mirth: “Ne valyate duraka” (“Don’t roll the fool around”). A direct translation of Nick’s phrase could in no way sound cheerful in Russian. Addressing the lieutenant as a fool would earn Nick a bul-
let in the brain, even if he did say it smilingly.

Second, Kashkeen’s characters use idiomatic speech where Hemingway’s characters do not. While Hemingway’s Nick observes that “There was no one in the town at all,” Kashkeen’s Nick uses the popular phrase “V gorode nebilo nee dushi” (“In the town there was not a soul”). Hemingway’s Nick responds to the Lieutenant’s threat “If I thought you were a spy I would shoot you” with “Come on…. Let us go to the battalion.” In this original version, there seems to be little ambiguity regarding the tone of Nick’s “Come on.” The lieutenant makes him nervous and he seeks the safety of the battalion. Kashkeen substitutes a playful Russian colloquialism for Nick’s expression of urgency. While there is no adequate translation of “Da budyet vam,” the intonation and direction of the phrase closely resemble those of the American “Oh, go on!” Here, it is more likely that Kashkeen mistook Nick’s statement for an idiom than that he consciously augmented the intent of Nick’s expression.

When Nick explains that his business at the battalion is to display the American uniform, Para expresses a confused and somewhat concerned curiosity: “How odd.” Kashkeen alters the tone of Para’s remark by replacing it with the acerbic Russian phrase “Vot yeshcho vidumalyi” (similar to the English “what the hell were they thinking?”).

Furthermore, Kashkeen’s employment of Russian idioms often does not match in emphasis or connotation the ones used by Hemingway. Nick’s repetition of “bloody” in both his speech and his internal monologue reflects the frustration of an ebbing sanity. Hemingway deliberately has Nick repeat this one word, rather than a variety of expletives, to illustrate the dichotomy of the forced focus and the limited speech of a mind that lacks clarity. While this word does not lend itself to direct translation, Kashkeen seemingly ignores the tendentiousness of Hemingway’s repetition and offers a variety of Russian idioms in place of Nick’s singular and recurring expression. “Bloody politicians” becomes “poostobreh-meenistri” (“empty-bellied politicians”). “Bloody balls” becomes “chortavaya kasha” (“devil’s porridge”). “Bloody American uniform” becomes “proklyataya amerikanskaya forma” (“damned American uniform”). And the last occurrence of “bloody,” which appears when Nick advises Para to bury the dead or “You’ll all get bloody sick,” translates as “namayetes”—an old Russian term suggesting an unrelenting, tormenting struggle. A similar effect is produced by Kashkeen’s omission of the repeated “I should” in Nick’s explanation of the missing cigarettes, postal cards, and chocolate.
This last example illustrates an instance when Kashkeen conveys what a character means rather than what he says. Other instances of this interpretive liberty are evident throughout the translation. First, Kashkeen shifts the assignment of action in Nick’s description of the condition and position of the dead. In Hemingway’s version, the dead perform the action: “they showed, by their positions, the manner and skill of the attack.” The Russian translation transfers the action to the observer: “po eeh polozheniyo mozhno bilo soodeet, kak ee naskolhko umelo velas ataka” (“from their position, one could ascertain the manner and skill of the attack”).

Second, perhaps as a means of supplementing Hemingway’s scarcity of detail, Kashkeen supplies words for Hemingway’s intimations. This adjustment undermines the force of Hemingway’s controlled understatement. Kashkeen’s rendering of Nick’s journey to the battalion contains one salient instance of the translator’s interpretive liberty. Where Hemingway implies a slope (“where the road slanted down”), Kashkeen interpolates a mountain, “doroga ushla pod goru” (“the road went under a mountain”). Another instance, this one possibly a reflection of Socialist proclivity, occurs when Kashkeen substitutes the Russian idiom “oh hell” (translated exactly as “devil”) for Nick’s exclamation, “Christ.”

Many of these modifications might stem from Kashkeen’s early quarrel with Hemingway’s “affectedly clumsy” simplicity (90). Perhaps Kashkeen attempted to refine this awkwardness and present a more readable text to the Russian public. However, we cannot blame the translator too much. Since linguistic peculiarities are specific to the cultural considerations of language, translating this awkwardness in a manner consistent with its specific nuances must be an insurmountable difficulty.

Perhaps Kashkeen understood that this cultural and semantic disparity might hinder the Russian reader from accessing the appropriate undercurrents of the story. Through modification of tone and refinement of language, Kashkeen, ever so subtly, divulges more of the story than Hemingway does. The only problem is that with excessive augmentation the story ceases to be Hemingway’s.

Translation can never fully capture the texture of an original work, and criticism, by its very nature, contains a certain degree of subjectivity. However, in the Soviet Union these natural encumbrances were amplified by a mandated public ideology. We can hope that the social and political restructuring of Russia will foster a new wave of Hemingway criticism and translation. Until then, all that remains are the politics, stylistic predilections, value judgments, and attitudes of a nation that now seems long since gone.
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———. “What is Hemingway's Style.” Proffer 181-89.


Marxist Literary Theory: a Prolegomenon

TIMOTHY GILMORE

As far as introductory texts go, few can rival the pointedness and powerful economy of Terry Eagleton’s *Marxism and Literary Criticism*. The text offers a succinct exposition of the major concepts in Marxist theory, their historical foundations, and their relations and development. Eagleton maintains a constant call to praxis, imbuing the reader with the understanding that criticism is effete and academic if it does not raise social and political consciousness and communicate the need for change through action. As Marx said, “The reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to clarify its consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself, in explaining to it the meaning of its own actions” (Tucker 15). Eagleton never fails in contributing to this goal and in showing how literature and the proper criticism of it move humanity ever closer to self-consciousness and action. It is clear from start to finish that Eagleton never loses sight of the necessary link between theory and practice.

Having been greatly influenced by the argumentation of the book and the readily apparent coherency and concreteness of Marxist theory, I intend to explore in this paper several key aspects of Marxist theory as revealed in the text and to argue, using these aspects as initial ground of proof, for the supremacy and inclusiveness of Marxist literary theory. I do not intend to disparage other forms of literary criticism but show how Marxist criticism, owing to its inclusiveness of other critical modes, is ultimately the most productive, in terms of moving towards an encompassing understanding of a text, as well as effecting individual, social, and political transformation. My discussion will loosely follow Eagleton’s text but pause to elaborate on particular key aspects of Marxist theory.

 Fundamental to any understanding of Marx’s dialectical materialism is the relation between the economic base or infrastructure and the superstructure that is built upon the base and works reflexively to justify it. Althusser describes these cogently as “the infrastructure, or economic base (the ‘unity’ of the productive forces and the relations of production) and the superstructure, which itself contains two ‘levels’ or ‘instances’: the politico-legal (law and the State) and ideology (the different ideologies, religious, ethical, legal, political, etc.)” (Althusser 134). The productive forces and relations of production that consti-
tute the economic base at any particular historical moment are dependent for
their reproduction upon the superstructure that develops out of it on account of
the necessity to justify those specific forces and relations. Thus those who con-
trol state power utilize the state apparatuses, both repressive—such as the police
and courts—and ideological—such as education and communications—to
maintain power and ensure that the forces and relations of production are repro-
duced. There exists a dialectical relation between base and superstructure, where
the base creates the possibilities for the forms the superstructure may manifest
and where the specific content of these forms, on the other hand, works back
upon the base, justifying it and ensuring its continuance. It must be noted that
there is no simple, static, one-to-one correspondence between base and super-
structure; both contain various constituents that all evolve and respond to the
dynamic historical process at various rates, never forming or stemming from a
unity, but rather from an interplay of difference.

The social consciousness of a people—their ideology—is one of the most
important constituents of the superstructure and as such is dictated by the eco-
nomic base. We are who we are due to the material conditions of our lives. As
Marx pointed out, “Production … not only creates an object for the subject, but
also a subject for the object” (Eagleton 70). We are therefore not free to think
and act as we wish but are constrained by our ideology, which is the ideology of
the ruling class in society. Thus, if one does not belong to that class, one is being
repressed and controlled by one’s ideology.

The question inevitably arises as to what place art, and in particular litera-
ture, has within this dialectical interplay of base and superstructure. Art is a
form of communication and as communications is one of what Althusser calls
the ideological state apparatuses; art is involved in the ideological “instance” of
the superstructure. But in what way is it involved in ideology and what function
does it perform as ideology?

In order to answer the former part of this question, it is necessary to point out
that while art communicates something to people, it cannot be reduced to the
same status as popular mass media forms of communication. These latter forms
of communication play into and take advantage of the escapist desires of the
people, delivering them material to be thoughtlessly absorbed and by which
they are ideologically “interpellated,” or made into a specific type of subject.
The viewer or recipient of such communications takes a passive role in the
process of communication and thus loses any opportunity given to render
opaque to consciousness the ideology that is being disseminated. The ideology
thus remains transparent (unable to be seen) to the recipient or subject that it
works to constitute. In fact, this transparency of ideology is what renders it effective. The subject, unknowingly interpellated by an ideologically specific set of socio-cultural value relations and norms, participates in the justification and further dissemination of ideology through his unconsciousness of it—thus the importance for Marx of waking the subject from his dream of himself and bringing the truth of his situation to consciousness.

It is the province of art to act as such a stimulus of awakening. Art, or specifically literature, may not be simply reduced to ideology. Literature, as a part of ideology, participates in the superstructural dialectical interplay with the infrastructure; yet because of its relationship with ideology, it retains a relative autonomy from the economic base, as well as an internal distance from ideology. In order fully to understand a work of literature, one may not simply view it as a direct expression of a specific ideology stemming from a specific mode of production. Rather, one must unearth all the complex conjunctions between the various elements that work toward the constitution of the literary work, such as the class position of the author, ideological forms and their relation to literary forms, the techniques of literary production of the time, the prevalent philosophical and spiritual beliefs and so on (Eagleton 16).

The fact that we may do such an analysis of a literary work and that the work indeed promotes such analysis begins to answer our question of the relation of art to ideology and its function within ideology. For that which separates art from popular mass media is the fact that art provokes the subject into reflection rather than somnambulism. Art so relates to ideology that it gives us the feeling, “makes us ‘perceive’ (but not know) in some sense from the inside, by an internal distance, the very ideology in which [we] are held” (Althusser 223). Thus, taking Althusser’s statement, we may describe literature’s relation to ideology as that of both vehicle for the dissemination of ideology and also, by its distancing effect upon the reader, as exposer of ideology. At the same time that literature participates and furthers the transparent indoctrination of ideology, it is also making ideology more opaque. It does this by engendering within the reader an experience or feeling of the ideology, the way of life, depicted in the work. This experience does not give the reader knowledge of the ideology in a scientific, conceptual sense, but opens the door to knowledge for the reader, who, having experienced from the inside the ideology of the work, may now not only investigate that ideology, but even awaken to his own ideologically constructed situation and thus begin the arduous process of bringing it into the light of understanding. The latent revolutionary function of literature, and more broadly of art, within ideology is then to force the subject into experiencing ideology in
a less transparent, automatonic manner, to awaken the subject from his dream of himself and bring the truth of his situation to consciousness. The goal of Marxist criticism is to make explicit, with scientific rigor, the ideology that the work allows one to perceive. This project is similar to and may be further elucidated by the hermeneutics of Hans Georg Gadamer, who says: “Methodologically conscious understanding will be concerned not merely to form anticipatory ideas, but to make them conscious, so as to check them and thus acquire right understanding from the things themselves. This is what Heidegger means when he talks about ‘securing’ our scientific theme by deriving our fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conceptions from the things themselves” (Gadamer 239). In other words, we must not remain content with thinking as we have been ideologically programmed; rather, we must make the prejudices we bring to the text (and the world) conscious so that we may respond more fully to that which speaks from and through the text, namely the ideology of the writer’s historical moment and all that relates to it in terms of base-superstructure theory.

In order to accomplish the task of Marxist critique, it is essential that one grasp “the work as a formal structure” (Eagleton 19). It is in the theory of the form-content relation that the greatest achievement of Marxist critique lies. Throughout history thinkers have attempted to understand art in terms of the ostensible dichotomy between form and content but have always erred in placing emphasis on one side of the equation over the other. The reason for this error invariably stemmed from their stances toward larger epistemological issues. Plato, the first great idealist philosopher, placed all truth within the realm of the Forms and thus denigrated appearances as illusory, owing to their specificity of content, which kept them from attaining pure Form. Art, being imitation of appearance, was thus banished from his ideal republic because of its distance from and propensity to lead away from truth in the Forms. Aristotle, a staunch materialist, erred in the opposite direction by placing the forms within the things themselves, not to be disjoined, which in itself is not problematic, but he focused mainly upon content, viewing form as a scaffolding that was secondary in importance. We even see this debate still raging into the modern period, with thinkers such as Locke positing a substance, something we know not what, that is the underlying form of a thing, in which its primary qualities, such as height, length and such, inhere objectively. Berkeley countered this position by pointing out that if we may know primary qualities only through secondary qualities, such as color, roughness and the like, then we cannot attain direct knowledge of this pure form or substance but are privy only to the content of our subjective experience.
Not until Hegel did the true dialectical nature of the form-content relation become properly understood. Hegel understood that the relation between form and content develops dialectically through time. This means that neither has absolute priority over the other, but rather the relation between the two shifts dynamically through the diachronic aspect of time. At any synchronic moment one may have precedence over the other as a result of specific historical conditions, but the relation is always subject to change and development. Unfortunately, Hegel saw this dialectical relation as an abstract process unfolding in the Absolute Spirit or Mind. Marx took Hegel’s idealist construction of this dialectic and applied it concretely to material reality. Whereas Hegel saw this dialectic as part of the process of the self-realization of Absolute Spirit, Marx cast off the absolute and saw the dialectic in a more practical, concrete manner.

For Marx, form was not an abstract, artistic term, but rather a necessary concomitant of the concrete historical, economic content. For the Marxist, the content has primacy over the form, as form is the “working out of content in the realm of the superstructure” (Eagleton 22). But this is not to say that content is prior to or more important than form, for “form reacts on content and never remains passive” (Eagleton 23) and “does not merely process the raw material of ‘content,’ because that content ... is ... already informed” (Eagleton 23-24). By viewing the relation historically, the problem of priority is solved because in order to have a static relation of priority, of precedence, there must be an unhistorical reification and separation of the concepts involved, which allows one concept to be ideally placed in a position of priority over the other, such as may be seen in Plato’s eternalization of form. This is not to say that there are never times when either form or content takes precedence over the other in varying degrees, only that such priorities are historically determined and never stable. Dialectical materialism, by doing away with unhistorical and ideal modes of viewing concepts and their relations, reveals the true historical dynamic and interpenetration of form and content.

The form-content relation of literature resembles that of the base-superstructure. Literary forms arise as a result of specific, concrete, historical conditions (content) and may only arise when they do. After a literary form comes into play, it may lose dominance within the literary community of production because of changes in historical conditions and the development of newer forms, yet it will always remain to interplay with new and old forms, influencing the newer forms which arise. Form is ideological in that it stems from the changing ideological superstructure, but as stated previously, literature maintains a relative autonomy from ideology, in that form need not change in a one-to-one rela-
tionship with the changes of ideology. Rather, the persistence and sublation of old forms within new forms creates an internal tempo of change within literary form that may not be reduced to a mere symmetry with or subservience to ideology. “Form,” Eagleton suggests, “is always a complex unity of at least three elements: it is partly shaped by a ‘relatively autonomous’ literary history of forms; it crystallizes out of certain dominant ideological structures … and … it embodies a specific set of relations between author and audience” (Eagleton 26). Thus form is a complex dialectical unity that circumscribes the possibilities available to the author for production even as it creates them. Edmund Spenser could not have written *The Faerie Queene* as a novel because the audience of his time, being aristocratic, expected the epic form; in addition, other material and ideological conditions were not in place for the novel form, which originated as the form of the bourgeois class, of bourgeois values.

It is the task of the Marxist critic to investigate the manner in which forms relate to content and thus uncover the ways in which literary texts participate in the concrete historical conditions of which they are a part. He or she will investigate a particular form and show how and why it does what it does and is the way that it is. Lukács, for example, explored the nineteenth-century realist novel in order to show how its form related to its content. For him, the realist form of the nineteenth-century novel, because of its attention to detail, which exposed the complex relations between man, nature, and history, perfectly performed the task of revealing the typicality of the period and thus of making the historical specificity of the prevailing social and economic relations and norms breathe. Lukács viewed the realist novel as a structured totality that synthesized the various conflicting aspects of the historical period and, by bringing them into relation, harmonized them. His emphasis upon the priority of realism contributed to the rise of ‘socialist realism’ under Stalin—which went directly contrary to the democratic views of art held by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky—by condemning all art that did not conform to the goal of promoting the proletarian cause. Acceptable art under ‘socialist realism’ were depictions of smokestacks, happy peasants producing for the common good on collectivized farms, and descriptions of the joys of factory work. While Lukács did promote ‘socialist realism,’ he also criticized much of its products, yet he made a fetish out of realism and idealized it into a utopian form, which was highly undialectical and unhistorical. He was attacked by various people for this, most notably Pierre Macherey and Bertolt Brecht, both of whom contributed to a deeper understanding of the Marxist conception of form.

Macherey attacked the notion of Lukács’s that the work “is a constructed
totality rather than a natural organism” (Eagleton 34). For Macherey, ideology speaks not so much through what the text says, but rather through the gaps in the text, through what is left unsaid. He points out that the writer is constrained by the transparency of the ideology within which he writes and is thus unable to make that ideology explicit; rather, the ideology is implicit in the text as the omissions and silences that it forces upon him. The critic must then make these absences within the text speak in order to reveal its ideological content. Because of these gaps and silences within the text, the text must be understood as always incomplete rather than structured and harmonious. In fact, the text is a decentered structure that gains its significance from the contradictions, conflicts, and dispersals of meaning. It would seem that Macherey has a more Marxist, dialectical understanding of form and content than Lukács, because while Lukács sees form and content unifying into a harmonious, symmetrical unity, Macherey stays true to the non-symmetrical, complex interplay of form and content that can only be understood as a constant conflict or struggle towards a unity that may never be achieved, given the temporal nature of the dialectic and the limitations of the writer within this process.

Whereas Macherey attacked Lukács’s ideas of what the literary text is formally, Brecht criticized the ideas of Lukács on what the text does and how it relates to an audience. Following up on Walter Benjamin’s ideas that art forms and new media must be revolutionized in order that they may be used to change society, Brecht attacked Lukács’s idealizing of one historically specific form over all others. Whereas Lukács had attacked Modernist expressionism “as decadently formalistic” (Eagleton 71), Brecht saw these new art forms as perfectly suited to the times in which he lived, where the feeling of alienation bred by capitalism was pervasive. Along with Benjamin, Brecht utilized this understanding to create a theater that engendered an alienation effect within the audience in order to shock them out of complacent absorption into the illusion of not only bourgeois theater but bourgeois culture as well. Brecht viewed Lukács’s notion that the literary work is a “spontaneous whole’ which reconciles the capitalist contradictions between essence and appearance, concrete and abstract, individual and social whole” creating “wholeness and harmony” (Eagleton 70), as a participation in and promotion of the hegemonic illusions of capitalism. The artist and his art should rather reveal these internal contradictions of capitalism for what they are, thus inciting people to work toward effecting change in real life. Brecht’s work shows that the prevailing social relations and artistic forms are altered by the artistic modes of production and, as a good Marxist, he understands what Lukács does not: that one must not hold onto and idealize one form, but rather
utilize the forms available to rework the system from the inside, raising con-
sciousness and awakening the subject from his dream, rather than lulling him
further into sleep with utopian dreams of reconciliation and harmony. Brecht
does not reject realism, only the idea of realism as an absolutized, atemporal
genre; he views realism as “a kind of art which discovers social laws and devel-
opments, and unmasks prevailing ideologies by adopting the standpoint of the
class which offers the broadest solution to social problems” (Eagleton 72). Thus,
art need not be rigorously realistic in detail in order to be realism, for even fan-
tasy and expressionist forms may reveal ideology and social relations. In fact, it
would be absurd to think that works such as The Metamorphosis and The Castle
did not do so, or did so less effectively than Cousin Bette.

It is due in part to this profound understanding of form and content that
Marxist theory and literary criticism gains supremacy over other forms of criti-
cism. Other schools of criticism focus upon one aspect or the other, not
necessarily to the exclusion of one, but always placing priority upon one side of
the dialectical relation, thus disrupting it. For example, Formalism, as an obvious
case, makes the form of the work into the heart of the matter and only looks at
content insofar as it contributes to the organic harmony of form. Reader
Response theory, on the other hand, tends to give a preponderance of attention
to the subjective content of the reader's mind, often denying that the text has
any formal existence independent of the reader. Similar examples of varying
degrees of force may be found in other schools of criticism. It is only Marxism
that fully understands the complex relation of form and content within the text,
but more importantly it is only Marxism that fully understands the relation of
the text to the social world and its economic underpinnings.

It is here that Marxism gains the full right to be considered supreme in its
inclusivity of all other critical modes. No other critical method understands the
text in terms of all the factors that it is involved with. Psychoanalytic theory
looks at the text as an expression or repository of the author's and reader's psy-
chic manifestations; Formalism looks at it as an organic unity divorced from any
external factors; Reader Response views it as a creation of a reader's interpretive
strategy; Myth criticism looks at it as a displacement of myth and as an object to
be schematized according to mythological structure; Structuralism and
Linguistic theories attempt to find either the linguistic structure of the text or, as
in Deconstruction, the lack thereof. All of these theories take the text and focus
on one specific aspect, absolutize their position, and view all other critical modes
as derivatory. Only Marxist criticism attempts to see the text in the concreteness
of its historical and economic specificity. In order to do so, it may look at the psy-
chological manifestations of the writer and how they are the result of his historical situation and ideology; or the formal unity of the text and how that unity is a result of a specific historical literary form, stemming from specific economic and social forces; or the subjective content of the reader's experience and how that is a construct of his ideological interpellation and social participation within certain interpretive communities, with specific relations and norms derived from the economic relations and forces in which they participate; or the mythological content of the text and how that content is a part of the ideology of a specific time period displaced to suit the needs of another time; or the linguistic content and structure of the text and how it breaks down under scrutiny into a play of signifiers, dispersing meaning in an endless chain of differance, which is ultimately a subversive tactic, undermining the hierarchies of the capitalist hegemonic order. Or it may view the text using all of these lenses, and then go on to show how the text is a commodity that was produced as a part of the economic base in order to earn money for the writer or prestige for the sonneteer within the court and how the text is a call to action that awakens the reader from his dream of himself and urges him to work toward changing the world. Marxist criticism is supreme because it is not just another approach to the text, but rather the inclusive underpinning of all approaches to a text.

Marxist criticism is by far the most productive of all modes of literary criticism and as such demands a lot of the critic. It is the province of the critic to act as intermediary between artist and audience, to be himself both artist and audience at once in the act of criticism, and engender understanding within both himself and his audience through the activity of opening up the text in all its complexity of meaning and significance, both in relation to its internal form-content dialectic and its external participation in a concrete, historical, base-superstructure dialectic. The literary critic must resolve to engage in “the work of our time to clarify to itself … the meaning of its own struggle and its own desires” (Tucker 15).

Notes

1. This essay is the product of the author's first encounter with the topic and as such is subject to the errors of zealous exuberance. As the title suggests, the essay is meant as a point of entry to be progressively moved beyond.

2. For an excellent example of this type of criticism see Laura Brown's "Reading Race and Gender: Jonathan Swift."
Works Cited


News and Notes

In this column, we feature news from current and recent graduate students: honors, achievements, publications, conference papers, progress in Ph.D. programs, and other news. Please submit your news to the editors.

1. Six recent recipients of our M.A. continue their progress in Ph.D. programs: Eileen Abrahams at the University of Texas at Austin, Lynne Crockett at New York University, Debbie DePiero at the University of Rhode Island, Christopher Hartley at Fordham University, John Langan at City University of New York, and Sharon Peelor at the University of Oklahoma.

2. Tina Iraca Green, recent graduate of our M.A. program and current Adjunct Instructor of English, has been accepted, with a Teaching Assistantship, by the doctoral program in English at the University of Connecticut. As we go to press, she has not yet made her decision.

3. Cristy Woehling, current Teaching Assistant at New Paltz, has been accepted, with financial support, by three doctoral programs and is leaning, as we go to press, toward Miami University of Ohio.

4. New Paltz graduate students, and recent recipients of the MA, continue their extraordinary track record of scholarly presentations at conferences. Since the publication of our last issue: Christopher Carolei, Jane Dionne, David Fish, Steven Florczyk, Tina Iraca Green, Adam Romano, Jenica Shapiro, Michael Smith, Christopher Tanis, and Dennis Winter read papers at the Third Annual Elizabeth Madox Roberts Society Conference at St. Catharine College, Kentucky (April 2001); Jenica Shapiro was a panel member at the Arts Now Conference, New Paltz (September 2001); Breida Gallagher read a paper at the Elizabeth Madox Roberts Symposium, Westfield State College, Massachusetts (September 2001); David Fish and Christopher Tanis read papers at the Beats Attitude Conference, University of Lowell (October 2001); Kevin Cavanaugh, Radmila Genyuk, and Cristy Woehling read papers at the Conference on College Composition and Communication in Chicago (March 2002). Students should please submit, at the end of each year, a complete list with date, place, and title of conference presentations, and we will print them in future issues.
5. The Fourth Annual Elizabeth Madox Roberts Conference will again be held at St. Catharine College in April, and once again many New Paltz graduate students will be participating. Conference Directors are John Langan and H. R. Stoneback.

6. Five graduate students or recent recipients of the M.A.—Lawrence Beemer, Mark Bellomo, Jane Dionne, Radmila Genyuk, and Dennis Winter—have had papers accepted for the highly competitive and prestigious X International Hemingway Conference in Stresa, Italy (July 2-8, 2002).


8. The Editors would also like to announce the Russell S. Cleverley Memorial Fellowship, established by Luella and Donald Cleverley in memory of their son Russell S. Cleverly, who earned his Master’s degree in English from SUNY New Paltz, and wrote a Master’s thesis on Hemingway. Russell lost his life in a tragic drowning accident in the spring of 1998.

The Cleverley Fellowship is open to students matriculated in the SUNY New Paltz M.A. program. The award for 2002-2003 will be $1000. To be eligible, the applicant must have a 3.5 GPA and be registered for 41590, Thesis in English, during the award semester (either Fall 2002 or Spring 2003). Please submit a letter of application, the thesis proposal signed by the thesis director, and two letters of recommendation (one from the thesis director) to Prof. Thomas G. Olsen, Acting Director of Graduate Studies. Applications are due by May 1, 2002 for the 2002-2003 academic year. Preference will be given to applicants not otherwise supported by New Paltz during the award semester.
As the journal of the English Graduate Program, *Shawangunk Review* publishes the proceedings of the Annual Graduate Symposium. In addition, the editors welcome submissions from any graduate student in English concerning any area of literary studies: essays, explications, book reviews, and scholarly notes and queries. English graduate students and faculty are invited to submit poetry and translations of poetry, and faculty members are invited to submit book reviews and scholarly notes and queries.

**Manuscripts** should be original material on literary biography, history, theory and methods, analysis and interpretation, and critical syntheses that may emerge from courses or seminars taken at the college. Manuscripts should be prepared in the preferred style published by the Modern Language Association in its *MLA Handbook*. All manuscripts should include an abstract of 50 words or less and biographical information of four to six lines that indicates the author’s professional, research, and literary interests. Please submit three copies.

**Book reviews** are invited that relate to specific courses or to literary interests having general appeal to the graduate student body. Book reviews should be scholarly in orientation and approximately 1,000 to 1,500 words in length. Please submit two copies.

**Original poetry or translations** of one to five pages may also be submitted for consideration. Please submit two copies.

**Abstracts of M.A. Theses** should be approximately 150 words in length. Degree candidates who have completed (or are nearing completion of) an MA thesis are encouraged to consult with their advisors in preparing an abstract. Please submit two copies.

**Letters to the editor** are invited to promote scholarly discussion and debate.

The deadline for all submissions is December 15, 2002. Manuscripts and other submissions should be accompanied by a diskette containing the word processor file and sent to *Shawangunk Review*, Department of English, State University of New York, New Paltz, New York, 12561.
Catherine Aldington (see introduction preceding poems, page 63)

Nancy Armstrong is the Nancy Duke Lewis Professor of Comparative Literature, English, Modern Culture and Media, and Women’s Studies, at Brown University, where she is also Chairperson of the English Department. Professor Armstrong is the author of Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (Oxford University Press, 1987), Fiction in the Age of Photography: The Legacy of British Realism (Harvard University Press, 1999), and co-author, with Leonard Tennenhouse, of The Imaginary Puritan: Literature, Intellectual Labor, and the Origins of Personal Life (University of California Press, 1992). She has edited several collections, anthologies, and special issues of journals, and she has published numerous articles.

Lawrence Beemer will soon complete his M.A. in English at SUNY New Paltz, where he has taught both as a Teaching Assistant and an Adjunct. He has delivered papers at the Graduate Symposium at SUNY New Paltz (2000), Convivium at Siena College (2000), and the Ninth Annual International Hemingway Conference (Bimini), and he will be presenting a paper this July at the Tenth Annual International Hemingway Conference (Stresa, Italy). This is the second of his articles to appear in the Shawangunk Review.

Kevin Cavanaugh completed his B.A. in English at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is in the third year of his M.A. program at SUNY New Paltz and expects to graduate in May 2002. Kevin has been teaching for the English Department at SUNY New Paltz as a Teaching Assistant and for Mount St. Mary College in Newburgh as an adjunct. He presented papers at the Conference on College Composition and Communication in Denver (March 2001) and in Chicago (March 2002). His article on Shakespeare’s The Tempest appeared in the Spring 2001 issue of the Shawangunk Review.

Rebecca Cummings is a student in the M.A. program at SUNY New Paltz and a Teaching Assistant in English. She plans on pursuing her Ph.D. in early American literature after graduating in Spring 2003.

Dennis Doherty is a former TA in English who holds the New Paltz M.A. in English. Currently a Creative Writing Instructor in English, he is a widely published poet.
DAVID FISH received his B.A. from SUNY New Paltz in 1999. He is currently a Teaching Assistant in English at New Paltz and expects to finish his M.A. by December 2002. He has presented papers at the Beats Attitude Conference, University of Lowell (October 2001), and at the Third Annual Elizabeth Madox Roberts Conference, St. Catharine College (April 2001). He published a poem, “90 Feet Away From You,” in last year’s Shawangunk Review.

RADMILA GENYUK earned her B.A. in English/Secondary Education at SUNY New Paltz. Currently, she is an M.A. candidate at New Paltz and a teaching Assistant for the English department. This summer, she will present a version of the article collected herein at the Tenth Annual International Hemingway Conference in Stresa, Italy.

TIMOTHY GILMORE completed a B.A. in English and a B.A. in Philosophy at SUNY New Paltz and was awarded the “Outstanding Graduate in the Philosophy Department Award” in May 1999. He is currently in his second year of the M.A. program in English at New Paltz, where he is also a Teaching Assistant.

TINA IRACA GREEN earned her B.A. and M.A. in English at SUNY New Paltz. She graduated in May 2001, at which time she was honored with the “Outstanding M.A. in English Award.” Tina is currently teaching Freshman Composition at SUNY New Paltz and at Marist College in Poughkeepsie. She is also employed as a development consultant for the St. Cabrini Home. Tina has published articles in The Elizabeth Madox Roberts Society Newsletter, as well as in the Hudson Valley Magazine, The Poughkeepsie Journal, The Times-Herald Record (Middletown), The Legislative Gazette and other local publications.

JENNIFER KAUFMAN holds a B.A. in English and a B.A. in History (with a minor in Women’s Studies) from the Pennsylvania State University. She also completed an M.A., with Distinction, in Nineteenth-Century Literature from the University of London, King’s College. Jennifer is currently enrolled in the M.A. program in English at SUNY New Paltz, where she has also worked as a Teaching Assistant.

ROBERT SINGLETON (M.A. New Paltz) is a Ph.D. candidate at New York University, Adjunct Professor of English at New Paltz, and a widely published poet.

H.R. STONEBACK is Professor of English and Director of Graduate Studies at New Paltz, a leading
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